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PREFACE 
RELIGION W A S T H E CHIEF M O T I V A T I N G F O R C E in the social, 
and perhaps in the political, history of western Arabia in the nine­
teenth century. Secularizing European reforms had little impact in 
the period between 1840, w h e  n Egypt withdrew from the Hijaz and 
the Ottomans reoccupied it, and 1908, w h e n the future leader of 
the Arab Revolt of 1916 became amir of Mecca. 
Thefirst pupose of this book is to examine the social and po­
litical expressions of religion as seen in the region of Mecca, Jidda, 
and Medina in order to establish the shape of h u m a n experience 
in a setting dedicated to the transcendental. In this milieu where 
Islam originated, it was at its most intense, for m u c h of life was 
determined by it. In a continuum based upon religious versus sec­
ular values in society, the Hijaz was at the religious end. Others 
have studied Middle Eastern societies dominated in the nineteenth 
century by secularizers and dedicated to the restriction of the place 
of religion in social activity and politics to a minor role. I hope to 
present a picture of a society and its political structures in a chron­
ological setting and geographical area that was unique but that 
nevertheless can be useful for a deeper understanding of the Is­
lamic faith in both the past and present. 
Second, I hope to illuminate the nature of Ottoman imperial 
rule in its Arab provinces in the last decades of its existence and, 
in the process, shed s o m e light on a major alternative to national­
ism. The Ottoman Empire succumbed to secular, ethnic national­
ism and to the armed might of the Entente Powers in World W a r I. 
Yet if nineteenth-century Middle Eastern history is seen solely as a 
prelude to the growth of twentieth-century nationalisms, the posi­
tive aspects of the Ottoman Empire m a y be ignored. In its central 
Arab lands, Ottoman provincial administration endured for four 
centuries despite increasing external attacks, decentralization, de­
population, and economic decay. Ottoman rule had supporters 
and provided s o m e benefits. The other side of the coin of modern 
nationalism in the Middle East is the history of the prior successful 
functioning of Ottoman institutions. T o understand either the final 
collapse of the empire or its long existence necessitates analyses 
of the empire with attention both to the failings and to the suc­
cesses of Ottoman rule. T o date, most studies of Ottoman history 
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that have dealt with provincial governments have not linked suc­
cess with failure, or they have been so colored by nationalist prej­
udice as to be nearly useless. 
Modern nationalism has been the major cause of two world 
wars and most of the extraordinary suffering and brutality that have 
afflicted the twentieth century. The pro-nationalist views of Arab, 
Turkish, and Western historians have denigrated Ottoman rule 
and, by implication, its anti-national policies and religious loyal­
ties. However, once again in the Middle East the possibility of large 
political units being organized on religious rather than national 
lines is being raised. The lessons of the past m a y be useful to those 
engaged in analyzing this resurgence of Islam. 
Although the Hijaz was both the birthplace of Arab political 
independence and the religious center of the Muslim world, its 
political history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is 
nearly unknown. Trying to reconstruct the history of the Hijaz 
brings to mind the fable of the blind seers and the elephant: each 
perceives a different kind of being depending upon the informa­
tion available to him. The rare Christian traveler w h  o managed to 
evade local authorities saw the holy cities during the pilgrimage as 
religious centers; European consuls, w h o were restricted to Jidda, 
k n e  w merchants engaged in international trade; chroniclers and 
later Arab nationalists concentrated on the rulers of Mecca from the 
point of view of their later leadership of the Arab Revolt in 1916. If 
the Hijaz in the modern period is to be properly understood, these 
facets must be combined and two missing ingredients added: the 
Ottoman part in Hijazi history and the religious, social, economic, 
and health aspects of the life of the Hijaz. It is, however, easier to 
prescribe such an approach than to follow it, particularly for a non-
Muslim w h  o is not able to visit Mecca and Medina. Also, though 
Ottoman records provide a rich source of information, they have 
been difficult of access and poorly organized until recently. 
I have not yet been able to locate the court records of Mecca, 
Medina, and Jidda. Until these records are located, m u c h of the 
social, legal, and economic history of the Hijaz must remain un­
known. Nor have I been able to use the manuscripts by Arifi Bey 
cited by Ehud Toledano in his recent work on slavery. The Egyp­
tian archives have not been consulted for this work; they undoubt­
edly will be found to have m u c h useful material that m a y alter 
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m a n y of the conclusions of this book. The information contained 
in the tables in chapters 3 and 5 was compiled from extremely scat­
tered British and French consular reports; I have not found official 
Ottoman information on these subjects. 
Despite these gaps, this book does, for thefirst time, examine 
the religion, society, and politics of the nineteenth-century Hijaz in 
their mutual interactions. At present, comparisons between the Hi­
jaz and other Ottoman-Arab provinces in the nineteenth century 
are not likely, in most cases, to be productive because political his­
tory and social, economic, and religious historical studies have not 
been fully integrated. Charles Issawi's An Economic History of the 
Middle East and North Africa ( N e w York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982) provides an extremely valuable framework for begin­
ning such comparisons. Unfortunately, this study was completed 
before Issawi's appeared. 
The useful works of de Gaury, Uzuncharshili, and Al-Amr deal 
respectively with the political happenings, Ottoman-Hijazi rela­
tions, and the British role in the Hijaz. N o n e of the authors exam­
ines religion in detail, and none integrates social and economic 
history with political history. A m o n  g other authors there has been 
an unfortunate tendency to generalize about the history of the Hi­
jaz and to ignore the real changes taking place there in the rela­
tionship between religion and society. E d w a r d Said has 
sarcastically, but accurately, summarized m a n y of the secondary 
works dealing with the Hijaz: 
Arabia has been an especially privileged place for the Orientalist, 
not only because Muslims treat Arabia as Islam's genius loci, but also 
because the Hejaz appears historically as barren and retarded as it is 
geographically; the Arabian desert is thus considered to be a locale 
about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the 
same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding 
the present. In the Hejaz you can speak about Muslims, modern Islam, 
and primitive Islam without bothering to mak  e distinctions.1 
Transliteration from Arabic and Ottoman poses m a n y prob­
lems. Individuals' names and most terms are transliterated accord­
ing to the system used in Arabian Studies, the 'ayn is not shown, 
and all diacritical marks are dropped. Modern Turkish spelling has 
been employed for Ottoman, except that "sh" and "ch" are used, 
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all "i"s are dotted, and the "o" and "u" are used for both types of 
Turkish "o" and "u." Authors' transliterations of their o w n names 
have been retained. 
All foreign m o n e  y has been stated in terms of its value in Ot­
toman m o n e y of the time. The Ottoman pound (T. L ) has been 
assumed to have been worth 100 kurush, although the actual worth 
varied. Conversion of dates has been m a d  e according to Faik U n  ­
at's Hicri Tarihleri Milade Tarihe Chevirme Kilavuzu (Ankara, 
1974). 
I wish to thank the editors and publishers of Middle Eastern 
Studies and Arabian Studies for permission to reprint here in a re­
vised form articles that originally appeared in those journals. 
A number of people have assisted m  e at various stages in the 
preparation of this work. Yusuf Ibish was particularly kind in allow­
ing m  e to m a k  e copies of documents relating to the nineteenth-
century pilgrimage. Saleh M u h a m m a  d al-Amr, Marwan Buheiry, 
David Burr, Laverne Kuhnke, Donald Lach, George Rentz, Rachel 
Simon, Richard Verdery, and R. Bayly Winder have been of help 
through discussions, references, and criticisms. The staffs of the 
Bashbakanlik Arshivi in Istanbul, the Public Record Office in Lon­
don, and the French Foreign Ministry in Paris were generous in 
their time and assistance. M  y reading in the masterful works of Fer­
nand Braudel has shaped this study in m a n  y ways. 
A major debt of gratitude is o w e  d to Daniel Bradburd and 
Larry Shumsky for reading this work in manuscript form and mak­
ing m a n y useful suggestions. George Hayhoe helped improve style 
and organization immensely thanks to his detailed comments. 
I have had the benefit of financial aid from the American Re­
search Institute in Turkey, the Faculty Research Abroad program of 
the U.S. Office of Education, and the Social Science Research Coun­
cil. The Department of History of Virginia Polytechnic Institute has 
provided m  e with released time from teaching duties and diverse 
and appreciated additional help. Patty Mills, Lisa Donis, Teresa 
Phipps, and Rennie Givens showed remarkable patience while 
preparing a difficult manuscript for publication. Mark Rehn com­
piled the maps. Robert Sergeant and Robin Bidwell of the Middle 
East Centre of the University of Cambridge extended to m  e their 
kind hospitality and the use of the Centre's library during 1979-80. 
I a  m extremely grateful to them. 
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Manyfriends have provided m  e with the support so vital to 
such a long-term undertaking. Most important of all was Alan Dean, 
whose help and encouragement over the years has enabled m e to 
finish this book, which I dedicate to him. 
1. Edward Said, Orientalism, p. 235. 
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PART ONE 
THE RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OFTHEHIJAZ 

INTRODUCTION 
RELIGION, THE OTTOMANS, AND THE HUAZ 
IT IS N O  W A R G U A B L E that the single most important determining 
factor in the political and social history of the moder  n Middle East 
has been religion. Personal identity, political power, military effec­
tiveness, the shape and content of social institutions, and the re­
actions of the Middle East to imperialism have all been greatly 
molded by religious values. Secularizing modernizers in m u c h of 
the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at­
tempted to denigrate the social and political importance of reli­
gion and to limit its sphere of action to personal belief. The ruling 
elite's secularism concealed the opposition by the masses of the 
population to modernization conceived as the transformation of 
the Middle East on European models into secular nation states. 
However, beneath the reformism of the capital city bureaucrats and 
the n e w ethnic nationalism of the army officers, the peasantry, the 
nomads , and most of the townspeople continued to place a higher 
value upon the religious beliefs of preceding generations than 
upon the n e w imported ideas. O n the other hand, the environ­
ment, the economy, and the desire for power continued to be fac­
tors in influencing events, as was the use of religion by the cynical 
to motivate the pious. Although religion formed and determined 
aspects of politics and society, politics was equally determined by 
raison d'etat, personal ambition, the idea of monarchy, and the de­
sire for the conservation and perpetuation of the existing order. 
T o see if this actually was the case, it is necessary to test the 
centrality of religion in ultimately determining political actions 
and in shaping social attitudes and behavior. The history of the 
Ottoman Empire is particularly useful for this purpose, for that e m ­
pire's politics was based upon a mixture of religion and dynastic 
loyalty. This state spanned parts of three continents and six 
hundred years of military victory and defeat, growth and decay, in­
stitutional innovation and rigidity. It began in the thirteenth cen­
tury in western Anatolia as a frontier state whose legitimacy c a m e 
from fighting Byzantine Christians in holy warfare. Eventually it led 
most of the western Turks and Arabs against the renascent power 
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of Christian Europe and conquered the Balkans for Islam. By the 
nineteenth century, however, its earlier flowering had ended, and 
it was no longer able successfully to defend Muslims from the in­
cursions of Christian Great Britain, France, and Russia. More and 
more of the Middle East fell under the direct or indirect control of 
external powers. Sections of the Ottoman ruling elite decided in 
the early nineteenth century that to defeat the armies of the Euro­
pean states the empire must transorm its government and military 
so as to more closely resemble those of its enemies. 
O  n balance, the military reforms of the Ottomans were unsuc­
cessful, since the empire's provinces were conquered and finally, 
following World W a r I, its very existence was lost. Civil changes 
were equally unsatisfactory, for though the central power of the 
state over its provinces was increased, the loyalty of the provincial 
populations was increasingly lost as ethnic nationalism, political 
liberalism, and European intervention weakened the emotional 
ties that had bound the people to the Ottoman sultans.1 
In the case of the Arabic-speaking lands, Ottoman rule had 
begun in the sixteenth century. Their distance from the agricultur­
ally richer European provinces and from the imperial capital of 
Istanbul created a tendency toward decentralization and local au­
tonomy. A m o n  g the Arab lands, the chief revenue-producing re­
gions were Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Hijaz in western Arabia was 
peripheral to the military and financial well-being of the state, but 
the religious prestige that accrued to the Ottomans from being the 
protectors of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was valuable to 
the dynasty. The annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina 
was sponsored and protected by the Ottoman central government 
and its provincial governors in Egypt and Syria. Insofar as the Ot­
toman sultans successfully portrayed themselves as the caliphs, or 
successors to the Prophet M u h a m m a d  , w h  o had lived in Mecca and 
Medina, they depended for legitimacy upon possession of the Hi­
jaz. Their authority within the Hijaz was reinforced by this claim, 
though they had little right to m a k  e it. 
If there ever were a society that one would expect to be totally 
dependent upon religion, it was that of the Ottoman Hijaz. It had 
little agriculture, a precarious nomadic sector that lived outside the 
towns, and few natural resources. The extreme dryness of most of 
the region, the extraordinary heat and humidity along the coast, 
the bleakness of the mountain chain that runs inland parallel to the 
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coast and that separates it from the dry interior—all combined to 
produce a great local poverty and a marked dependence upon ex­
ternal help. The four principal towns of Medina, Mecca, its port of 
Jidda, and its s u m m e  r resort of Taif found their livelihood in the 
pilgrimage. In all aspects of life, the Ottoman Hijaz presents an 
opportunity to examine what was an extreme case of the determi­
native role of religion in politics and society. 
The most important aspect by far of the religious experience 
of mankind in the Hijaz, that of direct contact with G o d , lies out­
side the scope of this study. Both prophetic experiences and those 
subsequent generations w h  o empathically venerated t h e m 
through the worship of the divine have been the subjects of m a n y 
studies by participants as well as outsiders. What has been missing 
has been a study of the secular consequences of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. T  o study the political history and society of the Hijaz while 
not describing the holy places or the rituals of the pilgrimage m a  y 
seem to trivialize Islam or to denigrate it by overly associating it 
with secular factors. However, religious experiences must take 
place in a concrete setting. Islam's validity was not necessarily af­
fected by the actions of its believers at any specific time or place. 
The consequences of political actions and social institutions 
for religion can be profound. If it should be shown in the case of 
the Hijaz that religion had little real impact upon politics and so­
ciety or that politics and society determined the nature of religious 
expression, then it would be difficult to argue that religion was a 
strong and independent factor in geographical regions less ob­
viously influenced by religion than the Hijaz. 
HIJAZIS AND OTTOMANS 
The central government of the Ottoman Empire, even after 
the conquest of the Arab provinces, remained primarily in the 
hands of Turkish-speaking Sunni Muslim m e  n from Anatolia and 
Europe. In the Hijaz power was shared from the sixteenth century 
between Arab and Turkish Sunni Muslim m e n . The chief agents of 
the central government were the valis, or goverors, of Jidda and the 
qadis, or judges, of Mecca; the major Arab figures were the descen­
dants of the Prophet M u h a m m a  d w h  o inherited the title sharif, and 
particularly their leader, w h o was given by the Ottomans the title 
of amir, or prince. The Hashimite family of sharifs w h  o had ruled 
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Mecca for centuries before the Ottoman conquest thus continued 
to control it under Ottoman overlordship. A complex and ambigu­
ous relationship emerged between the two principles upon which 
the Ottomans and the amirs relied for legitimacy. The Ottomans 
had a religious justification for possessing power insofar as they 
defended and expanded Islam and in their carrying out the holy 
law. The Hashimites' legitimacy was entirely religious. Descent 
from the Prophet M u h a m m a d m a d e them venerated and powerful, 
even though the Quran specifically stated that nobility in the eyes 
of G o d was dependent upon fearing G o d and not upon descent.2 
The power balance between amir and valifluctuated accord­
ing to effective support from Istanbul; the absorption of the empire 
elsewhere; the personal weakness, strength, and longevity of the 
participants; popular support for the amir or vali; and the degree 
of dissent a m o n  g the amir's family. Sheer historical experience also 
carried weight. As the centuries passed, it seemed inconceivable to 
the Hijazis that they could ever operate outside the Ottoman sys­
tem of government; the Ottomans came to feel that their local rule 
was based upon the amirs. Therefore the Arab political elite oper­
ated within the constraints of the Ottoman way of life and them­
selves became, to a degree, Ottomanized in language and style of 
life. The Ottoman sultan and his vali wanted chiefly two things: an 
amir w h  o could maintain order so as to protect the pilgrims and 
acknowledgment of Ottoman overlordship. If these were present, 
the Ottomans would financially and militarily support the prince 
of Mecca. In return, the amir desired chiefly local autonomy, pre­
sents, and protection from external attack. The sultan and amir dis­
played personal respect for each other's status; they exchanged 
mutual support.3 
Within the Hijaz the amir had certain privileges. H  e possessed 
his o w n small force, composed of his household slaves, relatives, 
and hired free m e n  . H  e held jurisdiction over certain legal matters, 
especially those cases where nomads and pilgrims were arrested 
in Mecca. The amir personally decided m a n y cases. H e received 
m o n e y and food from Istanbul and from Ottoman Egypt, and also 
owned agricultural lands in Wadi Fatimah, near Mecca, and in the 
Taif area. The amirs enjoyed such prestige that w h e n some visitors 
passed in front of their residences, they dismounted so as to show 
respect. Most of the amirs had residences in Mecca, Taif, and, 
sometimes, Istanbul. 
The staff of the amirfluctuated in numbers and in power, but 
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usually it was small. In addition to personal servants, there were 
secretaries for correspondence in Arabic and in Ottoman Turkish, 
military aides-de-camp, messengers, supervisors of storehouses, 
accounting clerks, flag bearers, musicians, and, most important, an 
administrative deputy w h o was a substitute for the amir during his 
absences from Mecca. In addition, the amir traditionally had p o w  ­
ers of appointment to positions such as the market inspector 
(muhtasib), heads of the guilds, and neighborhood leaders. His 
influence was frequently dominant among the m e n of religion. 
The power of the amir, his local residence, and his familiarity with 
the inhabitants of the Hijaz m a d e him the most popular political 
official in the region.4 
Outwardly the amirs were loyal Ottomans, no matter h o w 
deep their inner doubts and opposition. Rebellions against Otto­
m a n rule led by the amirs took place rarely, and then only on a few 
occasions w h e  n the Ottomans were replacing an amir with another 
m e m b e  r of the Hashimite family. 
Every year w h e  n the sultan's order confirming the amir in of­
fice was read, the Ottoman notables of the Hijaz showed their re­
spect for the amir as the most prestigious local person. The 
religious judges, jurisconsults, leaders of the pilgrimage from Da­
mascus and from Cairo, and garrison commanders were led by the 
governor in this ceremony.5 The vali presided over the symbols of 
the amir's authorization to rule locally, even though the vali was 
frequently struggling for power against the amir. 
Istanbul had a way to exert pressure on the amirs short of de­
posing them. Prospective heirs to the amirate were often kept in 
Istanbul, where they were trained in Ottoman ways, used in gov­
ernment administration, and could easily be sent to Mecca to sup­
plant the ruling amir. Sons of the ruling amirs were appointed to 
the chief reform councils of the empire. By 1886 there were five 
sons or grandsons of Amir M u h a m m a  d serving on the imperial 
Council of State. Their service on such bodies informed possible 
heirs about general policy while it gave the bureaucratic elite a 
chance to judge their abilities. The Hashimites in the capital lived 
on pensions and gifts from the sultan. 
During the nineteenth century, the valis usually held less 
power than the amirs. Once the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz 
was ended in 1840, the post of governor assumed its former sub­
servient status, except w h e  nfilled by unusually energetic and able 
m e n . The personal talents of the amir and vali were often more 
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responsible for changes in the balance of power than were altera­
tions in Istanbul's policies on centralization or decentralization. 
The changes m a d e by Ottoman reformers between 1840 and 1876 
in the paper powers of the provincial governors mattered relatively 
little. The rapid rotation in office of the valis, and the general scarc­
ity of competent and honest m e n tofill the office, mattered more.6 
The most important power of the vali was his c o m m a n  d of 
Ottoman military forces in the Hijaz and his ability to obtain rein­
forcements w h e  n needed. With the advent of artillery, limited mil­
itary superiority over the nomad  s existed for the Ottomans. Also, 
the vali's recommendations to Istanbul concerning the deposition 
or retention of the reigning amir or the appointment of a n e w one 
were given great weight by the sultan. However, the long delays in 
receiving instructions from Istanbul caused by the distances in­
volved lessened the vali's ability to act quickly. 
The governor had the power to intervene in judicial cases 
only to a limited degree, e.g., he could order a prisoner freed, but 
he did not himself judge offenses. His power was similarly circum­
scribed in regard to finances; the Hijaz vilayet treasurer was re­
sponsible directly to Istanbul. The governor did supervise such 
institutions as the advisory councils, government warehouses, the 
market inspectorate, the police, the post and telegraph, the official 
press, and government hospitals—once these latter were estab­
lished in the course of the nineteenth century. But happenings out­
side the towns and garrisoned villages, and particularly robberies 
and violence a m o n g the Bedouins, were left by the vali to the amir. 
In the Hijaz the authority of the vali and of his master the Ot­
toman sultan was m a d e possible by the lightness of Ottoman rule. 
There was practically no taxation except for customs duties on im­
ports. Conscription into the Ottoman army did not exist; and, in­
stead of making demands for m o n e y or m e n , the Ottomans 
provided gifts to the Hijaz. The townspeople of the holy cities, w h o 
received most of these gifts, were grateful. There were recitations 
of the Quran on behalf of the reigning sultan at the Prophet's tomb 
in the Medina Haram. The political desires of the townspeople co­
incided largely with those of the rulers—both wanted minimal 
government, gifts and m o n e  y for the pious of the holy cities, the 
security of all from violence, the carrying out of holy law, and sup­
port for a religiously based society.These were given by the Otto­
mans to the townspeople; it was the nomads, w h o received 
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relatively less from the state, w h  o objected to Ottoman sovereignty 
in the Hijaz. 
The relationship between Ottomans and Arabs hinged on the 
religious importance of the Hijaz and, to a lesser degree, on its 
physical environment, especially its distance from Istanbul and 
lack of an agricultural base for taxation. Consequently, the impact 
of religion upon society and politics can be clearly seen in the Hi­
jaz, after accounting for the role of the local setting. Religion as 
expressed in the pilgrimage and religious institutions crucially af­
fected health, education, law, commerce , and social organizations. 
Indirectly, religion had a major impact, equal in weight to that of 
such other factors as personal ambition, upon political, military, 
and financial events. 
1. Stanford and Ezel Shaw's History of the Ottoman Empire and M<xiern Turkey has 
the most useful general survey of Ottoman history. 
2. Quran 49:13­
3. C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Litter Part of the 19th Century, p. 244; C. Snouck 
Hurgronje, Mekka: Die Stadt und ihre Herren, p. 180; I. H  . Uzuncharshili, Mekke i muker­
reme emirleri, pp. 22-34. 
4. Hurgronje, Die Stadt, p. 187; Uzuncharshili, Mekke, pp. 29-30. 
5. For descriptions of the ceremony, see M u h a m m a  d al Batanuni, Al Rihlat al Hija 
ziyyah, p. 200; Ibrahim Rifat Fasha, Mirat al Haramayn, 1:49-51. 
6. Roderic H  . Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 140-41, 168-70. In the 
eighteenth century, the Ottomans had used the governor of Damascus, w h  o was also usually 
the leader of the pilgrimage caravan, to supervise the amirs of Mecca, according to Karl 
Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758, pp. 162-66. In the nineteenth century, this 
was not done. 
CHAPTER 1 
PEOPLE AND PLAGES 
IN T H E LAST S T A G E of effective Ottoman rule of the Hijaz, be­
tween 1840 and 1908, religion and politics operated within the 
constraints established by the geographical position and environ­
ment of the Hijaz. 
The environment of the Hijaz was harsh and forbidding, both 
for its permanent inhabitants and for pilgrims. Inside the Hijaz 
province as defined by the Ottomans, heat and dryness posed se­
vere problems for the economy. The concepts of time and the cal­
endar were dominated by religious events and not seasonal and 
agricultural changes. Exactly h o w m a n y people there were in the 
Hijaz was impossible to know, particularly because of the geo­
graphical mobility of the Bedouins and pilgrims, and also because 
of the inability of the Ottomans to conduct a census in Arabia. 
The character of life in the holy cities differed sharply from 
that of the nomads. The richness of religious life; the facilities, 
amenities, and services available in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda; and 
a pride in local unique characteristics developed a separate and 
distinct style of living in the towns. N o m a d  s had their o w  n distinc­
tive patterns of living, often directly contrary to those of the towns. 
Underneath all the sharp distinctions of town and desert and even 
more important than the limited economic base of the area was 
the tremendous force of religion, which had been since the sev­
enth century as constant, continuous, and vital a factor for the Hijaz 
as climate. 
The core of the Hijaz was defined by the Ottoman Empire as 
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Their ports of Jidda and Yanbu 
and their outlying dependencies such as Taif, Tabuk, and Rabigh 
were also included. More distant areas were said to be in the Hijaz 
even w h e n they were not under the actual control of the Ottomans. 
Parts of the western coast of the Red Sea were administratively at­
tached to Mecca and Jidda. Suakin and Massawa were governed 
from the Hijaz, but their politics and social life were distinct from 
those of the Hijaz. The northernmost village of the Hijaz proper 
was said to be Aqaba, but throughout most of the nineteenth cen­
tury, Aqaba and the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba were the concern 
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of Egypt or Damascus. It was at al-Ula that the amirs of Mecca usu­
ally welcomed the pilgrimage caravans and the Hijaz effectively be­
gan. In the south, Ot toman and sharifial control fluctuated 
according to the power of local princes in Asir and Y e m e n . Usually 
Lit was inside the Hijaz; sometimes Qunfuda was included. South 
of Taif the amirs had a great deal of influence and, from time to 
time, real power among the local tribes. To the east, Ottoman 
power was extremely weak; the influence of the amir of Mecca ex­
tended only to Khaybar and sometimes to Taraba. A generous es­
timate was that the Ottoman Hijaz encompassed about 452,000 
square kilometers, with a width of 400 kilometers and a north-
south distance of 1,130. Within that area the Ottoman valis and 
amirs of Mecca had a certain sway, though it was unclear at any one 
time h o  w m u c  h area they controlled or h o  w effectual their control 
1was.
THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Life in the Hijaz was m a d e difficult by a physical environment 
that presented a constant challenge to the peoples of the area. 
Heat, humidity, lack of rainfall, coral reefs, steep mountains, and 
wind patterns formed a constant background. The alternation of 
the pilgrimage, as the lunar and solar calendars interacted, meant 
that the key day of the pilgrimage and therefore the chief economic 
event of the year would sometimes fall in the summer and some­
times in the relatively cooler parts of the year. Especially before the 
advent of scheduled steamship service to Jidda, the seasonal fluc­
tuations of the wind in the Red Sea also affected commerce and the 
economy. 
The chief port of the Hijaz, Jidda, in addition to coral reefs and 
poor anchorages, was beset by a combination of heat and humidity 
that frequently m a d  e life there extremely uncomfort­
able. The average and m a x i m u m daytime temperatures in the 
shade were as follows: December-March, 24° and 30° Centigrade; 
March-May, 30° and 34°; June-September, 36° and 38°; October-
November, 29° and 33°. O n one day in Jidda in 1859, the tempera­
ture reached a scorching 55°; the same year the lowest recorded 
temperature in Jidda was 14°. Average humidity in April-June was 
about 60 percent. Jidda averaged only nine days of rain and 
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twenty-three millimeters of rainfall per year. O  n the other hand, 
occasionally there would be too m u c h rainfall, which caused 
floods: in one incidentfifty houses in Jidda were destroyed by 
heavy rainstorms.2 At Yanbu, also on the Red Sea coast, similar con­
ditions prevailed. 
Inland temperatures were sometimes as high as those along 
the coast, but they were usually lower and the humidity less. The 
only k n o w n observations for Medina in the nineteenth century 
showed a range of 6° to 45°. At Taif the low temperature reached 
0°. Al-Batanuni, an early twentieth-century traveler, asserted that 
the low temperatures at Tabuk and Madain Salih in the interior 
reached from —5° to 15°. Mecca ranged from 15° to 47°, with morn­
ing temperatures in February averaging 20°; the average high tem­
perature for August was 4l°.3 
The impact of the climate of the Hijaz was felt by outside ob­
servers to be enervating, particularly in Jidda. Reduced energy, a 
high mortality rate from disease, a slow pace of society and busi­
ness, and an alleged "Arab fatalism" were said by foreigners to be 
caused by the weather. O  n the other hand, the calmness and tran­
quillity of the town and the clear view of the stars in the sky in­
spired some Europeans to praise the nights, after the setting of the 
implacable sun. Since seaborne commerce was cheaper and less 
exposed to raids than caravans going overland through the heat 
and desert of the interior, people continued to live on the coast 
even though climatic conditions harshly affected the health and 
energy of residents. 
Transportation and communication in the Hijaz were pain­
fully slow by land or by sea. Foreigners felt themselves to be iso­
lated and at the end of the world; Hijazis viewed the area as being 
the center of the Muslim world. 
Transportation by ship was slowed by adverse winds, fear of 
running aground on coral reefs, and the desire to have a full cargo 
before sailing to the next port. Wind patterns in the northern Red 
Sea from M a y to November featured winds coming from the north-
northwest. In the southern parts of the sea, the wind camefrom the 
south-southeast between October and May. Delays for sailing ves­
sels were frequent during certain parts of the year. Delays also took 
place because captains of ships waited to accumulate cargoes and 
passengers rather than sailing on afixed schedule. The Suez-Jidda 
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trip of 645 nautical miles averaged for sailing ships thirty to forty 
days because of these factors, and in one case even took fifty-eight 
days, although under happier circumstances it lasted far less time. 
Once steamships started to operate in the Red Sea, they reduced 
the time needed for traveling: the direct Jidda-Suez trip was only 
three days long. 
The Ottoman government did little to help seafarers. The 
Jidda harbor was surveyed and mapped completely in 1876 by the 
British, not the Ottomans. Jidda's dangerous harbor was neither 
dredged nor adequately buoyed, even though the Ottoman grand 
vezir himself suggested the clearing of the small inner harbor 
channel in 1882. Security at sea was occasionally imperiled by pi­
rates. If a ship anchored north of Jidda along the coast, payments 
to the local Bedouins were necessary to carry out trading.4 
The roughness of the terrain and the lack of any suitable roads 
discouraged the use of carriages. There were only two carriages in 
Mecca and Medina in the 1880s. Instead, camels and donkeys were 
the beasts of burden for transporting merchandise, passengers, and 
messages.5 The speed of camels varied greatly depending upon the 
load, type of camel, and availability of fodder, but Burton in the 
1850s estimated that a caravan averaged only two miles per hour. 
The trip from Yanbu to Medina by fast camel took two days; by 
slow camel, four. Similarly, by the eastern desert path the Mecca to 
Medina transit varied from five to eleven days, or in some cases 
even more. 
Inland communications were equally slow, though they in­
creased in speed because of technological changes. The regular 
pilgrim caravan from Cairo to Mecca had taken about forty days. 
Mehmet Ali lessened this to twenty days by establishing a regular 
camel relay service. With the Jidda-Mecca telegraph in the 1860s, 
the Damascus-Medina telegraph of 1899-1902, and the Hijaz Rail­
way in 1900-1908, a major savings in time took place. Letters to 
and from Istanbul, which often had been carried by caravans, were 
n o w conveyed more rapidly. Even w h e n the telegraph was ex­
tended to the Hijaz, the rates charged discouraged its extensive 
use. The rate per word from Mecca to Damascus or Istanbul was 
sixteen kurush, and from Mecca to India it was thirty-one. The 
Jidda-Suez and Suez-Jidda mail was sent once a week in 1902 by 
Egyptian steamer. Mail went from Jidda to Mecca twice daily in the 
1880s, but Mecca-Medina mail went only once every two weeks. 
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There were local Ottoman post offices in Mecca, Medina, Jidda, 
Taif, Yanbu, Tabuk, and al-Ula and an Egyptian post office in Jidda 
between 1865 and 1881. Letters were frequently lost in Mecca by 
the postal workers, w h o were too few in number to handle the 
flood of pilgrimage correspondence. 
The Istanbul government recognized the slowness and diffi­
culty of sending letters as early as 1868. T w  o cures were suggested: 
the establishment of a separate post office for handling mail from 
Mecca to Medina, and regular steamer service by the Ottomans 
along the coast so as to carry the mails. Nothing was actually done 
to secure these changes. N  o foreign post offices were opened. By 
1909 the total mail carried by the Ottoman post office both for the 
Hijaz and Y e m e n was only 800,000 pieces, or about 1.5 percent of 
the mail of the entire Ottoman Empire.6 
The construction of a telegraph line from Damascus south to 
the Hijaz linked Medina to a worldwide communications system, 
but not directly to Mecca, for the line was not finished. W h e  n the 
Hijaz Railroad was opened in 1908, Medina, again, was the only 
Hijazi town linked by railroad to the rest of the Ottoman system; 
Jidda and Mecca were intended to be joined to the Ottoman rail­
ways, but World War I and the opposition of the Bedouins pre­
vented this from happening. 
O n e result of the problems in transportation and communi­
cations was the establishment of branches of trading companies, 
with partners having full powers to decide local issues. A second 
result was the sharp division between Jidda, which was relatively 
in touch with the outside world, and Mecca, which was not. It was 
not only religion that kept Europeans along the coast, but also the 
concentration of import-export commerce in Jidda. The unattrac­
tive climate of Jidda was counterbalanced by the relative ease of 
transporting large cargoes by water and receiving letters and tele­
grams there. A third consequence of the transport and communi­
cations pattern was the extraordinary isolation of Medina from the 
rest of the Hijaz. The provisioning of Medina was subject to the 
irregular Yanbu caravans, which were frequently raided by no­
mads. Greatfluctuations of prices took place since only about one-
third of the grain consumed in Medina every day was grown lo­
cally. S o m  e grain, as well as honey, sheep, and charcoal were pur­
chased from Bedouins, but most food had to be brought from the 
Red Sea or from Syria. Medina had little to do with the political and 
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commercial life of the rest of the province. Fourth, the poor har­
bors along the eastern coast of the Red Sea meant that Jidda's, bad 
though it was, was the best available, and far superior to that of the 
chief port of Medina, Yanbu. Other Hijazi ports could not seriously 
challenge the dominance of Jidda. 
TIMEAND POPULATION 
The climate and the terrain exerted a profound influence 
upon the life of the Hijazis, but religion determined the cycles of 
time according to which the settled peoples organized their year. 
Muharram, thefirst month of the Muslim lunar year, saw the 
resumption of normal life after the pilgrimage; though some of the 
pilgrims were still present, most had left. Meccans moved back to 
their regular abodes and methods of living, and classes at the Mec­
can Haram resumed. Pilgrim agents w h  o lived abroad departed to 
recruit n e w pilgrims for the Meccan guides. O  n 10 Muharram, the 
commemoration day of the martyrdom of the I m a m al-Husayn ibn 
Ali in 680, the Kaba was opened. In Jidda after 1877, Shiites openly 
met to commemorate 10 Muharram, but they continued to meet 
secretly in Mecca. Feast days, holidays, processions, and visits to 
shrines took place in the months following according to the lunar 
calendar. S o m e of these occasions were celebrated solely by m e n 
and some solely by w o m e n  . A saint's day celebration for m e  n near 
M u n a in Jumada al-Akhir, the sixth month, was used to vent quar­
rels between the partisans of various sections of Mecca. In Rajab, 
the seventh month, celebrations were held at the Sanusi convent 
near Mecca for Bedouins of the Harb and other tribes. Major reli­
gious events such as the journey of M u h a m m a  d to Paradise were 
celebrated by all, irrespective of sex or status.7 
Permanent residents of Jidda, Mecca, or Medina usually visited 
the other two cities for pleasure, business, and religious purposes 
outside the pilgrimage months. Jiddawis and Meccans went to 
Medina to visit the Haram in Rajab and returned in the next month. 
The inside of the Kaba was opened for visitors on nine occasions 
before the pilgrims arrived. Shops were rented for six-month per­
iods, beginning with 1 Muharram and with 1 Rajab.8 
W h e  n thefirst pilgrims came to Jidda in Shaban, the eighth 
month, the year started to assume a different character. Ramadan, 
the month of fasting during the day, was still primarily a continua­
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tion of the regular year; but by Shawwal, the tenth month, all minds 
and all energies were turned to the pilgrimage. Special courses of 
interest to pilgrims were given at the Haram. Pilgrims poured into 
Jidda in D h u al-Qadah, the eleventh month. O  n the fourth day of 
D h u al-Hijjah, the twelfth month, all government offices in Jidda 
closed and practically the whole town moved to Mecca to partici­
pate in the pilgrimage ceremonies.9 
The number of Hijazis involved in the pilgrimage was rather 
small. Since no official census was ever taken in the Hijaz, esti­
mates of population for the towns and region varied considerably. 
Although the numbers of houses were counted by visitors, the 
number of people in each house was indeterminate. Outside the 
pilgrimage season, the population of Jidda was roughly between 
18,000 and 20,000. By the 1900s the population had grown some­
what, perhaps to as high as 30,000. Mecca, larger than Jidda, had a 
population in thefirst half of the nineteenth century of about 
40,000. Later, it perhaps doubled to 80,000 people. Medina also 
grew, starting with about 18,000, and increasing by the 1900s to 
40,000. In thefirst half of the nineteenth century, the three largest 
towns numbered about 75,000; by the end of the century, they in­
cluded some 150,000 people. 
The other towns and villages of the Hijaz were m u c h smaller. 
Taif s population in the summer , w h e n Meccans flocked to it for a 
vacation from the heat, reached about 8,000, but the permanent 
residents were far fewer. The port and oasis of Yanbu had 5,000 
people or fewer. All of the townspeople together numbered some 
85,000 in the period 1840-80 and about 160,000 in 1908. The n u m ­
ber of villagers was perhaps somewhere in the vicinity of 50,000. 
The tribes were even more difficult to count because of their ex­
treme mobility. Including Asir there were some 400,000, with a 
margin for error of 200,000 in either direction. A  n extremely un­
certain population total for the Hijaz at the end of the nineteenth 
century would range from 400,000 to 800,000.10 The total popula­
tion of the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s was between 17,000,000 
and 20,000,000; the Hijaz province had only about 3-4 percent of 
the total. 
Mortality a m o n g the population of the towns was high even 
w h e n epidemics of cholera were not taking place. Malaria in Jidda 
and Medina was the most frequent disease, but smallpox and 
deaths of infants immediately after birth also claimed man y casual­
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ties. Digestive and eye diseases, diarrhea, dysentery, and rheuma­
tism were widespread. Birth control was often practiced, as was 
abortion. The populations of the towns had to be resupplied from 
the nomads or from abroad in order to retain their size. 
THE ECONOMY 
The overwhelming impression gained by visitors to the Hijaz 
was of a bleak desert, bleaker mountains, and widespread poverty 
a m o n g nomads and townspeople. The dryness of the interior, the 
infrequent rainfalls, the scarcity of wells, the absence of year-round 
rivers, and the scorching heat all seemed to imply that there was 
no agriculture in the area, and that the Hijazis apparently lived 
solely from the pilgrimage. Although this was true for the vast bulk 
of the Hijaz, there were sections where agriculture existed and still 
more where productive herding of domesticated animals was pos­
sible. Most of these districts were not seen by pilgrims, merchants, 
or foreign travelers, and so remained unknown. 
There were small oases scattered throughout the Hijaz: Khay­
bar, Tayma, al-Ula, and Yanbu in the interior were some examples. 
The more productive regions were the Wadi Fatimah, between 
Mecca and Jidda, and the district around Taif and to the south of it. 
These areas and the oasis town of Medina had springwater in abun­
dance. Dates, onions, radishes, grapes, lemons, bananas, honey, 
henna, wheat, barley, clover, pomegranates, and m a n  y other items 
were locally produced. A m o n  g these the dates were the most fa­
m o u  s because of their variety and delicious taste. Certain crops and 
animals were not found locally: pigs were not raised because Islam 
forbade the eating of pork; coffee was imported from Y e m e n ; little 
milk was available in the towns; beyond the coastal villages fish 
were usually not found in the diet; and apparently there were no 
oats grown in the Hijaz. Tobacco was a government monopoly; it 
was imported and not legally grown in the Hijaz.11 
Animal husbandry was practiced by both Bedouins and vil­
lagers. W h e  n they had a surplus of animals, these would be sold to 
the townspeople. Camels and donkeys were also raised to be 
rented in the pilgrimage season, and sheep were sold to the pil­
grims at M u n a to be ritually slaughtered at the end of the ceremo­
nies. Many were consumed on the spot; some were cut up and the 
meat dried for future eating; but most of the meat went to waste 
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since it was difficult to store it for a long time in an edible condi­
tion. Horses were in demand for export purposes as well as for 
tribal warfare and the Ottoman military. There was an annual horse 
fair after the pilgrimage in Mecca in the 1840s, though this m a y not 
have been continued in later decades. Arabian horses were famous 
around the world for their quality. The best stock came from Najd 
and not from the Hijaz. Camels were butchered for meat in the 
towns, as were the sheep. About ten to fifteen camels per day were 
killed for meat in Medina. Camels were also used by the townspeo­
ple for raising water from wells. In Jidda during the pilgrimage, 
seventy to eighty sheep were slaughtered per day for meat. Only 
two or three cows were consumed per month. At the time of the 
pilgrimage, hundreds of camels would arrive from Syria, central 
Arabia, and the Hijaz tribes for rental or sale to pilgrims. If they 
were not rented, their owners frequently would accompany them 
as cameleers for the pilgrims.12 
Bedouins used income to purchase food, cloth, rifles, slaves, 
and coffee in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. In return the nomads sold 
to the townspeople camels, sheep, samn, butter, white cheese, and 
attar of roses. 
Agriculture had a higher prestige than commerce for Medi­
nans. Even though they m a d e a lower profit per year on agricultural 
property compared with commerce, Medinans nevertheless in­
vested heavily in agriculture. In Wadi Fatimah the richer cultivators 
were sharifs w h  o were closely related to the ruling clan of Mecca, 
and the poorer farmers were members of a sedentary tribe. The 
amirs of Mecca themselves owned lands in the Taif region and in 
Wadi Fatimah.13 
Most of the settled population of the Hijaz lived by occupa­
tions other than farming or herding. In the towns the range of jobs 
available was great, though most jobs ultimately depended on re­
ligion and the pilgrimage. Admission to certain types of labor was 
controlled by guilds; even more frequently an occupation was dic­
tated by inheritance, for sons tended to follow in the same work 
that their fathers had performed. However, the great influx of pil­
grims, w h  o stayed in some cases for years and worked to support 
themselves, gave someflexibility to jobs. 
The complexity of economic activity was indicated by the va­
riety of trades and occupations: retail merchants, tailors, confec­
tioners, goldsmiths, water-carriers, doorkeepers, interpreters, 
20 RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE INARABIA 
pharmacists, preachers, coffee-makers, police, carpenters, under­
takers, druggists, construction workers, blacksmiths, letter-writers, 
sandal-makers, Jidda customs house workers, prayer bead-manu­
facturers, ship-builders, coral processors, ship chandlers, seal-carv­
ers, melon-sellers, and so on. In m a n y cases, there was an 
overlapping of occupation and ethnic identity: peddlers tended to 
be Indians, Sudanese and Hadramawtis were the porters in Jidda, 
prostitutes were usually from Egypt, and m a n y of the Meccan gold­
smiths and silversmiths were from Najd. The most numerous oc­
cupation was that of pilgrim guide; in Mecca there were some 800 
to 1,200. O f the British Indians in Jidda in 1891, forty-two were 
merchants, twenty pharmacists, fifteen traders, seven pilgrim bro­
kers, six clerks, three tailors, three shopkeepers. The youngest of 
these was aged twenty-eight, the oldest sixty-eight, and all were 
1 4 m e n .  
The goods m a d e by craftsmen, imported products brought 
into the towns, and the food grown in the villages were all sold by 
hawkers or in specialized markets. Blacksmiths and locksmiths 
could be found in the smiths' market, food-sellers in the "small" 
market in Mecca, slaves for sale in a special market, and so forth. 
The larger markets were roofed and had stalls or shops that opened 
off a c o m m o  n lane. Since most shops or businesses selling similar 
products were close together, comparative shopping for the con­
sumer was easy. Propinquity also m a d e guild supervision possible. 
Most prices were not marked; shopping involved protracted bar­
gaining between seller and buyer, with each attempting to maxi­
mize his gain at the expense of the other. 
O n  e noticeable peculiarity of the Medina artisans was that 
they were few in number and usually from abroad. In Medina in 
1815 if a carpenter was needed, it was necessary to send to Yanbu 
to get one. There was only one locksmith in the town, and there 
were no tanners, dyers, or jar-makers. W h e  n major repairs in build­
ings had to be undertaken, such as the reconstruction of the M e ­
dina Haram in 1848-60, skilled workers had to be sentfrom Egypt 
and Istanbul.15 
Industrial manufacturing was largely absent from the Hijaz. Al­
though a few pieces of steam-powered equipment existed, they 
were usually either out of operation or very small. There were no 
large weaving or cloth-making facilities. A Frenchman for a short 
time in the 1860s operated a steam-powered mill in Jidda. A similar 
enterprise managed by an Istanbul official in the 1890s in Jidda 
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suffered greatly from competition by cheap flour from B o m b a y . 
Still later, in the 1900s, a Greek Orthodox Ottoman ran a gasoline-
powered mill for grinding grain in Jidda. Six wind-powered mills 
designed to raise water to ground level had been built in Jidda, but 
they had ceased working by 1890. There was one gasoline-pow­
ered flour mill in Mecca; it processed one and one-half tons of 
wheat per day in 1909. Other forms of European machinery were 
present in the Hijaz: a government printing press in Mecca; an ice 
factory; a water purification and desalinization plant in Jidda; after 
1908, a Medina electric-generating facility that was used to illumi­
nate the Haram and the Hijaz Railway station.16 Most of these un­
dertakings existed in Jidda, and nearly all of them were short-lived. 
There were numerous reasons for the failure of manufactur­
ing and power machinery in the Hijaz. First was the absence of 
natural resources, either mineral or animal. There was no k n o w n 
iron ore, coal, copper, oil, cotton, orflax, and very little wool; in 
the nineteenth century, gold was not yet k n o w n to exist in quan­
tities in the Hijaz. The Ottoman government sent an exploring 
party to the east of Medina to look for metals and g e m s in 1879, 
but no important discoveries were m a d e . There was also a decided 
shortage of skilled labor. Thanks to the pilgrimage, there were un­
trained workers in abundance; Hijazis worked on the Sudanese 
Suakin-Berber Railway in 1904, but only as unskilled laborers. A 
third reason was the lack of security for private property in the Hi­
jaz. Wealth was subject to confiscation by the amir. Surplus profits 
were spent on expansion of firms outside the Hijaz; consumption 
of luxuries, such as lavish wedding celebrations; Meccan real estate 
for rental; and purchases of gold and jewels that could be easily 
hidden or transported as the need arose. A fourth problem was the 
competition of the already industrialized world or those regions 
such as India that were in the process of industrializing. After 1838 
the Ottomans were unable to protect their domestic economy so 
as to encourage the growth of industry; even in such places as 
western Anatolia, where the prerequisites for industrialization ex­
isted to a m u c h greater degree than in western Arabia, there was 
relatively little successful industrialization before World W a r I. 
The existing class structure and even basic information on in­
c o m e and prices have not been systematically analyzed. In order 
to provide any light at all on these matters, it is necessary to rely 
upon scattered information and impressionistic accounts.17 
A worker's income varied according to his skills, the availabil­
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ity of labor, and the economic prosperity of the area as a whole. 
The information that an unskilled laborer in Mecca earned three 
kurush per day should be seen only as an indication of a general 
level of wages. A blacksmith or carpenter received aboutfive ku­
rush per day, plus his food. In 1853 at the Medina Haram, a muez­
zin earned nearly two kurush per day, a gardener the same, a 
carpenter eight, and a doorkeeper one plus board and clothing. A 
skilled gardener at Taif in 1880 m a d  e nearly four kurush per day, 
plus food, whereas an ordinary laborer received perhaps one ku­
rush. In 1910 a gendarme received six kurush per day.18 
W h e  n pilgrimage time came, prices doubled and shortages 
frequently occurred. Also, droughts and political disturbances 
could force prices higher. Pilgrims paid more because of a pattern 
of exploitative prices charged them. O  n the other hand, some 
prices werefixed, outside the pilgrimage season, by the muhtasib. 
There were muhtasibs in Jidda, Medina, Mecca, and Taif to super­
vise weights and measures and to inspect the markets forfraud. In 
Mecca the muhtasib helped set the price of bread, meat, and clari­
fied butter. Occasionally the imperial government intervened to try 
to lower prices, as in the order from the grand vezir to the vali of 
the Hijaz in 1881 to lower the prices of w o o  d and coal. Because so 
m a n y goods came from abroad, prices reflected the cost of trans­
portation over long distances. Charities sponsored by Indian rul­
ers, Egypt, and Ottoman waqfs (charitable foundations) supplied 
some food and lodging to the destitute as well as food to officials 
and religious leaders. 
The standard of living can also be seen in the consumption of 
meat. A chicken cost aboutfive kurush, and one-half kilo of mutton 
cost two, in the non-pilgrimage parts of the year in M e  ­
dina. In Jidda during the pilgrimage, a kilo of mutton cost more 
than four and one-half kurush. O n  e reason for the relatively high 
cost of meat was that it could not be kept for long because of the 
heat. Bedouins reserved eatingflesh for great occasions. W h e  n pro­
longed droughts took place, Bedouins were forced to eat their 
camels and sheep, thereby creating hardships for succeeding years 
w h e n the herds would be small. Locusts devastated crops and pas­
turage, but they also provided a free source of food; they were 
roasted and eaten by Bedouins and even byjiddawis in 1889.19 
The food needed to keep a person alive was estimated to cost 
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between two and three kurush per day. W h e  n a temporary mar­
riage was contracted, the amount paid to the wife for subsistence 
during the obligatory waiting period following dissolution of the 
relationship was about four kurush per day. But in addition to food, 
housing was also needed, and rents in Mecca were expensive. For 
a house or large apartment in a desirable area during the pilgrim­
age season, the cost was twenty-three to twenty-seven kurush per 
day; and a rented room in Medina was about eleven kurush per 
day.20 
Transportation was also expensive for pilgrims. Rates were 
usually fixed by the amirs, with the result that they benefited migh­
tily at the expense of the pilgrims. In 1887 the pilgrim going from 
Mecca to Medina by camel was assessed seven hundred kurush. 
Twenty-eight kurush were paid as tax to the Ottoman government, 
and the same to the head of the caravan and to the persons acting 
as hostages with the Bedouin tribes. Fourteen kurush were paid to 
the pilgrim broker, and the remaining balance to the owner of the 
camel. By contrast, the Mecca-Jidda-Yanbu-Medina trip by camel 
and steamer cost only about three hundred kurush. But there were 
fluctuations in expenses from year to year.21 
The poor were extremely poor. Outright destitution was 
greatest a m o n g pilgrims, but most of the Bedouins were very poor 
in terms of material goods. The poverty of townspeople and pil­
grims was lessened by donations of food from the imperial govern­
ment. Social mobility existed, particularly for anyone in commerce , 
and the shortage of artisans meant that those w h  o were skilled or 
able to learn a craft lived relatively well. Still, the lot of most Hijazis 
was one of relative deprivation compared with populations of 
more agriculturally abundant areas. The lightness of government 
taxation, the absence of conscription, and the spiritual rewards of 
living in or near the holy cities were perhaps s o m e compensation 
for widespread poverty. 
TOWNS AND VILLAGES 
The life of poor and rich alike was determined to a great ex­
tent by their location in or near the three chief towns of Mecca, 
Jidda, and Medina. Although they were ruled by the Ottomans, 
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each town also had special characteristics created by its history, 
religious prestige, site, and economic function. Since nomads and 
villagers traded with the towns and m a n y visited them for the pil­
grimage, there was constant intermixture between the hinterland 
and urban society. 
Mecca was an unwalled town, built in the midst of mountains 
and traversed by unpaved, irregular streets lined with multifloored 
dwellings. The three- and four-floor gray stone buildings were not 
often subjected tofires, but once afire broke out, it burned without 
hindrance, since there was nofire department and little water to 
stop it. Dust from the streets coated people and buildings, and 
there were few trees or shrubs. Streets were unlit at night. Unused 
space existed in the town, though all the land near the Haram was 
fully utilized. By the 1840s most of the houses had become waqf 
property, but ownership and control was often legally somewhat 
uncertain.22 
There were few large buildings other than the Haram itself, 
which was built around a central courtyard containing the Kaba. 
The Haram served as a gathering place, school, and center for so­
cial occasions of all sorts. In 1887 the town of Mecca also possessed 
the following large buildings: a government office building, two 
forts, a religious court, a telegraph and post office, two military bar­
racks, two hospitals, and two bathhouses. 
There were also an estimated 40 water fountains and public 
taps, 6,500 houses, 30 large stores, and 3,000 small shops. Other 
commercial and business establishments included 2 roofed mar­
kets, 1 pharmacy, 9 caravanserais for travelers, 80 small mills, 60 
ovens that could be hired for baking, 8 potteries, 2 tanneries, and 
95 coffeehouses. There were more than sixty small neighborhood 
mosques and a number of schools.23 With the growth of popula­
tion, n e w establishments were provided. By 1909, for instance, 
there were 4 pharmacies—3 more than in 1887. The town was di­
vided into neighborhoods along ethnic and economic lines. 
Although the history of Mecca was to a substantial degree the 
same as the history of the Hijaz, local environment helped create a 
somewhat separate pattern of social and political history in other 
towns and villages. For instance, the distance separating Mecca 
from Medina and the local features of Medina resulted in a differ­
ing political experience and differing basic characteristics. 
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Medina in the eighteenth century had often been indepen­
dent of Mecca and its amir. During the Wahhabi occupation, taxes 
were collected in Medina, though not in Mecca. The amir of Mecca 
after 1840 had a local representative and supervised the Bedouins, 
but he had little other power in Medina. By the 1900s Medina was 
separate from the Hijaz Vilayet and was placed directly under the 
central government, in whose hands it remained until it surren­
dered to the British and Arabs in early 1919. 
O n  e reason for the independence of Medina was its high 
walls, with towers, fortresses, and cannons, which enabled a rela­
tively easy defense against the Bedouins. Medina also contained 
within itself water sources sufficient for the population and some 
local agriculture. A  n underground channel brought waterfrom the 
nearby Ayn Zarqa spring. However, gardens lying outside the walls 
were tempting targets for nomadic raids. Suburbs lying outside the 
walls originally existed to provide services for camel caravans; 
eventually the suburbs became almost as extensive as the town. 
The cemetery where m a n y of the early Muslims were buried also 
lay outside the town. N e  w public buildings, such as the Hijaz Rail­
way station, were put in the suburbs. More than four hundred gar­
dens and date groves in the town and nearby were a source of 
entertainment and places for relaxation on holidays and after Fri­
day noon prayers. 
The character of the architecture in Medina was similar to that 
of Mecca. Multistoried,flat-roofed, gray, well-built houses with lat­
ticed balconies lined narrow, cool, unpaved streets. Stone, bricks, 
and palm w o o d were used to build houses. Since camels, donkeys, 
and horses were expensive, most people walked. The streets were, 
therefore, usually quite narrow.24 
The religious and social center of the town was the Haram 
built around the tomb of the Prophet M u h a m m a d  . There were also 
ten large mosques and a number of religious schools and Sufi m e e ­
tinghouses. Since civil government was often in the hands of the 
sheikh or leader of the Haram, the governor's residence built to 
the west of the Haram and the government office building were 
not always important in the life of the town. 
There were fewer services and facilities in Medina than in 
Mecca. Medina had only 1 hospital, 18 ovens for baking bread, 26 
coffeehouses, 2 baths, 10 small police stations, and 21 large public 
fountains. In 1853 there was only one physician. The chief market 
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was inside the walls. The city's trade was mostly with Egypt, India, 
and Syria. Other than dates, little of what was sold was locally pro­
duced. The grain and grocers' markets were outside the walls. 
There were more than nine hundred small stores.25 
Since Medina was more isolated from the Red Sea coast than 
was Mecca and since the caravans linking Medina to Mecca were 
frequently attacked by Bedouins, Medina looked to Damascus al­
most as m u c h as to Mecca for styles and ideas. Meccans considered 
Medina to be a holier and purer town than their o w n h o m e city, 
and the manner of life in the towns differed. There were different 
methods in the two towns for drinking sherbet, wearing sandals, 
and tying turbans. 
The most significant physical change in the town of Medina in 
the nineteenth century was the rebuilding of the Haram by Sultan 
Abdulmecid at a cost of about T. L 750,000. Construction took 
twelve years and included not only extensive work in the Haram 
itself but also the razing of nearby houses. 
The third large town, Jidda, had a location on the Red Sea that 
m a d e it more open to change than was Medina. However, since 
the town was largely a way station of goods and pilgrims en route 
to Mecca, there was a tendency for little to be done by government 
that was permanent or expensive. From time to time, a reforming 
governor undertook improvements in the town. In 1867-69 stag­
nant pools were drained, n e w markets were built, dead animals 
were moved far out of the town, and the cisterns were cleaned; but 
other public services were few, and conditions of life were precar­
ious and uncomfortable. 
Jidda was as barren as Mecca, with extremely little vegetation 
inside the town's walls. The walls and fortifications were occasion­
ally rebuilt or strengthened, but usually they were in a dilapidated 
condition. Gates were closed at sundown except during the month 
of Ramadan. Coral, a major building ingredient, even after it was 
dried in the sun deteriorated m u c h faster than stone or brick. The 
houses tended to be airy, roomy, and large. They had shops on the 
groundfloor with higherfloors built over the street so as to gain 
additional room. They were decorated with elaborate wooden 
screens on windows and balconies, and with painted calligraphic 
and geometrical designs. 
Outside the walls in nearby villages lived the semi-sedentary 
Bedouins and the poor. In the 1900s some n e w buildings were 
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also constructed beyond the walls close to the sea. Porters brought 
fruits, vegetables, and some other goods into the town from a mar­
ket outside the wall. 
The large structures in Jidda included the government cus­
toms house, quarantine facilities, post office, police stations, hos­
pital, barracks, and the governor's office. Non-government 
buildings featured two caravanserais, the mansions of the Nasif 
clan and a few other notables, andfive large mosques. There were 
also thirty smaller mosques, but only one pharmacy in 1888. De ­
spite the heat and the humidity, there was surprisingly only one 
bath.26 
Services were also relatively few. Charity and government pro­
vided nine public water fountains, but most apartments depended 
upon one of the three hundred or more cisterns for water. The 
water supply from nearby springs by an Ottoman aqueduct was 
often interrupted by cistern owners w h  o objected to the competi­
tion for the sale of water. The sanitation systems of Mecca and M e d ­
ina were poor, but that of Jidda was even worse. Cesspools were 
emptied into holes dug infront of the houses in the street, m a n y 
people were buried in shallow graves inside the town, and animals 
were often left in the streets w h e n they died. 
The economic life of the town was dominated by the pilgrim­
age and its export-import trade. There were forty coffeehouses, 
forty-seven public ovens, and some nine hundred shops. Unlike 
Mecca and Medina, there were several public restaurants in Jidda. 
Also unlike the holy cities, there was no single, obvious center to 
the town's social life other than the central market. However, 
benches on Jidda's streets served as meeting places in the evenings 
and provided an opportunity for male socializing in the same way 
that the two Harams did in the larger towns. 
Jidda and Mecca dominated the m u c h smaller towns and vil­
lages in their areas. Wadi Fatimah's villages producedfruits and 
vegetables, henna, dates, wheat, and some meat animalsfrom the 
thirty springs and gardens of their valley. Their produce was taken 
to Jidda and Mecca for sale. Taif was the s u m m e r capital: all the 
Meccans w h  o could afford to do so took the eighteen hours 
needed to m o v  e to Taif to escape the oppressive heat of Mecca. 
The permanent inhabitants were mostly of the Thaqif tribe, along 
with some Indians and sharifs. Most of the gardens, many nearby 
villages, and the larger homes were owned by Meccan sharifs or 
m e  n of religion (ulema). The two thousand or more people living 
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there had twelve large and small mosques, two hundred shops, 
nine ovens, a public bath, a barracks, and a fortress. The Ottomans 
and amirs of Mecca shared local authority, with justice and reve­
nues divided. Although the town was protected by a wall, its poor 
condition and the closeness and strength of the nomads, as well as 
the extensive suburbs that had c o m  e into existence by the 1900s, 
m a d  e Taif difficult to defend.27 M u c  h of the time of the amirs of 
Mecca was spent on tribal politics in and near Taif so as to develop 
military alliances to protect the town. 
The dependencies of Medina were more numerous and wide­
spread, though smaller in population. Yanbu and Wajh had for­
tresses and garrisons, but were often dominated by the Juhaynah 
and Billi Bedouin tribes, respectively. Yanbu's water came from 
storage cisterns, and its food from an interior village, also called 
Yanbu, and from Egypt. Smugglers and sailors lived in quarters sep­
arate from the settled tribesmen and merchants w h  o traded with 
Medina and Egypt. The total population was about four thousand. 
Wajh had only about one thousand people, and was a regional mar­
ket for the Bedouins and the Sanusis in the 1880s. Wajh's exports 
were samn and wool.28 
Ottoman control extended to two days' march to the east and 
northeast of Medina and along the caravan and pilgrimage routes 
linking Medina to al-Ula, Madain Salih, Tabuk, Maan, A m m a n  , and 
Damascus. The walled Ottoman date palm oasis of al-Ula had a 
population of more than one thousand. It grew rapidly after 1907 
with the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. Although both politi­
cally and militarily linked to Medina or to Hail, economically al-Ula 
was closer to Damascus and the Syrian pilgrimage. Tabuk was sub­
servient to the Banu Atiyyah or to the Ottoman fortress guards; it 
usually lay outside the reach of the Hijaz government.29 
THE BEDOUINS 
The role of Bedouins in the Ottoman Hijaz and their involve­
ment in the relationship between religion and the state was seen 
in their cohesion and location, their economic relationships with 
the towns, Ottoman payments to maintain public order, Bedouin 
activity during the pilgrimage, the military power of the nomads, 
and the political intervention of the towns in the internal affairs of 
the tribes. 
The nomads of the Hijaz w h o lived outside the towns and vil­
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lages have been the subjects of a detailed and splendid literature. 
Early Arabic poetry was essentially tribal; the great classics of po­
etry composed before Islam and in its early centuries were still 
studied in Arabic-speaking lands in the nineteenth century. Per­
haps the greatest travel books in the English language have dealt 
with the nomads—the magic works of Burckhardt, Burton, 
Doughty, and Lawrence. However, since the relationships between 
religion, the state, and the nomads were not central to these earlier 
authors, a reexamination of the nomads m a y still be valuable. 
The nomads were in m a n y ways outside the Ottoman system, 
but in s o m e areas there was an interaction. The social structures of 
the Bedouins had remarkably little to do with the peoples of the 
towns and villages. In a sense the townspeople and villagers were 
swimming in a Bedouin sea, but this had only military and eco­
nomic importance and did not produce cultural, religious, and so­
cial results. There were obviously certain c o m m o n factors linking 
the social groups. Bedouins, like townspeople, were Muslims, Sun­
nis, Arabic-speakers, pilgrims, consumers of imported goods, and 
providers of services for foreign pilgrims. But the inhabitants of the 
towns and the wanderers regarded each other with disdain and 
suspicion. The townspeople felt the nomads to be dangerous rob­
bers w h  o were irreligious, ignorant, uncouth, and barbaric. The no­
mads regarded the townsmen as defiled by their intermarriages 
with foreigners, unhealthy, effete, and cowardly. Enmity was great­
est between the Ottoman armed forces and the nomads. Each de­
fined public order and the nature of society in a way completely 
different from the other. 
Hijazi tribes in the nineteenth century were difficult to de­
scribe with precision because of their organizational and geo­
graphicalflexibility. Although all members were linked together in 
theory by descent from a c o m m o  n male ancestor, they frequently 
did not live close to each other, seldom gathered as a tribe, m o v e  d 
great distances to obtain pasturage, and had close relationships 
with lineages outside the tribe. There was nofixed pattern of hi­
erarchical organization within most tribes; leadership was fre­
quently vested in one family or clan, but the leader's followers 
were free to c o m e and go. Only if the whole tribe felt threatened 
from outside might it unite, temporarily, under the c o m m a n  d of 
the chief of the tribe. Nevertheless, in marriage, in the allotment of 
grazing lands and use of wells, and in raiding patterns there was a 
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clear sense a m o n g the nomads of the existence of tribes. S o m e ­
times tribesmen pretended infront of Ottoman officials to have 
greater cohesion than was the case, solely in order to secure larger 
payments for their chief. 
A n exact delimitation of tribal territory was contrary to the 
basic ethos of the tribal system. Not only did the tribes wander, 
they also changed their grazing areas in response to the rainfall 
distribution of any given year. Although there was a core area, or 
dirah, that was considered the tribe's o w n , thefringes of tribal ter­
ritory were variable, leading to numerous clashes with other tribes. 
Including the Asir tribes, there were probably about 400,000 
people in the tribes. Within this total, the larger tribes were the 
Harb, Juhaynah, Huwaytat, Utaybah, Thaqif, Ghamid, and Mutayr, 
with the Harb probably the largest tribe located entirely inside the 
Hijaz. 
Most of the tribes were engaged in nomadic animal husband­
ry, principally the raising of camels, which provided milk and meat 
for the herders. There were a few semi-sedentary pastoralists w h  o 
engaged in agriculture or w h  o m o v e  d theirflocks only a few times 
in the year. Not all tribes were camel-herders. The Zabid lived 
along the coast of the Red Sea, as did other tribes, and there they 
gained a livelihood by fishing, smuggling, slave dealing, and 
mother-of-pearl gathering. S o m  e tribal groups provided services: 
the Ghamid tribe of Asir provided porters in Jidda, Mecca, and Taif 
during the pilgrimage season, and the Ghami  d also raised tobacco, 
which was sold, illegally, in Mecca.30 
The Bedouins consumed most of their herds' products di­
rectly, but s o m e animals were sold to the townspeople. In return, 
the tribes bought a wide variety of goods from the towns, including 
grains, dates, cloth, weapons, lead for bullets, coffee, and sugar. 
The pilgrimage caravans provided a major source of income and a 
chance for trade. Salesmen went from the caravans to the tribes to 
sell goods, rejoining the pilgrims upon their departure from the 
Hijaz. As the distance increased from Damascus, which was the 
source of the goods, so did prices: biscuits cost seven times as 
m u c h at Madain Salih as at Damascus. Insecurity also increased 
costs. Three or four safe return trips from Tabuk to Wajh on the 
coast would be enough to m a k e a merchant wealthy.31 
Trading, fishing, and selling dairy products to townspeople 
were secondary to the nomads' main concern, which was camel­
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herding. Frequent intertribal raids and irregular rainfall meant that 
rapid changes in herd size, and therefore wealth, were likely. The 
Bedouins were constantly subject to the possibility of losing m a n y 
or all of their animals in a raid. Since it was impossible to m o n o p ­
olize ownership of camels and since camels were the means of 
transportation used in the raids, the pattern of raids and counter-
raids was endlessly repeated.32 
The Bedouins were poor in terms of physical possessions and 
comforts—poor in their o w  n eyes and by the stardards of settled 
society as well. They were periodically on the verge of starvation. 
Extremes of heat and cold, infrequent and unpredictable rainfall, 
diseases affecting both humanity and animals, constant raids—all 
these m a d  e the Bedouins poor. Yet passing directly through their 
midst were enormous riches in the form of pilgrim caravans and 
the commerce coming from the coast to the holy cities. The juxta­
position of poverty and wealth produced tensions, insecurity for 
the pilgrims and merchants, and opportunities for robbery by the 
Bedouins. 
S o m  e channels existed for nonviolent economic exchanges 
between the pilgrims and the tribesmen. Pilgrims hired nomads as 
guides and rented nomads' camels. Hijazi tribes rented camels 
chiefly for the Mecca-Medina, Jidda-Mecca, and Medina-Yanbu 
routes. Protection m o n e y was also paid to the tribes through 
whose territory the pilgrims and merchants passed. A delicately 
balanced symbiotic relationship came into existence between the 
caravans and the nomads. If the nomads attempted to take too 
m u c h , the merchants would stop their trading, the numbers of pil­
grims would decline, and the Ottoman government would inter­
vene to maintain the pilgrimage. Yet if the Bedouin leaders asked 
for too little, their o w  n restless tribesmen might seek n e  w leaders, 
other tribes might intervene, and the Ottomans might conclude 
that the tribes posed so small a threat that payments could be de­
creased.33 
Detailed records were kept by the Ottomans on payments 
m a d  e to the tribes, and in thefirst part of the nineteenth century, 
they indicate that the amounts paid were in the range of T. L. 
35,000-40,000, including the value of grain. S o m e of this amount 
was stolen by those w h  o administered the payments. 
The Harb were the largest gainers from this m o n e y because 
they controlled the Jidda-Mecca, Mecca-Medina, and sometimes 
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the Medina-Yanbu paths. A m o n  g the major trade routes, only the 
area north of Medina was completely outside their control. In 
1864/65 eighty-three Harbis received a total of 4,711 ardebs of 
wheat. By comparison, the Juhaynah, w h  o controlled part of the 
Medina-Yanbu route, with thirty-six recipients, got only 513 ardebs 
of wheat. By 1880 the Harb were getting more; one subchief alone, 
the head of the Masruh section, which c o m m a n d e d the Medina 
routes, received T. L 1,064. Amounts climbed even higher in the 
1890s; in 1893/94 one Harb chieftain received T. L 4,609 of the 
total T. L 40,751 that was sent to the tribes. The Juhaynah remained 
second among the tribal groups. Their Amir Sharaf was given 
44,616 okas of wheat in 1899/1900 and for the next three years; 
this was one-fifth of the total of all wheat then disbursed. By the 
late nineteenth century, total Ottoman expenditures on the Be­
douins, direct or indirect, were as high as T. L 70,000.34 
Before 1908 payments worked reasonably well in stopping 
raids by the nomads against pilgrimage and commerce. Payments 
were m a d e by Ottoman paymasters with the Syrian caravan or by 
the amir of Mecca's agent in Medina. This system broke d o w  n 
w h e n payments were embezzled or delayed. The consequences of 
nonpayment could be evaded for one or two years, but eventually 
the tribes rose against the state, robbed travelers in their territory, 
and disrupted commerce until payments were resumed. Since the 
Ottomans, the amirs, the townspeople, and the tribes all needed 
the income they derived from the pilgrims, temporary agreements 
during the pilgrimage season were patched together; bitter quar­
rels could be resumed after the pilgrimage ended. Agreements 
were guaranteed by the giving of hostages. Every year about ten of 
the Harb stayed in Mecca as hostages for the safe return of the pil­
grims from the Mecca-Medina-Mecca overland trip through Harb 
territory. If conditions became desperate, the amir sent the pilgrim­
age caravans by sea rather than by land, thus completely depriving 
the tribes between Mecca and Medina of their income; but of 
course the Jidda-Mecca and Yanbu-Medina tribes would still have 
to be paid. T o a limited degree, the routes could be varied some­
what, thus changing the tribal areas traversed. However, the avail­
ability of wells and water usually dictated the choice of paths. 
The economy of the tribes, the payments to them to allow the 
pilgrims to pass safely, and the very life of their members de­
pended upon their military power. Unlike the monopolization of 
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violence in the hands of nation states in the twentieth century, in 
the Arabian deserts and mountains of the nineteenth century vio­
lence was at the disposal of any armed warrior, and nearly all adult 
males were armed. The limits placed on violence were those of 
tribal solidarity and the formal, though unwritten, rules of raiding 
enforced by peer group pressures.35 
The question remains, H o  w powerful were the tribes? In 
some places, under certain circumstances, they could defeat the 
organized armies of the Ottomans. If a large contingent of the Harb 
decided to hold the hilly region and narrow passes between Yanbu 
and Medina, it was almost impossible to dislodge them. In the de­
sert the nomads were more able fighters than the Ottoman regu­
lars; the Bedouins knew the desert, the location of the wells, the 
capacity of their animals, and were mobile enough to take advan­
tage of the desert's vastnesses. Most importantly, the advantages to 
be gained by defeating the nomads were far less than the expenses 
of moving soldiers to the Hijaz, training and equipping them for 
desert warfare, and compensating for the inevitable casu­
alties in m e  n and materiel. Ottoman troops were unused to Ara­
bian conditions and often died from disease. 
Still, the Ottomans maintained a military superiority over the 
Bedouins in the Hijaz. This was in part because of the Bedouins' 
o w n weaknesses. The nomads seldom remained in thefield for a 
long period of time. They could easily be divided by bribes and 
threats of force, and they did not possess the n e  w technology de­
veloped by the Ottomans from the Europeans. Ottoman soldiers 
also were also more willing to hold afixed position than were the 
Bedouins. 
The delicate military balance between the nomads and the 
Ottomans resulted in an allocation of territory: the Bedouins were 
supreme in the deserts and the Ottomans in the towns and in most 
of the villages. W h e  n townspeople passed through the deserts in 
caravans, there was an interaction that was settled sometimes by 
cannons sent from Damascus and sometimes by gold sent from 
Istanbul. 
The carrot was used along with the stick. The commanders of 
the Ottoman garrisons were ordered by the palace to treat the no­
mads carefully. According to Istanbul,friendly chieftains should be 
rewarded with medals and robes of honor, and tithes should not 
be collected from them. Appeals to loyalty to the amirate, the vi­
PEOPLE AND PLACES 35 
layet, and the empire should be made . The chieftains should be 
encouraged to participate in government, and their children 
should be sent to government schools at government expense. 
The key consideration was the safety of the pilgrimage; all mea­
sures designed to secure this were permissible. 
A key element in any sort of reconciliation of the tribes to Ot­
toman rule was the amirate of Mecca. The amirs were held respon­
sible by the Ottomans for the behavior of the tribes, and, as a result, 
the amirs acted as intermediaries between tribes and government. 
This was done by means of several channels. O n e was the marriage 
of the amirs or their relatives to a tribal chiefs daughter: Amir M u ­
h a m m a d married a m e m b e r of the paramount tribe of Asir. The 
amirs also appointed agents to deal with the tribes: there was an 
agent of the amir with the Shahran tribe in Wadi Bisha, and a sharif 
was appointed to deal with the Harb in 1905. 
The amirs interfered in the tribes directly as well as indirectly, 
and the major opportunity to do so came w h e n a n e w chief was to 
be chosen. Tribal leaders held their positions usually until they 
died, but there were instances, as in 1853, w h e n the Ottomans tried 
to oust one chief and install another. The chief of the Ahamida 
section of the Harb, with 5,000 members living near Medina, was 
ordered replaced by Amir A b d al-Muttalib, w h  o had killed the 
chiefs nephew, and the vali agreed. The incumbent resisted his 
deposition, and in the ensuing battles he defeated the Ottoman 
candidate. The incumbent continued in office until 1872. 
Usually the amirs could count on gaining temporary allies 
from a m o n g the tribes so as to mount a punitive raid, but these 
alliances were weakened by the very policy of divide and rule, 
which was the linchpin of the amirate's and empire's Bedouin pol­
icy. For although divided tribes were not able to mount a threat to 
Ottoman sovereignty, neither could they be used as a strong tool 
to restrain raids by their o w  n subunits. Authority within the tribes 
was loose. With the Harb the opposite policy of strengthening 
tribal leadership seems to have been tried by the amirs, but with 
little success. The overlords a m o n g the Harb, even w h e n backed 
by Ottoman grain and gold, restrained the raids of their followers 
only with the greatest difficulty. Since it was the Harb w h o were the 
aggressors, the amirs had to turn to the enemies of the Harb for 
military assistance. However, the interventions and military alli­
ances of the amirs did stop the emergence of a tribal confederation 
36 RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE IN ARABIA 
with aspirations to independence. It was only in the 1900s that the 
tribes played a major political role beyond the desert and the pil­
grimage, w h e n their interest in autonomy coincided with the same 
desire by the Amir Husayn. Both then opposed the construction of 
the Hijaz Railroad south of Medina to Mecca and Jidda. 
The nomadic tribes lived in the harshest sections of the Hijaz, 
but life was difficult and precarious for the settled population as 
well. Poverty and isolation were largely the results of the forbid­
ding climate and topography. Within this general environment, 
there were local differences with economic consequences that 
were crucial to the lives of the Hijazis, e.g., the dominance of Jidda 
over the other coastal towns because of its relatively better harbor 
and closeness to Mecca. But all of the Hijaz labored under the same 
need to import food because of agricultural poverty. 
The nomads were largely independent of the towns. S o m e 
trading between townsman and Bedouin took place, but the key 
linkages between the two groups were related to religion. The re­
ligious prestige of the amir of Mecca allowed him to mediate be­
tween the Ottoman government and the tribes. Raiding pilgrims 
and gaining protection m o n e  y from the Ottomans for the pilgrim­
age caravans provided the Bedouins with funds and goods to alle­
viate their poverty. 
Religious values were the prime factor in the local economy 
because of the economic importance of the pilgrimage. A m o n  g 
town Hijazis, religion determined the sense of time and the cal­
endar, and was a key factor because of the poor environment of the 
Hijaz. Religion was even more imporatnt than the geography, the 
economy, or the characteristics of the towns and Bedouins, for it 
was religion that m a d e life worth living as well as possible in the 
harsh Hijaz. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELIGION 
M A N K I N D W A S C R E A T E D from soil brought to Mecca and Taif by 
angels w h  o molded it and dried it into the shape of humanity. Eve, 
the mother of us all, was buried outside Jidda. Prayers offered to 
G o d were more valuable if made in the Hijaz. The water of the 
Zamzam well inside the Meccan Haram was considered to be so 
holy that some Indian Muslims threw themselves into it to be 
drowned. T  o be permitted to light the candles, sweep the floors, 
and wash the walls of the Kaba was a signal honor and blessing.1 
These and similar beliefs constituted for most of the population of 
the Hijaz an integral part of their religion. The sanctity attached to 
the Hijaz by Muslims outside the area, whether inspired by the awe 
attached to the place where the Quran was revealed or to these 
beliefs, also influenced the life of the people of the Hijaz. 
Religion was everywhere. Many individuals were personally 
pious; some were ascetics. Nearly all adhered to the conventional 
usages of Islam. In ordinary speech, in social relationships, in law, 
and in other aspects of life, religion and religious values played a 
determining part. The secularization of society that had begun in 
Western Europe in the eighteenth century and the consequent 
tendency to restrict religion to personal theology and morality 
were opposed in Mecca and Medina, as in other holy cities such as 
Jerusalem and R o m e . It was firmly believed that ultimate truth and 
contact with the transcendental had been given by G o  d to the 
Prophet M u h a m m a d in the form of the Quran in Mecca and M e ­
dina. The successors of the early Muslims saw around them in the 
nineteenth-century Hijaz the same places that had been sanctified 
by association with God's messenger in the seventh century. The 
progress of the lunar year through the calendar reminded people 
vividly of the earlier events. Near Mecca was Mount Arafat, sign of 
God's mercy to Abraham and thence to all mankind; in Mecca was 
the Kaba, cleansed by M u h a m m a  d of the abominations of idol wor­
ship; in Medina were the tombs of M u h a m m a d and his compan­
ions and immediate successors. And above all there was the 
renewal every year of the rites associated with M u h a m m a d '  s last 
pilgrimage, w h e  n tens of thousands of Muslims reenacted in and 
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near Mecca the rites of worship that G o d had enjoined upon all 
believers w h  o could afford the journey. 
A deep stratum of faith underlay religious forms, organiza­
tions, and officialdom. Both sides of religion—the formal and the 
personal, the social and the individual—were sincere, and both 
sides were necessary for the propagation and maintenance of re­
vealed truth. The point of view of such European Christian travel­
ers as W  . Robertson Smith that religion in the Hijaz was organized 
hypocrisy with the goal of extracting m o n e y from the pilgrims was 
incorrect. There was too m u c h evidence of personal morality, deep 
religious belief, and the social implementation of religious com­
mandments to permit this facile prejudice to be seriously enter­
tained. A m o n g m a n y possible examples of faith, a few m a y be cited 
here: public prayers led by the vali and the ulema for rain to end a 
long drought; the voluntary visits by Bedouin camel brokers to the 
Meccan Haram for prayers and religious lessons; the spirited de­
fense of Islam by Ibrahim A b d al-Fattah, a Hijazi merchant and 
commercial court judge, w h e n he was arrested by the British in the 
Sudan in 1885; and the participation in the pilgrimage rites by most 
of the Meccans and Jiddawis and m a n y Medinans and tribesmen 
every year.2 During the pilgrimage season, everything else came to 
a halt, partially because of the logistical problems of dealing with 
the pilgrims and the commercial fever of the merchants and 
guides, but also because of the absorption of the peoples of the 
Hijaz themselves in the grand religious event they organized and 
sponsored. 
Certainly not everyone was constantly engaged in religious ac­
tivity. There were those w h  o defied contemporary standards of m o  ­
rality; there must have been some for w h o  m public protestations 
of piety and participation in religious rites were hypocritical acts; 
and there undoubtedly was a sense of repletion and familiarity that 
induced m a n  y to regard the holy places with a feeling of proprie­
tary complacency. But the level of faith and belief was high in the 
crowds of hurrying pilgrims, the ragged Bedouins swaying on cam­
elback toward the holy cities, the villagers walking up the Wadi 
Fatimah toward Mecca, and the cosmopolitan townspeople of 
Mecca and Medina. Integral to these groups, and relying on their 
support and encouragement, there were the structures of reli­
gion—the varieties of religious experience, the mystical brother­
hoods, the different ways in which religious orthodoxy was 
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enforced, the international linkages that kept Islam united, and the 
officials w h  o managed the two Harams. 
RELIGIOUS RITUAL AND LAW 
There had grown up a m o n g Sunni Muslims four main schools 
of religious ritual and law: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali. Ad­
herents of each school consulted muftis belonging to that school; 
amon  g other things the admissibility of certain types of evidence, 
the rules of inheritance, and the leeway given the mufti to use his 
o w n judgment varied a m o n g the schools. The Ottoman Empire 
was officially Hanafi, whereas a majority of the population of the 
Hijaz was Shafii. 
The Shafiis included most of the Bedouin tribes, m a n y of the 
citizens of Medina, and the amirs of Mecca and the Hashimite clan 
from which they were drawn. The holy cities were mixed, but the 
Javanese were Shafii, and they constituted a large part of the Mec­
can population. O  n the other hand, the Harb tribe was Hanafi. The 
other two schools were poorly represented in the Hijaz, even 
though the founder of the Malikis was buried in Medina. The Ot­
toman central government sometimes did not appoint juriscon­
sults for those schools of law: Malikis in Medina petitioned 
Istanbul to appoint a mufti of their rite in 1867 so they could obtain 
legal opinions on inheritance. There were neither Hanbali preach­
ers nor a Maliki i m a m (prayer leader) in Mecca in 1873-74. The 
Hanafi and Shafii leaders took precedence w h e n there were rep­
resentatives of the other two schools present; the Hanafi led public 
prayers and presided at major public religious ceremonies. The 
Hanafi qadi of Mecca regulated the four schools and any conflicts 
among them inside the Haram.3 
The legal and ritual standing of Shii Muslims in the Hijaz was 
unclear. They were disliked and discriminated against by the Sunni 
majority. A few tribesmen near Medina, the poorest farmers of 
Medina, some of the butchers of Jidda, and the Persian pilgrim 
community were Shiis. H o  w they regulated questions of religious 
law a m o n g themselves is unknown. 
SUFISM 
The legal schools and the split between Sunni and Shii were 
two ways in which Muslims differentiated themselves. A third was 
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whether a given Muslim followed the mystical path toward illumi­
nation and knowledge of G o d . Mystics and nonmystics were not 
antagonistic or even sharply differentiated by the nineteenth cen­
tury. Membership in the brotherhoods gave the initiates contact 
with the brotherhood's spiritual past and its leaders w h  o had pos­
sessed religious insights. Through contemplation, ascetic prac­
tices, compliance with the formal requirements of Islam, and the 
gradual freedom gained from concern with worldly cares and 
pleasures, the individual believer, with the leadership of the fully 
initiated, might himself c o m  e closer to the divine. Differences 
a m o n g the brotherhoods existed on questions of the proper m e n ­
tal and physical routines needed to lead the proselyte toward the 
truth and the light, and also on the spiritual linkages, going back 
to M u h a m m a  d and Ali, that brought the initiate into contact with 
the inheritors of inner spiritual power and knowledge. The re­
wards of comradeship and religious solidarity were reinforced by 
the spiritual abundance and security available from the leaders of 
the order. For the more advanced in the stages of ascent, there 
were rewards in coming closer to G o d . 
The Sufis in the Hijaz were numerous and widespread. There 
were more than one hundred zawiyah chapel houses, known also 
as khanqahs or tekkes; unfortunately, the number of people w h  o 
attended the prayer sessions in the zawiyahs and the number of 
members of the Sufi brotherhoods are unknown. Not all orders 
had zawiyahs, but all the larger ones did (see table 1). 
The major brotherhoods in the Hijaz differed in their ap­
proach to spiritual issues, their political and public roles, their hi­
erarchy, and their impact upon the population of the area. The 
Qadiri order enjoyed some autonomy in its Meccan zawiyahs. They 
were usually headed by non-Arabs and especially by Anatolian 
Turks. The Qadiri and other brotherhoods that had originated out­
side the Hijaz or that had widespread external organizations were 
not dependent solely upon the local political authorities. The Qad­
iri order also had its o w  n funds provided from charitable founda­
tions. 
The leader of one of its Meccan zawiyahs, M u h a m m a  d ibn Ali 
Khamis, served as chief of its three zawiyahs w h e  n dealing with the 
head Sufi of Mecca; in Medina and Jidda, the zawiyahs were directly 
under the local Sufi sheikh. The same pattern existed for the other 
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Sufi Brotherhood Mecca 
TABLE 1 
SUFI ZAWIYAHS 
Medina Jidda Elsewhere Total 
Qadiri 3 Some Some 3+ 
Khalwati 12 20 8 
Khalwati-Sammani 
Shadhili-Rashidi 3 
4 5 
4 
1
1 
Isawi 
Darqawi 
1
2 
1
2 
Darqawi-Rahmani 3 1 4 
Nakshabandi 2 1
1 
3 
5Badawi-Ahmadi 3 1 
Some 
1 
Baiyumi-Ahmadi 
Dasuqi-Burhani 
Tijani 
68
1 
2 
Taif 14+ 
2 
Yanbu 3 
Rifai 
Sadi-Rifai 
112
1 
4 
1 
Mirghani 
Siddiki 
Kalandari 
Sanusi 
14 
1
1
1 
5 Taif 11 
1
1 
11
1 
9 12 
1Uzbek 
Totals 53 10 + 27 + 12 102+ 
S O U R C E : Alfred Le Chatelier, Les Confferies musulmans du Hedjaz (Paris, 1887), passim; BBA, M e  ­
clis-i Vala 1270; BBA, Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to sheikh of the Haram, 17 Shaban 1294. 
brotherhoods: if there were several zawiyahs, an intermediary was 
chosen to c o m m a n d them and represent them to the sheikh; if 
there were only one or two, the sheikh acted directly. Abd al-Karim 
Bantin, the leader of the Qadiris in 1884, after living in Indonesia 
and Singapore, spent eleven years in Mecca, where he maintained 
a large house with abundant hospitality for Qadiris. H  e led a sim­
ple life and got along well with the learned masters of formal Is­
lam. H  e sought the inner meaning of ceremonies and rituals; 
especially moving were his prayer and remembrance services for 
the Prophet. 
The Khalwatis, and especially the Sammaniyah branch, were 
strong in the Hijazi ports and in Y e m e n . M u h a m m a d ibn Abd al-
Karim al-Samman (d. 1775) founded the branch in Mecca; it soon 
spread to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Southeast Asia. Its members 
were mostly non-Hijazis. The Khalwatis were renowned for ascet­
icism, secrecy, and emphasis upon teaching. There were at least 
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1,800 members in the Hijaz, and it was upon them that the order 
depended for money, since it had no pious foundations. In the 
1880s its leaders in Jidda and in Mecca held the positions of head 
of the Sufis of those two towns and thereby conferred prestige 
upon the order. The Sammanis remained influential in Medina in 
the early twentieth century. M u h a m m a  d Abu al-Hasan al-Samman, 
the mayor of Medina in 1910, was a descendant of the branch's 
founder and was the local head of the Sammanis. 
The Shadhilis were famous for their rationalistic approach to 
Islam. They included a number of philosophical mystics and re­
cruited from the graduates of al-Azhar in Cairo. Ibrahim al-Rashidi 
(d. 1874/75) and Ali ibn Yaqub al-Murshidi of the Shadhilis both 
were harassed by the ulema of Mecca. The order was divided inter­
nally on many small doctrinal points. 
The most famous m e m b e r of the Darqawis was M u h a m m a d 
Zafir al-Madani (d. 1911/12), an adviser to Sultan Abdulhamid II. 
In 1875 M u h a m m a d  , the son of a Medina Shadhili leader, predicted 
the accession of then Prince Abdulhamid, w h  o subsequently em ­
ployed him as an envoy in African Tripoli and as an agent among 
the brotherhoods in Istanbul. H e was buried in a Shadhili zawiyah 
near the imperial palace ofYildiz. Another branch of the Darqawis 
secured a prominent adherent from outside the Hijaz: Abd al-Qadir 
al-Jazairi, the exiled leader of an anti-French rebellion in Algeria, 
became a Darqawi by 1868, thanks to the efforts of the Mecca za­
wiyah leader, M u h a m m a  d Abd al-Rahman al-Fasi (d. 1878). Abd al-
Rahman's branch of the Darqawis spread throughout the Hijaz after 
it divided from the rest of the order in 1850, but its only branch 
outside the vilayet was in Massawa. 
Another order founded in the Hijaz was the Alwanis, a group 
that was reformed by the Meccan Abd Allah ibn Salim al-Alwani 
(d. 1786/87). His grandson was in charge of the Meccan zawiyah 
in the 1880s. M u h a m m a  d Abd al-Rahman (d. 1878) founded a za­
wiyah in Mecca in 1857; his movement spread to the Sudan and 
the eastern Red Sea coast. 
The social composition of the local Nakshabandi order was 
the reverse of the Darqawis. The Nakshabandis existed primarily 
outside the Hijaz. Local members were non-Arabs, and were orga­
nized into two separate Indian and Turkish groups. A leader of the 
Turkish Nakshabandis was Ibrahim E d h e m (1829-1904), w h o had 
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been a Sufi sheikh in Istanbul as well as director of the Men's In­
dustrial Trade School there. Ibrahim had been sent to Mecca to 
direct repairs to the Kaba, but he earned a living as a seal engraver. 
Pilgrims of all ethnic groups were supplied with food and clothes 
by the Nakshabandis. Feast days were celebrated, and prayer ses­
sions and communal weekly meals took place. The Nakshabandis 
played a large role in Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamic movement and 
raised donations for the Hijaz Railroad. 
The Baiyumis were founded by an Egyptian sharif w h  o fre­
quently visited the Hijaz in the eighteenth century and gained 
m a n  y Bedouin as well as Indian and Nubian recruits. Hijaz zawi­
yahs of this brotherhood became independent from Egypt during 
a struggle over the succession to the grand mastership in the early 
nineteenth century. As a result, the organization's leaders were ap­
pointed by the sheikh of the Sufis. The ascetic Baiyumis provided 
hostels for pilgrims. Unlike the Baiyumis, the section of the Tijani 
order in the Hijaz did not serve to unite Muslims of different ethnic 
or regional origins. The Tijani movement in Mecca split in 1886 
between African blacks and Nubians under Sulayman Kabir, and 
Algerians and Tunisians under Sheikh Musa. 
A more numerous brotherhood and perhaps the wealthiest 
was the Rifai, which owned m a n y waqfs in Mecca and Medina, as 
well as being the beneficiary of funds from Istanbul. The imperial 
money was used for the construction of three n e w zawiyahs in the 
Hijaz.4 
These brotherhoods and others like them showed the variety 
of approaches to Sufism open to the Hijazi Muslim of the nine­
teenth century. Depending upon his area of origin, language and 
desire for greater or less direct mystical experience, he could find 
a brotherhood suited to his preferences. Although the orders dif­
fered sharply in their material resources, numbers of followers, or­
ganizational independence, and access to Ottoman officialdom, 
there were also similarities a m o n g the brotherhoods. M a n y of the 
orders were founded outside the Hijaz, there was a distinct ten­
dency toward fragmentation of the orders as n e  w leaders or 
doctrinal differences emerged, and the local zawiyahs gained 
members from limited segments of society. 
There were two prominent orders that originated locally and 
drew members from all of society—the Mirghanis and the Idrisi­
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Sanusis. The Mirghanis, or Khatmis, were founded by M u h a m m a d 
ibn Uthman al-Mirghani, a native of the Hijaz, born near Taif in 
1793/94. H e grew up in Mecca, where he studied religion before 
becoming a preacher in Egypt, the Sudan, and the Hijaz; he knew 
the mystic A h m a d ibn Idris (1760-1837) in Mecca. M u h a m m a d ' s 
death is variously given as 1851 or 1853. The order adopted an 
ecstatic approach to Sufi knowledge, used its founder's writings as 
a basis for ceremonies of remembrance of God, and believed 
firmly in hereditary grace and hereditary mystical power. As a re­
sult, even while it was spreading rapidly throughout the Red Sea 
area, there was a heated controversy over the succession to lead­
ership among the sons of M u h a m m a d ibn Uthman and, later, their 
heirs. 
The Meccan zawiyah that looked out onto the Haram was un­
der the control of a grandson of the founder, Abd Allah al-Mahjub, 
in the 1880s. Abd Allah controlled several other zawiyahs, includ­
ing at least one in Medina and one near Taif. H e and his cousin 
M u h a m m a d Uthman intervened on the side of the British during 
the war in the Sudan against the mahdi. Abd Allah's authority was 
weakened by the splitting from the brotherhood of believers in 
Y e m e n , Hadramawt, and the Sudan. Even in the Hijaz, there was a 
rival organization under the leadership of Ibrahim ibn Musa al-
Ukhayli, w h  o controlled at least two zawiyahs in Mecca and Jidda. 
Other Hijazi Mirghanis allied with the Shadhilis and Nakshabandis. 
Although the Mirghanis remained numerous in the Hijaz and the 
family was given Ottoman funds, they lost ground to the Sanusis 
locally. Mirghani influence was centered in the Sudan. 
The Sanusis were founded by M u h a m m a d ibn Ali al-Sanusi 
(1791-1859), w h o , like the Mirghani founder, met A h m a d ibn Idris 
and became a follower of his after making the pilgrimage of 1830. 
M u h a m m a d ibn Ali founded a zawiyah in Mecca in 1837 but was 
twice forced to go into exile because of accusations of heresy. By 
1853 additional zawiyahs were founded in Mecca, Medina, Taif, 
Jidda, and numerous smaller places. The movement spread rapidly 
among the Bedouins; unfortunately there is no evidence to indi­
cate what aspects of it appealed particularly to them. Perhaps it was 
the independence of the order, which was free from control either 
by the sharifs of Mecca or by the Ottoman government. As in Libya, 
where the movement eventually gained political power for part of 
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the twentieth century, so in the Hijaz the Sanusis founded settle­
ments, organized caravans, extended their protection, created 
plantations with a slave militia, and grouped together the usually 
antipathetic Bedouins and villagers. In the towns the Sanusi zawi­
yahs helped pilgrims and also used their extensive funds for teach­
ing. T w  o separate hierarchies supervised spiritual and financial 
matters, with an accountant and messengers under the control of 
the Sanusi's center at the oasis of Jaghbub in North Africa. The Hi­
jazi leadership was semihereditary, but after 1859 the family of the 
founder lived in North Africa. Sultan Abdulhamid II desired to use 
the Sanusis to spread Ottoman power in Libya and the Sahara. 
However, the Sanusis in Arabia remained more independent of the 
Ottomans than other Sufi brotherhoods. The Sanusis incurred the 
enmity and suspicion of the amirs of Mecca because of their inde­
pendence and because of their influence a m o n  g the tribes.5 
Despite their widespread following, the Sanusi order had little 
to do with the politics of the Hijaz or with the relations between 
the tribes and the government. The only k n o w n instance of inter­
vention or mediation was in 1886 w h e n the Sanusi leader in Yanbu 
opposed a rising by the villagers against the government over 
taxes. The local residents rejected his advice, revolted, killed s o m e 
Ottoman soldiers, and suffered casualties of their o w n before the 
revolt was suppressed.6 
REPRESSION AND INNOVATION 
Although the Sufi brotherhoods had m a n  y followers in the Hi­
jaz, their social power was small because their approach to life was 
apolitical and they tended toward the ascetic attitude of despising 
the material factors of life. Power in religion lay with the amirs of 
Mecca, the ulema, and the Ottoman government. The exercise of 
religious power was usually positive through the encouragement 
and regulation of such things as religious education, the pilgrim­
age, and charitable foundations. 
There were s o m e examples of the use of political power to 
enforce religious orthodoxy. A serious complaint to Istanbul was 
m a d e by a special council in 1849 composed of the Meccan ulema; 
the vali; A h m a  d ibn Zayni Dahlan, the Shafii mufti and head of the 
preachers and prayer leaders; all the other muftis of Mecca; the 
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head of the teachers; the deputy sheikh of the Meccan Haram; 
Hasan ibn Shahin, the deputy amir of Mecca; and M u h a m m a  d Imad 
al-Din, the qadi of Mecca. Several Indian Muslims were accused of 
leading the people into error by disavowing the four schools of 
religious law, opposing the miracles of the saints, and introducing 
innovations into religion. The Indians were said to have arrogated 
to themselves the right to interpret the bases of the faith. After hear­
ing witnesses testify against the accused, the council decided to 
arrest them and exile them. The vali wanted to execute the Indians, 
for he argued that evil in religion was the greatest of evils in the 
world. Eventually he gave way to the council's opinion, and after 
gaining the approval of the Istanbul Council of Judicial Affairs and 
the sultan, they were sent to India. Very similar occurrences took 
place in 1874 and 1883 w h e n Sunni Muslim Indians were exiled 
from Mecca for spreading what the Meccan ulema considered to 
be wrong beliefs. The Ottomans feared the coming of Wahhabi 
doctrines via India to the Hijaz. In 1885 the vali secretly obtained 
the papers and books of three Indian pilgrims w h o were suspected 
of Wahhabi ideas. In the next year, two more Indian pilgrim lead­
ers w h  o had recently become Ottoman citizens were arrested by 
the Ottomans. In their papers were printed proclamations by the 
Sudanese mahdi and works on Wahhabism. There was some agi­
tation in Mecca for their release, but instead Istanbul ordered them 
deported to India.7 
There were few cases of political suppression of religious dis­
sent a m o n  g non-Indians. O n  e of the few concerned the Rashidi 
Sufis. The Rashidiyah had been founded by A h m a d ibn Idris's dis­
ciple Ibrahim al-Rashid, w h  o disputed the claims of numerous 
other Sufi groups to be Ahmad's rightful heir. Ibrahim overcame 
the enmity caused by his rivals and was acquitted of charges of 
heresy in Mecca in 1856/57. With the aid of Indian Muslim gifts, he 
built a zawiyah there, where he died in 1874 and was succeeded 
by his nephew. Other instances occurred in the 1880s, a decade of 
political turmoil. A conflict over the leadership of the Nakshaban­
diyah in Mecca between Sulayman and Khalil ibn Yahya caused the 
first incident. Sulayman wrote a series of pamphlets said by the 
muftis and teachers at the Haram to be false and dangerous. Sulay­
m a n was imprisoned, his pamphlets were destroyed, and he apol­
ogized for his errors. Khalil's essays against Sulayman were a m o n g 
thefirst works printed in Mecca. A second incident was the execu­
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tion of a Sudanese, probably the Shadhili leader Ali ibn Yaqub al-
Murshidi, born in Mecca, w h  o proclaimed himself the mahdi in a 
village between Jidda and Mecca in 1886. H  e gained a small follow­
ing a m o n g some slaves, but was soon seized, condemned by a 
council of the ulema in Mecca, and executed by order of the vali.8 
The failure of such religious reformers to secure a substantial 
following in the Hijaz indicates the overwhelming commitment of 
the people of the holy cities to the continuance of the existing 
forms of religion, although there were some instances of changes 
introduced from abroad, particularly in the Sufi brotherhoods. 
More important, however, was the influence exerted by the 
Hijaz upon the rest of the Islamic world. M a n y Hijazi teachers of 
religion had disciples abroad, and Medina scholars had been im­
portant teachers as early as the eighteenth century. The mystic Ah-
m a d ibn Idris lived in Mecca and Asir off and on from 1818 to his 
death in 1837. H e was a m o n g the most influential Sufis of his gen­
eration, and his fame spread throughout the Islamic world through 
his disciples. Many contacts were m a d e a m o n g pilgrims w h o met 
in Mecca or Medina, where they exchanged ideas and approaches 
to religious truth. A n example was the spread of a stricter interpre­
tation of the Quran a m o n g Southeast Asian Muslims as the students 
of A h m a  d Katib (1855-1916), a Shafii law teacher in Mecca, re­
turned to Sumatra and Malaya in the 1880s and 1890s. The Naksha­
bandiyah in Mecca were particularly active. They gained large 
numbers of followers in the Malaysian states and in the East Indies. 
Many Meccan and Medinan ulema also went to other parts of the 
Muslim lands to gain funds for themselves and their religious and 
charitable undertakings in the Hijaz.9 
Muslims assumed that those living in proximity to holy places 
were pious and deserving of charity. O n  e sharif w h  o lived in M e  ­
dina for three months of the year spent the rest of his time traveling 
to Istanbul, Bukhara, Kabul, and India. In his case, as in others, his 
claims to receive charity and gifts were endorsed by imperial let­
ters of credence from the Ottoman sultan.10 
Despite the large numbers of pilgrims coming to the Hijaz 
and the influence of some Hijazis abroad, Mecca and Medina were 
not the most important and influential cities of Islam in the nine­
teenth century. The relative poverty of the Hijaz, the shortness of 
most pilgrims' stays in the area, and the pressure for religious con­
formity lessened substantial changes and developments in theol­
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ogy. Instead, Cairo, Istanbul, some of the Indian cities, and perhaps 
Riyadh led the way in the nineteenth century in the theological 
development of Sunni Islam. Mecca and Medina were important as 
refuges for conservative thinkers w h  o wished to escape the 
changes taking place in cities such as Cairo. 
OFFICIALDOM 
Religious experiences in the Hijaz took place in social struc­
tures and institutions supervised by officials appointed by, or with 
the sanction of, the Ottoman and amirate authorities. These offi­
cials influenced the nature of religious life both for Hijazis and pil­
grims. Since the officials were dependent for appointment, 
salaries, and promotion upon the Ottoman government, they were 
subject to direct government manipulation. 
The chief religious officials were the amir and qadi of Mecca. 
Next in importance were the two sheikhs, or directors, of the 
Harams in Mecca and Medina. The Meccan position was formally 
merged with the governorship of the Hijaz after 1864. 
In the case of Medina, the position of sheikh and that of Ot­
toman governor (muhafiz) of the city were often held jointly. In 
addition to the civil and police powers sometimes exercised by the 
sheikh, either in his o w  n role or as governor, his responsibilities 
were to supervise and administer the complex of buildings, offices, 
and storehouses associated with the Haram. The sheikh of the 
Medina Haram held office for a short term, averaging two to three 
years. Exceptional longer terms in office occurred in the 1840s 
w h e n Ottoman control was being reestablished after the end of the 
Egyptian occupation and again following the advent to power of 
Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1876 (see table 2). 
Once he had found an official he could trust, Abdulhamid 
tended to retain the same person in office. However, even the Cir­
cassian army officer O s m a n , w h o was governor and sheikh for the 
longest term, was occasionally limited in his authority by the sul­
tan. In 1899 and between 1902-4, four other people briefly served 
as governors of Medina, and O s m a  n retained only the position of 
sheikh of the Haram. Eventually O s m a n resumed the governorship 
until the Revolution of 1908 ousted Hamidian personnel in the 
Hijaz. 
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TABLE 2 
SHEIKHS OF THE MEDINA HARAM 
Years in Office Sheikh 
1839-40 Osman 
1841 Haci Ali 
1841-45 Sherif 
1845 Ashki 
1846-50 Davud 
1850-51 Sherif 
1851-52 Haci Edhem 
1852-55 Osman 
1855-56 Arif 
1856-58 Tosun 
1858-61 Mustafa 
1861-62 Ziver 
1862-63 Emin 
1863 Suleyman 
1863-64 Hafiz 
1864-67 Mehmet Vecihi 
1867-70 Emin 
1870 Osman 
1871-74 Halet 
1874-75 Mehmet 
1875-77 AliSarim 
1878-82 Halet 
1882-1889 Adil 
1889-91 Shevket 
1891-1908 Osman 
There were others w h  o shared in the administration of the 
Harams. In Mecca and Medina, the need to provide guards w h  o 
could with propriety supervise female pilgrims led to the use of 
eunuchs. Most of the eunuchs were black slaves from Africa w h  o 
had been castrated there and w h  o were trained as apprentices in 
Mecca or Medina. They enjoyed a high status,frequently having 
separate households and their o w  n slaves, but technically they 
were slaves themselves and thus could not leave the Harams of 
their o w n free will. Many had chosen to go to Mecca or Medina 
from Istanbul, seeing in those places an opportunity for a pious 
retirement from the imperial court. The one hundred twenty eu­
nuchs in Medina in 1853 were under the c o m m a n  d of a former 
slave of Sultan M a h m u  d II's sister. There were aboutfifty eunuchs 
in the Meccan Haram throughout the nineteenth century. The calls 
to prayer were given by muezzins. In the days before loudspeakers, 
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this often was a hauntingly beautiful part of religious life and the 
daily routine of Muslims. There were aboutfifty paid muezzins in 
each of the Harams. Prayer leaders numbered nearly ninety for 
Medina, and there were about forty-five preachers. Hanafis were 
the most numerous, followed by Shafiis, Malikis, and Hanbalis. 
Prayers were recited for the ruling sultan and for deceased Muslims 
by more than one hundred people in Medina, w h  o received pay­
ment for this service. In Mecca the Hanafis had forty-three paid and 
thirty-two volunteer preachers and prayer leaders, the Shafiis had 
twenty-five, the Malikis fifteen, and the Hanbalis only five.11 
In addition to those w h  o carried out the police and ceremon­
ial religious functions, there were officials w h o provided services 
and w h  o physically maintained the Harams: servants, doorkeepers, 
sweepers, candle-cleaners and -lighters, water-carriers, goldsmiths, 
and so on. Many of these posts were paid ones that rotated a m o n g 
the people of Medina so that all could share in the sanctity as well 
as the perquisites of office. Other posts were unpaid but remuner­
ative in terms of prestige and gifts. The title of servant of the Haram 
was sometimes awarded by the amir of Mecca or by the sheikh of 
the Medina Haram for cash payment; the title of servant of the two 
Harams was proudly borne by the sultan himself. Perhaps three 
hundred people were permanently paid by the Meccan Haram, ex­
clusive offifty to one hundred teachers and two hundred guides. 
If one added unpaid volunteers, the number of employees would, 
at the m i n i m u m  , have been doubled. Between four hundred and 
six hundred regular staff were paid at Medina, with as m a n y more 
volunteers w h  o received only small sums as their turns came in 
rotation. More than two thousand persons worked at both Harams. 
The Haram workers were organized with a sheikh for each of 
the various occupations. The appointment of the sheikhs had to be 
approved by the Ottoman government. 
Muftis were appointed directly by Istanbul for Mecca and 
Medina. As in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, in this position 
sons tended to follow fathers, and muftis held their offices for long 
terms. The most striking examples of continuity were the three 
members of the Barzanji family w h  o held the Medina Shafii mufti-
ship from 1852 to 1907 (possibly with a gap between 1897 and 
1905), and the tenures of A b d al-Rahman ibn Abd Allah Sarraj and 
Salih Kamal as Hanafi muftis of Mecca from 1878 to 1906. Similar 
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tenure and family recruitment practices probably existed for other 
posts as well. 
All of the m e  n of religion in each town were collectively 
headed by a sheikh. The exact duties of this position, the ways in 
which it wasfilled, and its relations with Ottoman and amirate of­
ficials are unfortunately unknown. In Medina in 1881, the sheikh 
of the ulema was also the Hanafi mufti; but in Mecca at the same 
time, Dahlan, the Shafii mufti, held the post. The latter distributed 
some gifts that had been m a d e to the whole ulema, appointed 
teachers at the Haram, and in general served as a link between the 
ulema and the government. H e also chose from a m o n g the ulema 
those w h  o would go abroad to collect charitable gifts. Dahlan's 
learning and forceful personality m a y have given him greater au­
thority than his predecessors or successors held. 
In addition to a chief of the ulema, there were potential rivals 
with the amirs of Mecca to lead the descendants of the Prophet 
M u h a m m a  d living in the Hijaz. In this area descendants of the 
Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s grandsons Hasan and Husayn were differ­
entiated; Hasanids were termed sharifs, and Husaynids, sayyids. 
Medina had a naqib al-ashraf, or head of the sharifs, from 1841 to 
1862 and in 1902, and a naqib al-sadat, or head of the sayyids, for 
the whole of the nineteenth century after 1840. There was a naqib 
al-sadat in Mecca in 1842-53,1857-71, 1881, and possibly at other 
times as well. The amir of Mecca headed the ashraf there, although 
Ishaq Efendi was called both naqib al-ashraf and naqib al-sadat in 
the 1840s and 1850s. 
In other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the naqibs were media­
tors between local governments and their groups. They also served 
as intermediaries, passing information and advice upward to the 
politically powerful and demands for services and support down­
ward. A similar function was exercised by the heads of the guilds, 
ulema, religious professions, and the Sufi brotherhoods. In the 
case of the Sufis, M e h m e  d Ali's Egyptian administration had intro­
duced to the Hijaz the function of chief Sufi sheikh. This sheikh 
presided over Sufi public ceremonies, led special prayers in mos­
ques, supervised pious foundations, and, w h e  n particularly p o w  ­
erful persons held the post, n a m e d the heads of the orders. The 
Ottoman restoration in 1840 kept the chief Sufi position and added 
a council of advisers. The sheikh lost some of his power as some 
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of the brotherhoods escaped his authority in the late nineteenth 
century. The central government itself also occasionally appointed 
heads of the Sufi brotherhoods independently of the sheikh. 
The Shaybi family held their post of keykeeper of the Kaba by 
hereditary right. They traced their ancestry back to pre-Islamic 
times and claimed to have controlled admission to the Kaba ever 
since. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government se­
lected the n e  w keykeeper from a m o n  g the family, although rival 
factions of the Shaybi clan claimed the succession, particularly in 
the 1870s and 1880s. The leaders of the family were greatly re­
spected, served on the administrative councils of the province, and 
received salaries and pensions from Istanbul. W h e  n the cloth cov­
ering of the Kaba was replaced, pieces of the old one were sold by 
the Shaybis to shops in Mecca for resale to pilgrims. The keykeeper 
also was given substantial presents by those admitted to the inte­
rior of the Kaba. After the Revolution of 1908, Hasan Shaybi was 
elected to the Ottoman Parliament from the Hijaz.12 
FINANCES OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
Religious structures, institutions, and individuals were sup­
portedfinancially in a variety of ways, but most of their m o n e  y 
came in one form or another from the Ottoman government. 
Pious foundations (waqfs) had been established throughout 
the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of aiding the holy cities. The 
income from these properties was collected by a treasury estab­
lished especially for that purpose. In Egypt waqfs existed to pay for 
the renewal of the Kaba's covering, for sending grain to the Hijaz, 
and for the pilgrimage. There were also some pious foundations in 
the Hijaz. The Haseki Sultan charity kitchens were maintained in 
part from Egyptian funds and in part from the rent from thirty-four 
shops in Mecca. This waqf provided soup, bread, and rice every day 
to the poor and sick of Mecca. Sultans had endowed the M a h m u  ­
diye school in Medina with local waqf income, and the Harams 
also had local waqfs for their support. Amirs of Mecca gave m o n e y 
and property to such pious foundations. A n example was the Amir 
Ghalib's waqf, which had an income in 1871 of T. L 2,295. The 
mosques of Jidda had waqf property yielding about T. L 7,500 per 
year in 1888. Private individuals also founded pious foundations, 
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for example, Mustafa Qadi, w h  o endowed the Sanusi zawiyah in 
Jidda in the 1840s with all his money.1 3 
Far more came directly from Istanbul through the imperial 
charities. The distribution of imperial charities in Medina was con­
trolled by the muftis, the chief preacher, and the judge's clerk. The 
recipients included all the major religious officials and the Sufi 
leaders. W h e n supplies of food or cash were not forthcoming, as 
in 1841, the officials petitioned Istanbul. O n  e of m a n  y recipients 
was the Medina Shafii mufti, w h o , in addition to his monetary sal­
ary, monthly received wheat, butter, rice, sugar, coffee, and soap. 
The central government also supported institutions. M u h a m m a  d 
Jan (d. ca. 1850) had built in Jidda a Nakshabandiyah convent that 
provided food to the poor. In 1854 Istanbul agreed to give food 
and m o n e y to the zawiyah. There were about one hundred fifty 
lodgings in Mecca andfifty-nine in Medina that supplied room and 
board to the needy. The lodging houses received grain and meat 
from the imperial government. Even though the Ottoman Empire 
was short of m o n e y in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
funds were found for the restoration of buildings in the Hijaz. Both 
Harams were extensively repaired and renovated, despite the op­
position of s o m e Medina mystics w h o objected to any changes in 
the holy structure.14 
Private sources of income included fees charged for such ser­
vices as performing marriages, notarizing documents, rendering 
judgments outside regular court service, opening the Kaba or sec­
tions of the Harams outside regular hours, and so on. O n  e ingen­
ious device took advantage of the desire of pilgrims from the more 
distant Islamic lands to exchange their present names for Arabic 
ones: printed forms for this purpose were kept at the muftis' resi­
dences and a fee was charged for their signatures.15 
The powers and status of the Muslim officialdom showed that 
the Hijaz was a Muslim land. S o m e Christians were permitted in 
Jidda and occasionally in the interior as travelers, but they were not 
allowed to visit the holy cities. In another sense the Hijaz was a 
Muslim land because of its deep piety, reinforced by religious 
structures. These were widespread and provided vehicles for form­
ing and shaping religous identity, legal opinions, and mystical 
yearnings. Political structures provided religious groups with the 
means to repress what were considered heresies as well as the fi­
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nancial support to maintain charities, the pilgrimage, the Harams, 
and the salaries of the chief religious figures. In return the m e  n of 
religion did not usually challenge government power. Religious 
legitimacy was conferred on the Ottoman Empire as the protector 
of the holy places of Islam. 
Conflict, tension, and change did exist, but only to a small 
degree in the religious life of the Hijaz. The Indian Wahhabis were 
outside the Hijazi spectrum of thought and were easily repressed. 
Orthodoxy and orthopraxy were popular. Potential challenges to 
the status quo could have c o m e from the Sufis and local religious 
officials. However, the brotherhoods were limited in the political 
sphere by their o w n ideology and by the division of religious re­
spect a m o n  g the populace between the Sufi leaders and the sharifs 
of Mecca. Thefragmentation of the Sufi orders along ethnic lines 
also weakened them. The most important Hijazi Sufi orders spread 
into Africa and found there a more congenial atmosphere for po­
litical influence. Roles as mediators and possessors of spiritual 
grace were alsofilled by the Hashimite sharifs of Mecca. Since the 
muftis and other religious officials were paid by the Ottomans, the 
possibility of their opposing imperial rule was slight. 
The wide range of religious groups and institutions was out­
side the total control of the Ottoman political elite. The Ottomans 
tried to overcome this by bringing the various religious groups un­
der their control through appointing the sheikhs w h  o headed each 
of them. Ottoman control of employment at the Harams was also 
of far-reaching importance: the 2,000 employees of the Harams 
provided a major source of influence for the central government. 
In short, the social institutions of religion were under the ov­
erarching control of the state, but the forms of those religious struc­
tures responded to the deepest beliefs and needs of the highly 
varied population of the nineteenth-century Hijaz. The Ottoman 
state supported religion and picked the leaders of religious insti­
tutions, but religious structures enjoyed a legitimacy, vitality, and 
authority independent of the empire. Through the pilgrimage re­
ligion greatly influenced all aspects of the social and political his­
tory of the Hijaz. 
1. Al-Batanuni, Al Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, pp. 127, 237. 
2. Smith, Lectures, pp. 493, 547; F  O 195/2224, Devey (Jidih) to O'Conor, 16 January 
1906; Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Turquie, Politique interieure, Arabie-Yemen 
RELIGION 57 
(hereafter FY), Malzag (Jidda) to ministry, 9 September 1907; Hurgronje, Mekka, p. 199; Abd 
al-Qudus al-Ansari, Tarikh Madinah Juddah, pp. 282-83. 
3. Burton, Personal Narrative, 2:6-7; Hurgronje, DieStadt, p. 159; Fuad Hamzah, Qalb 
Jazirat al-Arab, p. 97; BBA, Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to sheikh of the Medina Haram, 23 M u  ­
harrem 1284; Al-Batanuni, Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, p. 261. 
4. The foregoing discussion of Sufis is based on these sources: Alfred Le Chatelier, Les 
Confreries musulmans du Hedjaz; John Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modem 
World; Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad, pp. 69-76; B . Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II 
and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," pp. 146-48; Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 206, 276-81; J. S. Tri­
mingham, Islam in the Sudan, pp. 200, 231. 
5. Le Chatelier, Confreries, pp. 13-19, 226-42, 272-91; BBA, Bab i Ali Evrak Odasi, 
298156, 1911; FJP, Dorville (Jidda) to ministry, 2 September 1893; Al Barakati, AlRihlat al 
Yamaniyyah, p. 119; Al-Batanuni, Al-Rihlat al Hijaziyyah, p. 56; Trimingham, Islam in the 
Sudan, pp. 215-17; Nicola Ziadeh, Sanusiyah, pp. 45-47, 62-71, 114-16, 121; Voll, Islam, 
pp. 78, 137. 
6. Le Chatelier, Confreries, pp. 288-89. 
7. Voll, Islam, p. 126; Recueil de firmans imperiaux ottomans, p. 98; BBA, Meclis-i Vala 
5405, 26 Shewal 1266; BBA, Ayniyat 871, 12 Cemaziyelewel 1290 and 14 Cemaziyelahir 
1290; F O 195/1451, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) tojago, 10 November 1883; F O 685/2/1, Abdur 
Razzack (Jidda) to Government of India, 12 October 1885; F O 685/2/1, Jago (Jidda) to 
Government of India, 15 February 1886. 
8. Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 177-79; Le Chatelier, Confreries, pp. 9, 97-99; F  O 195/1547, 
Jago (Jidda) to Thornton, 17 May 1886. 
9. Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 3:83; John Voll, " M u h a m m a d Hayya al-
Sindi and M u h a m m a d b. Abd al Wahhab"; Voll, Islam, pp. 78, 117; A. Hourani, "Shaikh 
Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," p. 100; Hurgronje, Mekka, p. 241. 
10. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2:274; BBA, Ayniyat 1517, grand vezir to Sadiq 
Pasha, vali of Tunis, 4 Receb 1297; Burton, Personal Narrative, 1:159. A similar phenomenon 
took place among the Morcxcan marabouts w h o visited outlying regions and received gifts 
(Dale Eickelman, Monxvan Islam, pp. 169-70). 
11. Burton, Personal Narrative, 1:371-74; Ottoman Empire, Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 
1303, p. 185; Ottoman Empire, Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305, pp. 233-34; Ottoman Empire, 
Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306, pp. 302-5; Al-Batanuni, Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, pp. 101, 242; 
BBA, Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to amir and vali, 26 Safer 1290. 
12. BBA, Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to amir and vali, 19 Shaban 1294; BBA, Shurayi Devlet 
2874, 20 Shewal 1297; Al-Batanuni, Al-Rihlat al Hijaziyyah, p. 139. 
13. Sabri, Miratulharemeyn, 1:1039; Recueil, p. 41; BBA, Dahiliye 69888, 4 Rebiyulahir 
1300; BBA, Ayniyat 871, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1288, 29 Zilhicce 1288, and 15 Receb 1289; BBA, 
Shurayi Devlet 5368, 21 Receb 1305. 
14. BBA, Mesail-i M u h i m m e 2431, n.d., enclosure 12; BBA, Dahiliye 3887, 11 Receb 
1259; Burton, Personal Narrative, 1:374-75; BBA, Dahiliye 64975, 12 Rebiyulahir 1297; BBA, 
Meclis-i Vala 11868, 15 Rebiyulahir 1270; A h m e  d Cevdet Pasha, Tezakir, 2:15-17; Sabri, Mir 
atulharemeyn, 1:1039:40. 
15. Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 236-38. 
CHAPTER 3 
PILGRIMAGE AND HEALTH 
A C C O R D I N G T O M U S L I M S the pilgrimage is a reenactment of the 
Quranic story of Abraham. The willingness of Abraham to sacrifice 
his son so as to carry out the will of G o d  , the substitution of an 
animal sacrifice in the place of a h u m a n one through God's mercy, 
and the building of a house of G o d have been commemorated 
every year by millions of Muslims in the Hijaz and elsewhere. The 
prophet M u h a m m a  d revived and codified the correct procedures 
for pilgrims so that w h e n they went on the pilgrimage to Mecca 
and nearby sites to meet their religious obligations a detailed set 
of rituals existed. After the death of M u h a m m a d in 632 A D . , those 
sites in Mecca and Medina associated with his life and with the 
revelations that G o d had m a d e to him were visited by the pilgrims. 
The pilgrimage was the central link between religion and so­
ciety in the Hijaz. Its social and collective importance was seen in 
the external behavior of the pilgrims, the institutions of the pil­
grimage, and the impact of the pilgrims on Hijazi society. However, 
it should be remembered that the purpose of the pilgrims was to 
achieve personal, internal goals: for them the pilgrimage existed 
for spiritual and not material reasons. 
Pilgrims came to the two holy cities by a number of different 
routes. Muslims living to the southeast, east, and southwest of the 
Hijaz usually traveled through the straits of Bab al-Mandab at the 
southern entrance to the Red Sea; those coming from areas lying 
to the north and northwest of Mecca and Medina arrived by sea via 
Suez. Land caravans were slow and dangerous.1 Many were under 
the protection of Ottoman, Ottoman-Egyptian, and Central Arabian 
military escorts w h  o guarded the pilgrims from attacks by Be­
douins. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, a large major­
ity of the pilgrims from outside the Arabian Peninsula came by sea 
rather than by land. The bulk of pilgrims consisted of Hijazis, plus 
people from relatively close areas such as Najd and Y e m e n  . 
The conditions under which pilgrimages were undertaken 
changed from year to year as the crucial pilgrimage days of 8 to 12 
D h  u al-Hijjah according to the lunar religious calendar changed in 
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regard to the solar calendar. W h e n the pilgrimage fell in December 
and there was a period of comparative coolness in the Hijaz, the 
pilgrims tended to be happier and healthier than w h e n the holy 
days took place at the height of the heat in July. In the s u m m e  r 
tremendous problems were added for the pilgrims. 
Pilgrims received some assistance from the Ottoman sultan in 
his role of protector of Mecca and Medina and of the pilgrimage to 
these cities. The members of the Ottoman imperial court showed 
numerous signs of personal reverence for the pilgrimage in gen­
eral and for deserving pilgrims in particular. The sultans tradition­
ally celebrated the departure of a pilgrimage caravan from Istanbul 
with brilliant ceremonies. They sent guards to protect the pilgrims 
and occasional messengers with gifts, and they dedicated some of 
the tax resources of the Syrian provinces and Egypt to the pilgrim­
age. Drama, excitement, and danger surrounded the long trips of 
the two official Ottoman pilgrimage caravans from Damascus and 
Cairo to the Hijaz.2 
Once the pilgrims entered the Hijaz, they were by no means 
guaranteed the attainment of their goals. S o m  e past rulers had ex­
pressed personal piety and increased the safety of the pilgrims by 
accompanying the caravans themselves. Although none of the Ot­
toman sultans personally m a d e the pilgrimage, they did m a k e 
strenuous attempts to safeguard it. Nevertheless, there were occa­
sions w h e n the nomads succeeded in robbing and murdering pil­
grims, most notably in 1757, w h e n the Ottoman caravan was 
completely destroyed and a sister of the sultan killed. A lengthier 
interruption took place w h e n the Wahhabi movement conquered 
Mecca and Medina and the official pilgrimage from the Ottoman 
Empire ceased. Even after Egypt reconquered the Hijaz for the Ot­
tomans, there were interruptions caused by the military and polit­
ical rivalry between M e h m e  t Ali and Sultan M a h m u  d II. In 1831-33 
there were no official pilgrimage caravans from Syria, and from 
1834 to 1840, while Syria was under Egyptian occupation, an officer 
of the army of M e h m e  t Ali led the caravans.3 
Between 1840 and 1908, the leaders of the two pilgrimages 
exercised a good deal of independent authority in the Hijaz in or­
der to permit them to transit the lands of the Bedouin tribes. The 
leaders' duties included dispensing the imperial payments to no­
mads so as to secure their permission to go through their territory; 
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supervising the military guards and provisions; helping to choose 
the routes to be followed by the pilgrims; and governing the con­
duct of the pilgrims in their caravans. 
Despite the Quranic injunction promising a painful chastise­
ment to those w h o barred the way to the pilgrimage, a number of 
foreign states stopped Muslim pilgrims from making the trip to the 
Hijaz, usually for health reasons. As the Ottomans pointed out, pil­
grimages were sometimes banned in the years following the out­
break of disease w h e  n measures had already been taken to correct 
the health problems. Other barriers to the pilgrimage were politi­
cally or religiously inspired, as w h e  n the Sudanese ruler forbade 
the pilgrimage to the Hijaz on the grounds that his predecessor's 
tomb was a more suitable object for veneration.4 
It was extremely difficult for contemporaries to estimate the 
numbers of pilgrims coming to Mecca. Arrivals by sea were 
counted by the British and French with relative ease, especially 
after the establishment of quarantine stations, but the numbers of 
pilgrims arriving by land were not so easily ascertained, as is evi­
denced by the absence of figures in table 3- Variations in estimates 
of numbers in attendance were sharp. After the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, there was a general increase in sea arrivals caused 
by the increased speed and ease of travel by steamship, and per­
haps by increasing interest in Islam in South and Southeast Asia. 
W h e n political and security conditions in the Hijaz were favorable 
for several years in a row, pilgrims came there in greater numbers, 
as in 1905-8 (see table 3). W h e  n the key day of the pilgrimage was 
expected to fall on a Friday, which was considered to be an auspi­
cious day, the numbers of pilgrims rose, as in 1870 and 1893- Con­
versely, w h e  n political upheavals took place, attendance fell, as in 
1859 following the massacre of 1858 and in 1881-83- The epidem­
ics of the early and middle 1890s brought about a reduction in the 
numbers of pilgrims traveling to the Hijaz between 1897 and 1900. 
Changes in the expenses incurred by pilgrims in the Hijaz did 
not substantially alter the attendance numbers. Although consuls 
objected vehemently to the imposition of n e w taxes and fees on 
pilgrims, such as the sanitary tax of ten kurush in 1872, most pil­
grims paid without question. Even the more experienced pilgrims, 
w h o had m a d e the trip before, were usually not aware that exces­
sive prices for camel hire and shipping involved collusion by the 
amir of Mecca, the vali, and m a n y merchants and pilgrim guides. 
TABLE 3

NUMBERS OF PILGRIMS

Sea Land Total at 
Arrivals Arrivals Arafat 
1853

1854

1855

1856

1857

1858

1859

1860

1865

1866

1867

1868

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1876/77

1877/78

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

1891

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

1898

1899

1900

1901

1902

1903

1904

1905

1906

1907

1908

14,000

24,000

48,000

30,000

12,000

40,000

24,000

41,000

30,000

56,000

30,000

36,000

40,000

35,000

46,000

30,000

43,000

60,000

38,000

26,000

27,000

31,000

53,000

42,000

46,000

55,000

49,000

44,000

46,000

27,000

93,000

47,000

52,000

57,000

35,000

33,000

36,000

35,000

46,000

53,000

34,000

67,000

67,000

108,000

91,000

68,000

16,000

49,000

86,000

159,000

154,000

31,500

44,000

67,000

94,000

106,000

76,000

105,000

50,000

60,000

80,000

125,000

140,000

160,000

30,000

73,000

90,000

60,000

70,000

85,000

110,000

200,000

125,000

110,000

90,000

166,000

160,000

140,000

200,000

100,000

91,500

80,000

70,000

60,000

70,000

120,000

140,000

132,000

132,000

199,000

143,000

195,000

250,000

173,000

S O U R C E : The above estimates were drawn from varying sources, chiefly 
French and British diplomatic records. Numbers should be taken as only 
very rough Indications, particularly for the total at Arafat. 
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Costs to pilgrims arriving by sea included at least the prices 
charged them for the following items: passage to and from Jidda; 
passage by small boat to the Jidda quay; camel hire between the 
Hijazi towns; usually at least one clay's rent in Jidda; fees to the 
guides and their agents in the various towns; rent in Mecca and in 
Medina; food and provisions while in the Hijaz, though man  y pil­
grims brought some food with them; tips to workers and atten­
dants at the H a r a m s ; purchase of m e m e n t o s ; exchange of 
currencies. Since m a n y pilgrims did not k n o w Arabic, they were 
dependent upon their guides, w h o assumed complete charge over 
all their spending, often to the financial advantage of the guides 
and their friends and relatives. The guides then handled the com­
plicated relationships with camel brokers, the owners of rental 
property in Mecca, and so on. Since the cost of food and rent es­
calated sharply during the pilgrimage, pilgrims' costs were rela­
tively high compared with the cost of living for Hijazis during the 
rest of the year. A fairly modest rate of expenditure in the 1890s, 
but one including the side trip to Medina, would entail the spend­
ing in one month of at least T. L 12 in the Hijaz, exclusive of ship­
ping. W h e  n there were 80,000 non-Hijazis present for the 
pilgrimage, they brought in at least T. L 960,000 to the local econ­
o m y . 
The m o n e y available from such large numbers of travelers 
tempted Thomas Cook and Son, of Great Britain, to arrange all-
inclusive pilgrimages from India between 1887 and 1893. They 
were able to gain the business of about one-third of Bombay-Jidda 
pilgrims, but ultimately abandoned the scheme because of local 
opposition in the Hijaz and because expenses were too high, prof­
its too low, and the pilgrims too poor. 
The poverty of pilgrims created considerable problems for the 
Hijaz. Many poor pilgrims walked to the Hijaz or to ports nearby, 
where they gradually earned enough for their passage. W h e  n they 
arrived in Jidda, they had no m o n e y at all. Other pilgrims had to 
sell their return tickets so as to obtain sufficient m o n e  y for food 
and lodging. The Netherlands East Indies and Malayan authorities 
ultimately ended such problems for their pilgrims by forcing them 
to buy nonrefundable round-trip tickets in advance and to deposit 
surety m o n e y with their consuls on arrival in Jidda. India did not 
undertake a similar program, despite pleas from the Ottoman E m ­
pire to do so. Poor Indian and Sudanese pilgrims were the most 
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frequent beneficiaries of charity by steamship companies, the Ot­
toman government, local notables, and foreign states. Charity 
kitchens and hotels in the towns lessened the worst suffering, but 
the small amounts of m o n e y and space available for such purposes 
meant that m a n  y poor pilgrims died from starvation, malnutrition, 
and exposure; and m a n y more had to work in the Hijaz and save 
m o n e y for years before they could return to their homes.5 
The suffering of the poor pilgrims was perhaps alleviated 
somewhat by their belief that pains endured while on the pilgrim­
age were spiritually cleansing. Dying while on the pilgrimage was 
considered to be a benefit. Overcoming the difficulties posed by 
heat, hostile Bedouins, and the avarice of guides was essential so 
that the pilgrimage could be completed, but its true success was 
dependent more upon the individual's faith in the sanctity of the 
experience and the depth of his or her o w  n participation in the 
inner meaning of the public ceremonies. A pilgrim must wish to 
face G o d as well as to meet the formal requirements of the pilgrim­
age. 
At the opposite end of the status hierarchy from the poor were 
the prominent pilgrims w h o visited Mecca and Medina. Members 
of the ruling royal families in the Ottoman Empire, its Egyptian 
province, North Africa, Iran, and India cam e to the Hijaz between 
1840 and 1908. The mother of Sultan Abdulmecid died in Jidda in 
1873 and was buried near the reputed tomb of Eve. Rulers of Kan­
pur and Bhopal in India, Zanzibar, the Maldives, and Darfur m a d  e 
the pilgrimage. Istanbul was lavish with guards, ceremonies, m e d ­
als, and hospitality to impress favorably these visiting dignitaries.6 
The extreme heterogeneity of the pilgrims caused them and 
the local population m a n  y difficulties because of language and so­
cial differences, but the Shii religious minority posed a more basic 
challenge to the generally tolerant and egalitarian spirit of the pil­
grimage. Shii ritual and doctrinal differences resulted in quarrels 
and tensions between Sunnis and Shiis, particularly in the Medina 
Haram. M e h m e t Ali, of Egypt, had ordered the governor of Medina 
to enforce equal treatment for Shii pilgrims, including equal taxa­
tion and fees, during the 1830s. Disputes were to be settled by con­
sultation with the leaders of the overland pilgrimage from Iran. 
After the restoration of Ottoman control in the Hijaz and the rees­
tablishment of Saudi power in central Arabia, the Shii pilgrims 
once again had to pay special fees as protection money. Shii cara­
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vans between Mecca and Medina paid T. L 4 per pilgrim more to 
the nomads than did Sunnis. In Medina, Shii pilgrims had close 
relations with local Shiis there, the Nakhwalis, w h  o provided 
guides and housing to the Iranians.7 
HEALTH 
The powerful religious imperatives behind the pilgrimage for 
Muslims, the motivation of the Ottoman Empire to secure legiti­
macy as protector of the pilgrimage, and the desire of the European 
states to stop the spread of disease conflicted in the latter nine­
teenth century. Supervision of the health of the pilgrims and quar­
antine to control their travel were the focal points for a clash 
between religion and secular concerns. 
The growing interest of the Ottoman central government and 
Western European states in the pilgrimage's implications for health 
after the 1850s spurred a greater interest in the conditions of life 
and death in the Hijaz. During the bulk of the year, w h e  n large 
numbers of pilgrims were not present, this interest waned. In ques­
tions of health, religion dominated the Hijaz; religious attitudes 
and the passions of the pilgrims played a major role in determining 
types of government action to curtail outbreaks of disease. 
The maintenance of good health conditions for the pilgrims 
took greater priority, in the minds of Ottoman and foreign officials, 
than care for the welfare of the inhabitants of Mecca, Medina, and 
Jidda. However, the local population indirectly benefited or suf­
fered from the efforts of the Ottomans in the 1870s, followed by 
the increasingly serious measures taken by Great Britain in the 
1880s and 1890s, to improve the lot of the pilgrims. 
Sanitary and water conditions in Mecca and Jidda were so 
poor as to lower resistance against all diseases. W h e  n the pilgrims 
left Mecca in 1815, for instance, rubbish andfilth covered the 
streets, there were dead camels left to fester on the outskirts of the 
town, and privies were emptied into holes in the streets infront of 
the houses and covered with dirt. There were no public sewers, 
effective quarantines, or street-cleaning arrangements. It was diffi­
cult and expensive to obtain uncontaminated drinking water in 
Jidda and in Mecca, but somewhat easier in Medina.8 
It was the spread of cholera a m o n g the pilgrims going to the 
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Hijaz thatfirst brought forth concern over communicable disease 
in the holy cities. Cholera brought death on a vast scale to the pil­
grims and inhabitants of the Hijaz. Before 1831 the disease had not 
been known in the area. There were s o m e rare outbreaks of bu­
bonic plague in the early nineteenth century, but these were not 
as severe as the attacks that had devastated Ottoman port cities 
such as Izmir in the eighteenth century. 
W h e  n cholera appeared for thefirst time, it caused deaths not 
only a m o n g the poor but also a m o n g the rich and powerful. The 
Ottoman-Egyptian governors of Jidda and Medina and the leader 
of the Egyptian pilgrimage were killed by the disease. In 1832 the 
villagers and Bedouins were severely affected. More than ten thou­
sand people died in the Hijaz, and, as the disease spread to Egypt 
and Europe, thousands more were killed. 
Despite n e  w outbreaks of cholera in 1834,1836-38, and 1846, 
and four attacks in the 1850s, remarkably little was done by anyone 
to stop the disease. By the prevailing health standards of the Otto­
m a n central government, Mecca and Medina were not well treated. 
The vali of the Hijaz in admitting this to the grand vezir pointed 
out in 1848 that there were privies at only two gates of the Haram 
in Mecca and more were urgently needed, and that the streets 
needed to be swept and cleaned more regularly. Starting in 1844 
the Ottomans had sent a physician and a pharmacist to Medina at 
government expense, and there were some inoculators at work 
a m o n g the Bedouins and in Mecca and Medina. Inoculators were 
sent after 1868 from Istanbul and Cairo to Jidda and Mecca, where 
they received the active support of the amirs, w h  o encouraged Be­
douin leaders to have their children vaccinated. Vaccinations con­
tinued to be given in Mecca until at least 1907 to counter smallpox. 
The Ottomans applied the quarantine rules devised by the 1851 
Sanitary Conference of Paris. Casualties from cholera remained 
high—an estimated 10,000 died from it in Mecca alone in 1845/46. 
The repetitions of cholera outbreaks in the 1850s caused the amir 
to convoke a gathering of thirty-two religious leaders and notables 
to survey the religious practices and moral state of the population. 
H  e felt religious purity could help end the visitations of cholera, 
and man  y pilgrims believed that charity and pure living lessened 
the chances of disease.9 
The crowning touch to the series of cholera epidemics that 
began in 1831 was the great catastrophe of 1865 w h e n as m a n y as 
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30,000 people died. Casualties were especially high a m o n g the Ja­
vanese pilgrims, nearly all of w h o m died. More than one-third of 
all the pilgrims from outside the Arabian Peninsula were killed by 
cholera that year. The casualties also included the wife, son, and 
daughter of the Ottoman vali, w h o was so desolated at their deaths 
that he asked to be recalled from the Hijaz. W h e  n the infected pil­
grims arrived at Jidda, they were not helped in anyway. There did 
not exist any surveillance on arrivals by sea, and there was no pro­
visional quarantine, lazaret, hospital, pharmacy, or dispensary. A 
number of steps were taken by the Ottomans in response to the 
epidemic, however. Tanks were built at Mecca for water storage, 
burial pits for animal carcasses were dug at M u n a , two sanitary 
committees were sent from Istanbul in 1866 to study the health of 
the Hijaz, and the streets of Jidda were thoroughly cleaned, in the 
process destroying parts of the bazaar despite the vehement pro­
tests of local merchants.10 
There were no major epidemics in Jidda or Mecca in the later 
1860s and most of the 1870s because of Ottoman measures. Phy­
sicians were sent to the military detachments stationed in the Hijaz. 
The pilgrimage houses and hostels were whitewashed, streets 
were cleaned, a hospital with a disinfecting service was set up, a m ­
bulances were provided for those w h  o fell ill, and public assistance 
was organized for pilgrims w h o arrived in need. By 1878 the Hijaz 
Sanitary Commission assigned physicians to travel with the caravan 
from Syria, as well as to posts in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. The 
physicians accompanied the pilgrims in Mecca and Arafat. In 1878 
at M u n a , 158 cisterns were cleaned and filled withfresh water, 13 
slaughtering pavilions were constructed, and 600 trenches were 
dug where h u m a n waste was deposited and covered with earth 
and quicklime. Laborers from the Sudan were organized into 
squads charged with policing the streets in the towns as well as 
tent campsites. Still, the vali continued to complain about the con­
dition of the Medina hospital, which needed repairs and supplies.11 
Despite local actions, international pressure after the sanitary 
conference held in Istanbul in 1865 led to n e  w and stricter regu­
lations in 1868 on pilgrim transport by sea. Britain rejected the pro­
posal of its o w  n consul in Jidda to have an international sanitary 
commission stationed permanently at Jidda on the grounds that 
representatives of Christian states dictating pilgrimage conditions 
in the Hijaz would be seen by Muslims as excessive interference in 
a Muslim holy territory.12 
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It was the cholera attack of 1877/78 that increased Ottoman 
intervention in public health a m o n g pilgrims. The normal Jidda 
death rate was 10 to 12 per day during the pilgrimage season, com­
pared with 5 to 10 in the rest of the year. N o w , on some days, 50 
persons in Jidda and Mecca were dying from cholera. Between 24 
December 1877 and 7 January 1878,845 people died in Mecca and 
Jidda from cholera; 869 died from all other causes. Ottoman at­
tempts to isolate Medina from contact with the outbreak in Mecca 
failed w h e n a caravan of pilgrims forced its way into Medina. Meas­
ures taken as a result of the 1877-78 epidemic were of two types: 
ineffectual steps within the Hijaz and slightly more successful ac­
tions taken outside the region. The Jidda sanitary commission and 
the British consulate did little. N e  w rules for pilgrimage ships 
adopted in 1880 by the Ottomans allowed sanitary authorities to 
examine ships, established m i n i m u m amounts of room for each 
pilgrim, forbade certain types of cargoes on pilgrim ships, and re­
quired the ships' owners to have a physician on board.13 
The disease broke out again in Mecca in 1881. Between 15 
September and 7 December, 2,425 people died of cholera. Casu­
alties were especially heavy a m o n g the Javanese, whose living ac­
commodations in Jidda and Mecca were overcrowded. Little was 
done initially because the vali, the amir, and the chief of police of 
Mecca were all in Taif, but soon very energetic measures were un­
dertaken. The wells and cisterns at Arafat were cleaned, food shops 
were inspected, the streets of Mecca were cleaned, and offal was 
promptly buried. Nevertheless, cholera broke out again in Mecca 
during the chief days of the pilgrimage, and unburied corpses lit­
tered M u n a and Mecca. Casualties were m u c h higher than official 
figures indicated because they reflected only those burials that had 
been observed by the sanitary board. The villages around Mecca 
were also the scenes of great suffering. Egypt placed a strict quar­
antine on travelers from the Hijaz, and ten thousand pilgrims were 
crowded into quarantine facilities in Wajh in December. A few phy­
sicians were sent from Istanbul in response, but basically nothing 
changed.14 
Local cures were k n o w n in 1881. In M u n a there were no la­
trines and no ways to dispose of slaughtered animals. Water drunk 
by the pilgrims at M u n a came mostly from rainwater, which, along 
with local garbage, flowed into collecting cisterns. Cleaner water 
was available from Ayn Zubayda, but it cost twice as m u c h as the 
contaminated cistern water. A strong vali or amir w h  o was con­
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cerned about these problems could eliminate them, at least in the 
short run. Vali O s m a  n Pasha in 1884 practically eliminated cholera 
by ordering the emptying of the water tanks at M u n  a before the 
pilgrimage, and thereby forcing pilgrims to buy water from Ayn 
Zubayda. H e also employed sweepers, covered up the carcasses of 
dead animals, and built more latrines. His measures were contin­
ued in Mecca and M u n a until at least 1889, but little was done in 
Jidda or Medina.15 Apparently M u n a had been the local source of 
trouble, for no substantial outbreaks of the disease took place 
again until 1890. 
Local measures were supplemented by rigorous external 
quarantines, but certainly one or the other failed to function suc­
cessfully; for in the six years from 1890 to 1895, there were four 
years of cholera epidemics in the Hijaz. The number of deaths 
caused by cholera and registered with local officials was greatest in 
1893, w h e n 9,577 died. M a n y deaths were not registered; estimates 
by physicians of the actual total cholera deaths ranged from 32,000 
to 40,000, or about one-sixth of all those attending the pilgrimage 
ceremonies at M u n  a in 1893- At least 3,000 people died from chol­
era in each of the other epidemic years. The disease also struck 
outside the major towns: the villages of Wadi Fatimah were devas­
tated, as were the Bedouins. Medina and Yanbu seem to have es­
caped the worst ravages of cholera, but there were attacks of 
smallpox at Medina, which spread to the rest of the Hijaz in 1895. 
The casualties alone do not indicate the full horrors of the time. 
Fear of contagious disease and the chaos created by the pilgrimage 
prevented m u c  h care being given to the sick. Those w h  o died near 
Jidda, but outside its walls, were abandoned, and their bodies were 
devoured by dogs and birds of prey. The few private physicians and 
pharmacists were overwhelmed and, in some cases, provided as­
sistance only w h e  n paid in advance. Fear of cholera in 1890 caused 
the amir to avoid the chief religious-political event of the year by 
absenting himself from the ceremonies at Muna .  1  6 
Spurred on by disaster, the Ottoman government undertook a 
number of actions to stop cholera and to reduce disease. In 
1892/93 the sultan ordered T. L 1,500 to be spent on cleaning the 
pilgrimage sites and the streets of the three towns. In 1894 Asaf 
Pasha arrived from Istanbul with T. L. 44,000 for n e w hospital con­
struction in Mecca and Jidda. In 1895 a special medical mission 
from Istanbul arrived. However, medical services in Mecca and 
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Jidda remained understaffed, overworked, and poorly housed. The 
municipal council of Jidda and the sanitary inspector lacked 
m o n e y for the street-cleaning that they wished to do, so the kaim­
m a k a m raised funds on his o w n . In 1896 he personally inspected 
the quarters of the town for cleanliness and arrested those w h  o did 
not work on the cleaning of their houses and streets. Still, the water 
system, which was the real cause of the spread of cholera, re­
mained as before. Attempts to separate the ill from the healthy so 
as to stop the spread of various diseases generally failed, except 
upon occasion in Medina. Hundreds died from avoidable causes 
other than cholera: starvation a m o n g poor pilgrims was not even 
addressed by the special commissions sent from Istanbul.17 
The most controversial proposals of the doctors for stopping 
disease, which were m a d e in 1894, called for limiting the numbers 
of pilgrims per room, warned of the dangers of contamination 
from drinking water from the Z a m z a m well in the Haram, and e m ­
phasized the importance of disinfecting machines. These m a  ­
chines were installed in Mecca and Jidda, despite the violent 
opposition of the pilgrims and populace. In 1895 they helped 
bring about riots and the murder of the British medical vice-con­
sul. 
The most effective quarantine was the distance between 
Mecca and Medina, and between Medina and Damascus or Cairo. 
Physicians accompanying the pilgrims did sometimes stop the re­
turning pilgrimage caravans if there were signs of disease, so as to 
prolong the time before reaching inhabited territory and thereby 
safeguard it from infection. The British and Egyptians had built an 
effective quarantine station at Tor in the Sinai Peninsula in 1877 to 
replace their station at Wajh, which had been opened in 1873. The 
Kamaran Island quarantine station received pilgrims as early as 
1882, but its size and efficacy were greatly expanded after 1892.1H 
Quarantines were acceptable in principle to the Ottoman E m  ­
pire, but it rejected what it considered any interference by inter­
national health organizations in its internal affairs; and the 
Ottomans were especially sensitive about interference with the re­
ligious duty of the pilgrimage. Despite Ottoman refusal to coop­
erate fully in the formal international structures of the quarantine 
system, the stations at Tor and Kamaran did function well in stop­
ping the spread of disease. 
Quarantines were further developed by the Ottomans as well 
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as by other countries during the 1900s. During the cholera attack 
of 1902, the empire stopped all passenger shipping to and from 
the Hijaz between 18 October and 11 November. There were major 
Ottoman lazarets built at Beirut, Izmir, and African Tripoli, and 
quarantine physicians were stationed at Aleppo, Jaffa, Gaza, and 
Syrian Tripoli. The efficacy of quarantines was limited by the small 
numbers of physicians available, especially in Jidda and Medina, 
and the reluctance of pilgrims to undergo quarantine because they 
feared that quarantines before the pilgrimage days might be so 
prolonged as to forestall their appearance in M u n a  , an eventuality 
that would m a k e their pilgrimage void of its religious merit. As the 
Hijaz Railroad reached toward Medina in 1905-8, a n e w problem 
emerged. The increased speed of transportation in effect elimi­
nated the cordon sanitate provided by the desert against the 
spread of disease from Mecca to Damascus. Government railroad 
authorities set up a quarantine stationfirst at Maan and then at Ta­
buk, which was to be financed by an extra fee on passengers' tick­
ets. 
Ottoman quarantine and medical efforts were supplemented 
by those of other countries. The British vice-consuls from the 
1880s on were Muslim physicians w h  o staffed a clinic and small 
dispensary and w h  o m a d  e the pilgrimage in order to provide m e d  ­
ical supervision for the pilgrims. France also sometimes stationed 
physicians at its Jidda consulate. The British in Egypt periodically 
imposed sanitary blockades against shipping bound to and from 
Hijazi ports. France forbade the pilgrimage from Algeria and Tuni­
sia between 1896 and 1900 and again in 1903 because of fear of 
disease. The government of India stopped the pilgrimage in 1897­
1900 because of bubonic plague then devastating India. 
Since foreign governments imposed barriers to pilgrims leav­
ing their h o m e s w h e n an epidemic was announced, local govern­
ment officials, w h  o depended upon the pilgrimage for extra 
income, had an incentive to conceal the existence of disease as 
long as possible. Conversely, European states and Egypt had a vital 
interest in ensuring the isolation of the Hijaz and better sanitation 
in the holy cities. Egypt was particularly strongly affected by dis­
ease spread by returning pilgrims in the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s. 
Disease affected the poor foreign pilgrims more than the rich 
pilgrims or the native Hijazis. Deaths a m o n  g Javanese, Indians, and 
Africans were higher than a m o n g other pilgrims; a larger number 
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of the poor pilgrims were from those areas. Since m a n y of the pil­
grims were elderly or infirm, death rates after they had endured the 
rigors of travel in the Hijaz were high even w h e n major epidemics 
did not occur. 
Between 1895 and 1907, there was only one major outbreak 
of cholera in the Hijaz, in 1902, and there were far fewer deaths 
than in the early 1890s. Only one other disease assumed epidemic 
scope in the years up to 1908: there was a major outbreak of the 
plague in 1896-98. This was probably part of the great wave of pla­
gue that spread out from China in the late 1870s and killed 10 mil­
lion people. More than 1,400 died in the Hijaz. Otherwise the years 
following the great cholera epidemics were singularlyfree of com­
municable disease. However, Ottoman public and military hospi­
tals continued to be completely insufficient and even dangerous 
to their patients. 
Reaction to the ravages of disease was muted. Pilgrims 
seemed to be stupefied during the epidemic years; few even com­
plained. Despite the calamities that befell them, people continued 
to arrive for the pilgrimage, though sometimes in reduced n u m  ­
bers. The immutable cycle of the pilgrimage took place with reg­
ularity and serenity even in the midst of disaster. Strong objections 
were m a d e only to what were considered by the populace to be 
ill-founded steps by government to lessen the spread of disease. 
Particularly unpopular were quarantines, which severed merchants 
and pilgrims in Jidda from contact with Mecca, the examination of 
w o m e  n for diseases by male physicians, the forced use of hospitals 
and lazarets, and the segregation of the ill from the healthy in 
them. 
The government of the Ottoman Empire had the responsibil­
ity to administer the pilgrimage and to ensure the safety and secu­
rity of the pilgrims while on Ottoman soil. This was done 
reasonably well, other than in the health area, considering the pre­
carious military and financial condition of the empire. Treatment 
of the pilgrims by their guides and the prices paid by them for 
housing and other items were beyond the concerns of the Otto­
mans. Only under foreign pressure wereflagrant extortions of the 
pilgrims by local officials, merchants, and guides sometimes alle­
viated. The chief variables causing greater or smaller numbers of 
pilgrims to c o m  e to Mecca—such as the Suez Canal, steamship 
technology, prosperity in the countries of origin, and the falling of 
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the pilgrimage's chief day on a Friday—were also outside the con­
trol of the Ottoman state. 
The pilgrimage was the central event of the Hijazi year. It re­
mained at the heart of the spiritual, economic, and demographic 
factors that set the parameters of political history. The pilgrimage 
was also a quintessentially Muslim and Ottoman-Arab institution, 
separated from the ever-increasing influence and power of the Eu­
ropean Christian states. However, the inadvertent spread of disease 
from the Hijaz to the rest of the world caused Europeans and Egyp­
tians to intervene in s o m  e aspects of the pilgrimage through the 
establishment of quarantine stations and through encouragement 
of the Ottoman Empire to improve sanitation and public health in 
the Hijaz. 
As the numbers of pilgrims coming from areas ruled by Eu­
ropean states increased in the later nineteenth century, European 
concern over health grew. Ironically, the single most unpopular 
aspect of European and reformist Ottoman activity in the Hijaz was 
in the area of health. The Ottoman government resisted European 
supervision of the international pilgrimage; the Hijazi townspeo­
ple and Bedouins resisted European quarantines, which isolated 
towns from each other, and sanitation measures that they felt were 
ineffectual and actually more dangerous than inactivity would have 
been. 
Cholera epidemics in 1831, 1865, and in 1877/78 caused 
thousands of deaths. Improvements in the water supply and in the 
cleanliness of the towns and pilgrimage sites provided short-term 
remedies to the dreadful attacks of disease. The administration of 
Vali O s m a  n Pasha in the 1880s demonstrated the dramatic possi­
bilities for reform and change in health, as in so m a n  y other areas 
of life, and thereby m a d e the epidemics of 1890-95 seem even 
worse because they could have been avoided. Stricter controls over 
steamships and quarantines by Ottomans and Europeans ulti­
mately lessened the spread of disease outside the Hijaz, though 
little was done other than standard measures of cleaning to in­
crease health locally. Still, the pilgrimages, signaling the great reaf­
firmation of spiritual truth and the spread of Islamic learning, 
continued largely unaltered, despite the ebb and flow of disease. 
1. Actually traveling time between Damascus and Medina, for instance, was, with no 
interruptions, 334 hours by camel caravan; but pilgrimages took m u c  h longer in practice, 
w h e n rests and visits to the shrines were included. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEARNING AND LAW 
A L T H O U G H W E S T E R N E U R O P E A N SECULARISM had some impact 
on the pilgrimage's quarantine system, there was very little West­
ern influence in education and law, which continued to be domi­
nated by religion. Those secularizing changes that did take place 
werefiltered through the Ottoman government, whose educa­
tional and legal reforms in the Hijaz affected only a relatively few 
people. The dominance of religion in law and education helped 
assure the m e  n of religion of a continuing and vital role in society. 
Cultural and legal values in the Hijaz revolved around reli­
gion. The preservation, enhancement, and propagation of values 
were in the hands of the m e  n of religion. Even if a few participants 
in high culture did not hold religious positions, they still had been 
thoroughly exposed in their educational experiences to systems of 
thought and m o d e s of expression permeated by Islam and Islamic 
values. Most of the relatively small number of Hijazis w h  o attended 
schools were educated not in secular government schools but in 
private institutions where religious subjects predominated. Litera­
ture was generally imported. The little that was written in the Hijaz 
primarily concerned religion and religious law. However, the vast 
bulk of the population of the Hijaz found formal learning and law 
to be irrelevant since few could write or read. M a n y conflicts were 
resolved outside the formal judicial systems. 
Formal education was limited to males. For most students it 
consisted of attendance at an elementary religious school where, 
in the space offive years, reading, writing, and religious knowl­
edge were learned, particularly by means of memorization of parts 
of the Quran and Muslim rituals and rules for living. Given ability, 
perseverance, andfinancial support, the student then progressed 
to a madrasa, a higher religious school, for more specialized 
knowledge. Higher education had to be pursued outside the Hijaz 
unless one chose to study the religious sciences with the ulema at 
the Mecca or Medina Harams. 
State financial support for education existed, but the total 
amount spent was small; more frequently education was privately 
funded. Occasionally Istanbul authorized repairs to school build­
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ings, and it paid the salaries of some teachers. Funds for these pur­
poses came in part from pious foundations' incomes at the 
disposal of the central government. 
Money came from a mixture of private and public sources as 
well. A private school was begun in Mecca about 1874 by M u h a m  ­
m a d Khalil Rahmat Allah (1818-90), w h ofled to Mecca from India. 
Thanks to a substantial donation from a Muslim w o m a  n living in 
Calcutta, he was able to open a school whose purpose was to pro­
vide both a religious and a scientific education for the children of 
long-term foreign residents of Mecca. Another Muslim Indian 
school in Mecca was started in 1879 by Abd al-Haqq Qari with 
funds from pilgrims, parents, India, and the khedive of Egypt. The 
al-Najah elementary religious school was opened in Jidda by two 
Egyptians and three Jiddawis; despite gifts it had to close for finan­
cial reasons in 1908. M u h a m m a  d Ali Zaynul Ali Rida also estab­
lished two schools on his o w n , thefirst in Jidda in 1905 and the 
second in Mecca in 1912. A number of other schools were estab­
lished in the holy cities for educational and religious reasons by 
both Ottoman officials and private individuals.1 
Secular government schools, rushdiyes, were built in the Hi­
jaz, but slowly and in small numbers. A n elementary rushdiye was 
built in Jidda in 1874, partially with private funds. Medina's first 
rushdiye opened in 1876 and was moved to the Haram at the re­
quest of its sheikh in 1881. AMeccan rushdiye was opened in 1884. 
In 1901 Sultan Abdulhamid expanded the grade levels and hired 
teachers to give more advanced courses in the Medina school. Fol­
lowing the Revolution of 1908, more schools, including advanced 
and specialized institutions, were planned by the central govern­
ment, but the plans were either abortive or short-lived. 
The numbers of students attending each school and each type 
of school varied considerably. More than 150 students attended 
Abd al-Haqq's school, for instance, and by 1890 about the same 
number were at Rahmat Allah's. In the thirty or more elementary 
religious schools of Mecca, more than 1,000 students were en­
rolled, and about 300 attended such schools in Jidda and 300 in 
Medina. There were only twelve madrasas in Mecca and seventeen 
in Medina. Student attendance at the rushdiyes varied from a low 
of 22 in Jidda in 1900 to a high of 70 in Mecca in 1891. Many stu­
dents also attended lectures at the Harams in Mecca and Medina. 
Although there were few students in town schools compared 
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with the total school-age population, even fewer attended in the 
rest of the Hijaz. Four elementary religious schools existed in Taif 
in the 1880s and 1890s, and only two in the 1900s. A rushdiye was 
opened there in 1900. There were a few schools in Yanbu and 
Wajh, but not in any of the other villages. Thus the Wadi Fatimah 
peasantry, the agricultural population south of Taif, the fishing vil­
lages along the coast, and, most importantly, the nomadic tribes 
had no schools, though attempts were m a d e to solve this problem. 
The energetic Vali O s m a n in the 1880s proposed special schools 
for Bedouin children in Mecca, but they were never built. Sultan 
Abdulhamid planned to have the children of Hijazi Bedouin chiefs 
attend his school for tribal leaders in Istanbul; there were five 
places reserved for Hijazi students there in the 1890s.2 
Schoolteachers were poorly paid and were burdened with 
large numbers of students. In a rushdiye in Jidda in 1874, the salary 
per month was only T. L 4; the religious primary school teachers 
received less. Salaries were supplemented by gifts from students 
and special fees. Religious schoolteachers gained income by tak­
ing additional students outside the classroom. Many of these teach­
ers were primarily muftis and others engaged in the law, the 
administration of the Harams, and the pilgrimage, and only sec­
ondarily dependent upon their income as teachers. Class loads per 
teacher ranged from eight to forty-five, though in the latter case 
only calligraphy was being taught. In the religious schools and es­
pecially in the lectures in the Harams, where the religious classics 
were being expounded, class sizes were m u c  h larger. There were 
at least sixty teachers in the Meccan Haram and twelve or more in 
the Medinan Haram. O f this number perhaps one-half were Shafii, 
and most of the rest were Hanafi.3 
The diversity of the teachers reflected the heterogeneity of the 
general society. In Jidda in the late nineteenth century, there were 
ten teachers w h  o offered private lessons: a Shafii religious law spe­
cialist; a grammarian w h o also taught in the Lulu Mosque; a Had­
ramawti w h  o taught primarily his o w  n countrymen; a legal scholar, 
educated in Egypt, son of ajiddan; an Egyptian Shafii w h  o came to 
Jidda in 1889 after teaching in Medina; another Shafii law teacher 
w h  o lived in a Sufi convent; an Algerian w h  o taught theology; two 
graduates of al-Azhar in Cairo; and an Egyptian w h  o specialized in 
teaching reading. The teachers at the Meccan and Medinan Harams 
came from equally diverse backgrounds: Malaya, Anatolia, North 
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Africa, India, and Egypt, but only a few from the Hijaz. M a n y came 
to one of the Haram schools as students and pilgrims and stayed 
on to become teachers. S o m e were graduates of al-Azhar: in 1902 
there were seven Hijazis studying at al-Azhar. O n  e of the more suc­
cessful teaching careers was that of Ibn al-Talamidh al-Shinqiti, 
w h  o taught Arabic. H  e was invited by the Vali Sherif Pasha's son to 
Istanbul, where he met Minister of Education Munif Pasha and then 
traveled on to Spain. Another, Abd Allah Zawawi, in addition to his 
teaching in the Mecca Haram, was also one of the principal mer­
chants of Mecca, and served on the vali's advisory council. H  e 
headed the committee to restore the Ayn Zubaydah water sources 
in 1909-10. Ami  n ibn Hasan al-Madani al-Hulwani, another teacher 
at the Medina Haram, attended the 1883 congress of orientalists in 
Leiden.4 The government schools were largely staffed by Anatoli­
ans w h  o spoke Ottoman Turkish as their native language and for 
w h o  m Arabic was an acquired second tongue, but a necessary one, 
for their appointments were contingent upon knowing it. 
The knowledge presented to students differed according to 
their age and ability, but generally was based upon religion and 
language skills. In the rushdiye of Jidda in 1885, a student began 
with religion in his first year; in the second he undertook the study 
of the Persian and Ottoman Turkish languages; in the third he went 
on to study arithmetic, geography, history, and letter-writing. By 
1909 students began with the Quran, Ottoman Turkish, mathemat­
ics, and handwriting; in the second year they undertook Arabic, 
Persian, more Ottoman Turkish, geography, mathematics, and 
drawing; third-year studies included the three languages that con­
stituted the core of Ottoman Turkish, more geography and mathe­
matics, accounting, French, and health; the fourth year was an 
intensified version of the third plus history and religion; in the fifth 
year architecture was added to the earlier subjects. Ottoman Turk­
ish was especially promoted by the central government, which la­
mented the lack of knowledge of the basic rules of the language in 
the Hijaz. In the primary religious schools, teaching was less a m ­
bitious than in the rushdiyes, but perhaps was more realistic. The 
subjects taught were the Quran, reading and writing Arabic, and 
mathematics. In the upper religious schools, Arabic grammar, ac­
counting, theology, and religious law were taught. O n  e could 
spend as long as fourteen years in studying all subjects and all lev­
els of courses at a madrasa, but most students of course spent far 
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less time. At the Meccan Haram, students from throughout the Is­
lamic world and of varying ages pursued a wide range of courses, 
including studies of the Quran, the sayings of the Prophet, the un­
ity of G o d , religious law, Arabic grammar, elocution, polite litera­
ture, logic, Sufism, astronomy, and mathematics. Courses were 
given both in the daytime and at night. Public lectures were open 
and free, but gifts to the instructor were customary. Lecturing was 
suspended during the pilgrimage season, w h e  n the pilgrims filled 
the Haram to overflowing.5 
The Ottomans deplored the poor state of learning in the re­
gion and its result of very few Hijazis entering the administration 
of the Ottoman Empire. It was not necessary to be an ethnic Turk 
to join the Ottoman elite, but it was necessary to learn the Ottoman 
way of life and especially the Ottoman Turkish language, the tenets 
of Islam, and a set of values and customs expressed in a distinc­
tively Ottoman style of conduct. Ottomans began state-supported 
schools to inculcate Ottoman values, and for precisely this reason 
most of the townspeople of the Hijaz did not send their boys to 
the state schools. Hijazis feared and disliked the n e  w schools, 
which were seen as an attempt to Turkify children and take them 
into government and military service. This contrasted with the sup­
port of the rushdiyes in Ottoman Syria, where more were built and 
at an earlier period than in the Hijaz. O n  e of the differences be­
tween the two areas that explains the greater degree of public sup­
port in Syria was the prevalence of foreign missionary schools in 
Syria and Palestine. Popular enthusiasm for government schools 
a m o n g Muslims m a y have been based upon opposition to mission­
aries. With no missionaries in the Hijaz, there was no reason for 
Muslims there to feel the same way.6 
T h e n e w , wealthy, and pious group of merchants that 
emerged in Jidda and Mecca as a result of commercial growth in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, with the support of gen­
erous donors in the rest of the Muslim world, created madrasas to 
serve as an alternative to the rushdiyes. M a n y earlier madrasas had 
physically decayed or had been turned into hostels, refuges for the 
poor, or private residential property. People w h  o sought a good 
education for their children either employed tutors if they could 
afford them or sent children abroad. Advanced studies had to be 
pursued elsewhere in any event, but only a handful went abroad 
and even fewer returned subsequently. There was a felt need 
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a m o n  g the commercial townspeople for a n e  w style of education, 
efficiently administered and more widely available. 
The cultural attainments of Hijazis extended to areas beyond 
formal schooling and literature. In the cities builders constructed 
houses of some beauty; carpenters m a d e intricate w o o d e n screens 
with great skill; calligraphers copied and m a d  e decorations using 
the Quran. Although Hijazi Bedouin jewelry and the handicrafts of 
the towns have never been systematically studied, it is certainly 
possible that works of value comparable to those produced at the 
same time in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt m a y yet be found. 
In addition to formal schooling, apprenticeship, and handi­
crafts, a n e w means of propagating knowledge and values emerged 
in nineteenth-century Hijaz—the printed word. In other parts of 
the Ottoman Empire such as Syria and Egypt, the introduction of 
relatively cheap, accessible, and lively newspapers and the expan­
sion of literacy brought about a n e  w educational m e d i u m  , with 
widespread social, cultural, and political consequences in the late 
nineteenth century. In the Hijaz, which had been deficient even in 
copyists compared with cultural centers such as Cairo and Istanbul, 
the n e w m e d i u m and its various messages might have been ex­
pected to have particularly widespread results. It did not. There 
were, of course, some changes: students in the Meccan Haram 
started to buy printed editions of the texts that were being analyzed 
in lectures; the laborious task of taking the lecturer's dictation of 
the text, therefore, was avoided. Butrus al-Bustani's Arabic encyclo­
pedia was read in the Hijaz and even in the interior of Najd. News­
papers from abroad were read in the Hijaz. The short-lived but 
influential periodical edited by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani al-Asada­
badi in 1884, al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, was sent to the Hijaz, but far fewer 
copies were read there than in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. 
Whereas Beirut received 114 copies, Damascus 23, Cairo 152, and 
even Suez eleven, Mecca received only five copies and Medina 
two. There was no record of any subscribers in Jidda. Newspapers 
were sometimes banned, press censorship within the Ottoman 
Empire was strict, and the Ottomans attempted to keep out hostile 
newspapers published abroad.7 Newspapers favoring the policies 
of the Ottoman government, such as Beirut's Thamarat al-Funun, 
also circulated in the Hijaz. 
There was only one printing press in the Hijaz. It was estab­
lished in Mecca in 1883 by the government, and by 1886 it e m ­
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ployed twenty-two people. The vilayet press, unlike many other 
provincial presses, did not publish an official journal before 1908, 
but it did issue yearbooks in 1883/84, 1885/86, 1887/88, 1888/89, 
and 1891/92. The yearbooks were similar to those published by 
other provincial governments. Published usually in Ottoman Turk­
ish, they contained a wealth of information on the Ottoman offi­
cialdom of the Hijaz, its ranks, salaries, and hierarchy; the Ottoman 
view of the history, topography, and nature of the Hijaz; and a 
sketch of the history of the empire as a whole and the Hijaz in 
particular. The usefulness of the yearbooks for Hijazis and foreign­
ers was limited by the perfunctory manner in which information 
was revised as the years went by and the unreality of official views 
on such matters as relations with the Bedouins or the role of the 
amir versus the vali. 
The government press in the Hijaz published in Arabic and in 
Malay, with type fonts from Europe. More than thirty works were 
published in Arabic, twelve in Malay, and several in Ottoman Turk­
ish. Perhaps the most notable works were the religious and histor­
ical books by A h m a d ibn Zayni Dahlan. More religious books 
appeared than works dealing with any other subject, but the list of 
publications included books on medicine, law, language, and his­
tory.8 N  o translations from Western European languages were pub­
lished. In this way the Hijaz differed sharply from Egypt and 
Lebanon, where translation was widespread. 
The Hijaz had its o w n writers w h o wrote outside European 
styles and ideas, but within the classical Islamic literary genres. 
Most popular were the biographers of the Prophet M u h a m m a  d and 
religious writers in general. They continued in the m o d  e of writing 
of the highly influential eighteenth-century scholars w h  o had stud­
ied the sayings of the Prophet, though with less importance for the 
rest of the Muslim world. 
O n e of the few authors w h o wrote both on religion and polit­
ical history was the Shafii mufti of Mecca from 1871 to 1886, A h m a d 
ibn Zayni Dahlan. H  e was born in 1826 in Mecca and died in 1886 
in Medina. Dahlan's Taqrib al-usul discussed al-Ghazali and the 
works of such mystics as Ibn Arabi, as well as containing many say­
ings of the Prophet with explanations of their meaning. The Duwal 
al-Islamiyyah was a collection of lists of Islamic rulers, with dates 
of their rules. Dahlan also wrote works on particular points of the­
ology. His chronicle of Hijazi history, Khulasat al-kalam, has been 
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a valuable source for all subsequent studies of the Hijaz. However, 
during his lifetime only six copies of the Khulasat al-kalam were 
made, and the most recent events he discussed were omitted from 
the copies because of the political sensitivity of the subjects. Dah­
lan opposed M u h a m m a  d Hasab Allah w h e  n the latter attacked 
smoking as sinful and also w h e  n he maintained that the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d '  s close relatives w h  o died as unbelievers were pagans 
and therefore not deserving of veneration. Hasab Allah was exiled 
temporarily from Mecca, largely at the behest of Dahlan. C  . Snouck 
Hurgronje, the Netherlands orientalist w h  o posed as a Muslim and 
lived in Mecca in the 1880s, knew Dahlan well. Dahlan's disciple 
and aide, M u h a m m a d Said Ba Basil, carried on his work and his 
approach after Dahlan's death.9 
There were other religious writers in a variety offields. O n  e 
of the most prominent was the political and religious polemicist 
M u h a m m a d Khalil Rahmat Allah, whose school in Mecca has al­
ready been mentioned. H e was born in Meerut, India, in 1818, and 
after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 fled to Mecca, where he died in 
1890. H e wrote thirteen works on religion; his trip to Istanbul in 
1884 earned him a pension from the sultan. Perhaps his most fa­
mous work was Izharal-Haqq, which was an anti-Christian theolog­
ical tract. It was translated into Ottoman Turkish, Urdu, Gujarati, 
English, and French, and gained the favorable notice of the sultan. 
Manuscripts on the sayings of the Prophet and on religious law 
were written by two Medinans—Muhammad Ali ibn Zahir al-Watri 
(1845-1904/5) and M u h a m m a d al-Zahiri (1842/43-1910/11). The 
latter was born a Bedouin and became a settled m a n of religion. 
Uthman ibn Abd al-Salam al-Daghistani (1852/53-1907/8), the 
Hanafi mufti of Medina forfifteen years, collected and published 
his religious opinions in two volumes. Arabic logic and sayings of 
the Prophet were discussed in books by Yusuf Osmanoglu Harputli 
(d. 1875/76), a Hanafi teacher in the Mahmudiyyah madrasa in 
Medina. Religious law was analyzed by the Hadramawti A h m a d ibn 
Ali Ba Sabrin, w h o lived in Jidda. A m o n g books on mysticism were 
the work of the Algerian Abd Allah ibn Ghanim al-Najai (d. 1879), 
and an Arabic translation of A h m a d Sirhindi's writings on Sufism by 
the Kazan Tatar M u h a m m a d Murad al-Manzalawi (d. ca. 1916) w h o 
had settled in Mecca. The high value placed on poetry in Arabic-
speaking societies was reflected in the relatively large number of 
poets, including those w h  o wrote court poetry for the amirs of 
82 RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE INARABIA 
Mecca. M a h m u  d Safwat al-Saati (1825-80) began his career as court 
poet in Mecca, but lived the latter part of his life in Istanbul and 
Cairo. Ibrahim ibn Hasan al-Uskubi (1847/48-1912/13) was the 
table companion and poet of the Amir A w  n al-Rafiq. Al-Uskubi, 
w h  o was born in Medina, had traveled widely and was fluent in 
Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and Urdu. His political odes caused his 
imprisonment after 1908. Most of the poetry was apparently written 
in the spare time of the authors, for they had careers in the bu­
reaucracy, commerce, and mystical organizations. A n example was 
Anwar ibn Mustafa Ishqi (1848-1917/18), w h  o came from a prom­
inent Medina ulema family. H  e became inspector of the market­
place in 1885/86 and mayor after 1908.10 
Indeed, there were m a n y genres of writing that were absent 
from the Hijaz: the n e  w European novels, short stories, and plays; 
historical romances; n e w epic poetry. The genres of literature that 
were translated, imitated, and then adapted by writers in Beirut, 
Istanbul, and Cairo in the second half of the nineteenth century 
were missing in the Hijaz. In view of the conservatism of the Hijaz, 
this was not surprising; but with the exception of Dahlan and some 
of the tribal poetry, works written in the customary genres were 
also seemingly undistinguished in quality. O  n the other hand, little 
of Hijazi literature has yet been closely and critically examined. 
Certainly s o m e vivid poetry was written, as in the lines by the M e d ­
inan A b  d al-Jalil Barradah (ca. 1827-1908/9): 
It pleases m  e to spend

Nights in searching for

Knowledge and perfection,

By the lamp with the weak wick,

Until I drink knowledge like al-Ghazali."

A major Hijazi intellectual revival was started a m o n g the stu­
dents in the n e w schools founded in Jidda and Mecca in the 1900s, 
but they reachedfruition only in the more serene years of the 
1930s and 1940s. 
Ironically, the most famous work written about the Hijaz was 
the fictional book by A b d al-Rahman al-Kawakabi, published in 
Egypt, whose title Umm al-Qura (Mother of Cities), referred to 
Mecca, where the action of the book supposedly took place. In fact 
the representatives of all the Muslims of the world w h  o were said 
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to have assembled there secretly to plan a reformation of the Is­
lamic world never met. Mecca had been chosen as the site by al-
Kawakabi because of its religious importance, isolation from for­
eigners, geographical centrality, and the faith and knowledge of its 
inhabitants.12 
Both handwritten and printed works were available for read­
ing in libraries, which were established as acts of piety by wealthy 
donors w h  o provided their means of support as well as the books 
and manuscripts to be housed in them. A h m e d Arif Hikmet, qadi 
of Medina and Ottoman sheyhulislam (1846-54), created the larg­
est and most important public library in the Hijaz in 1853/54. Prop­
erty in Anatolia and Macedonia provided the revenue; Arif 
provided 7,000 volumes. There were eighteen mosque libraries as 
well as six large private ones with an estimated total of 50,000 
works. Religious books had been sent to the Haram libraries by the 
Ottoman sultans as gifts. A collection of Sultan Abdulhamid I 
(r. 1774-89) of more than 6,000 books and manuscripts was 
housed in Medina. Sultan Abdulmecid (r. 1839-61) provided vol­
umes for a Meccan library. The most notable library in Jidda was 
that of the Nasif family; there were more than 3,000 volumes in it 
by the 1920s.13 
The answer to the primary question concerning literary high 
culture in the Hijaz remains unclear: what did the literate in gen­
eral think? Their attitudes toward life and death, religion, the n e  w 
political and scientific ideas of the Western Europeans, and Otto­
m a n social and political developments are largely unknown. S o m e 
Hijazis, such as the Maliki mufti of Mecca in 1894, still believed in 
alchemy and omens. O  n the other hand, the importation of a large 
telescope from London at a cost of T. L 2,200 by the Amir A w  n al-
Rafiq in 1899 showed an awareness of n e w technology. Knowledge 
was fragmented. The range of opinion can be suggested if one con­
siders the probable points of view of a Bedouin of the interior, an 
Ottoman army official trained in Western science and languages in 
Istanbul, a widely traveled Indian Muslim merchant, and an Arab 
shopkeeper catering to heat-weary pilgrims. The exceedingly var­
ied ideas to be found a m o n g members of such social groups re­
sulted in the failure of unifying secular concepts such as 
nationalism. There was, however, a concern for all factors relating 
to the pilgrimage, which promoted a certain curiosity about the 
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rest of the world. Jiddawis in particular closely followed the press 
for items about foreign countries that might increase or decrease 
the number of pilgrims. 
LAW 
The law was one of the m a n y areas in which religion, the state, 
and social values were intertwined. In determining the proper 
sources of law, the procedures for deriving judgments, and the ju­
dicial process, religion and political power sometimes clashed and 
sometimes cooperated. 
The diversity of educational experiences was matched by a 
wide variety of legal and arbitration systems. The most notable 
problem was in the allocation of legal cases between the amir of 
Mecca, w h  o was the most prestigious local political-religious au­
thority, and the qadi of Mecca, w h  o was the representative of the 
political and religious power of the Ottoman Empire. Considering 
the turbulent population, the massive influx of foreign pilgrims, 
and the relative Ottoman military weakness, the legal systems of 
the Hijaz functioned with a remarkable degree of success and pop­
ular support. 
In dividing legal cases between the amir and the qadi, Be­
douin disputes and all cases involving sharifs, whether occurring 
in Mecca, in nearby villages, or in the desert, were to be resolved 
by the amir. All other individuals besides nomads and sharifs were 
supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman court sys­
tem. In fact, the allocation of cases was m u c h more complex than 
this neat division implies. Tribesmen in Medina and Jidda were 
tried by Ottoman courts. Pilgrims from outside the Ottoman E m  ­
pire and resident foreigners were tried in consular courts or in Ot­
toman courts with consular observers. S o m e individuals went back 
and forth from one set of courts to another. 
A series of examples indicates the nature of the problems of 
jurisdiction over nomads. In July 1859 a m e m b e r of the A w f section 
of the Harb killed a soldier in Rabigh. The suspect was arrested, 
sent to Mecca, convicted, and sentenced to death. His tribe then 
besieged the Rabigh fortress and raided the town. W h e  n reinforce­
ments of 400 troops were sent to the Ottoman garrison, the A w f 
went to the mountains to await their next chance for revenge. A 
remarkably similar incident in 1876 took place w h e  n the governor 
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of Medina arrested an A w f chieftain for the murder of a Medinan; 
the death of the accused in prison led the A w  f to besiege Medina. 
The governor was defeated in pitched battle, but the dispute was 
successfully mediated by U m a  r Nasif, of Jidda. Another chief of the 
Harb died in a sharifial prison in Mecca in 1904; as a result, his 
followers would not negotiate a safe passage for caravans for the 
next two years. In order to stop feuding in the Wadi Fatimah, the 
amir arrested a prominent local sharif, held him in the amirate's 
o w n jail, and then had him executed by being stabbed to death in 
public. 
Sources of justice were numerous: personal, arbitration, tribal, 
Quranic, Ottoman commercial legal codes, military, and foreign. 
Personal justice was meted out by the amir, vali, or tribal leaders, 
although in the case of the first two, captial punishment had to be 
approved by the sultan. Arbitration was a favorite device through­
out the Hijaz to avoid the formal courts and involved the settling 
of disputes by referring them to an impartial person w h  o rendered 
a judgment voluntarily accepted by the parties involved. Tribes-
m e  n and townspeople alike used arbitration; even the consuls oc­
casionally employed it. Tribal customary law based on the 
principle of compensation for injuries was applied by Bedouin 
chiefs. 
Religious law was ultimately based on the Quran, the sayings 
and practice of the Prophet M u h a m m a d  , and extrapolations there­
from. Religious law was applied in the Ottoman court system, and 
in some cases by the amir. The Ottoman judges and deputy judges 
were trained in religious law. Ottoman commerical law was trans­
formed in the nineteenth century by Europeanizing reformers. It 
was applied by separate courts and only to those areas of conduct 
that were specifically governed by the n e w decrees. Military justice 
pertained to those serving in the Ottoman armed forces. Foreign­
ers and foreign proteges were frequently covered by their o w n 
laws; extraterritorial rights had been granted citizens of foreign 
states by a series of capitulatory treaties. The special status of for­
eigners was jealously guarded and expanded by foreign consu­
lates. 
The chief judges of Mecca and Medina occupied high posi­
tions in the Ottoman legal hierarchy, but although their salaries 
and status were high, their actual power in the Hijaz was small. The 
great distance from Istanbul m a d  e the judges' positions unenvia­
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ble. Generally the posts were rotated often, the qadis serving for 
only one or two years. The judge of Mecca supervised all criminal 
and police cases in Mecca as well as those involving personal sta­
tus. H  e nominated the qadi of Jidda and received two-thirds of the 
latter's fees, leaving only one-third of the fees and no salary for that 
individual. Other deputies of the Meccan qadi were appointed for 
Taif, Rabigh, Lit, and Qunfuda. The Medinan qadi had deputies in 
Yanbu, Wajh, Diba, and Khaybar. Until 1895 deputy judges were 
Hijazis; after 1895 they were selected from a m o n g the graduates of 
the religious legal school of Istanbul. Although most commercial 
cases arising in Jidda were judged in its commercial court in the 
1890s, in the 1900s this was changed so that the Jidda qadi handled 
nearly all cases in the appeals courts. The court offirst instance 
dealt only with matters involving slaves, and the commercial court 
proper had very little business. It was only with the reforms follow­
ing the revolution of 1908 that a court offirst instance was begun 
in Mecca. Since the Hanafi school of legal precedents was official 
in the Ottoman Empire, the Hanafi muftis were the chief advisers 
to the qadis, even though a majority of the Hijazis were Shafiis. 
Meccans and Medinans sought the opinions of the muftis on 
a number of legal and moral questions. Muftis issued judgments 
on such topics as usury, vaccination, n e  w styles of clothing, and 
petroleum lamps in mosques. 
The limits on the importance of the religious judges can be 
seen in murder cases. A trial by the qadi or by his deputy was fol­
lowed by a review by a council of officials and notables. The local 
review council in Mecca was somewhat secular, since it was com­
posed of prominent merchants, a mufti, the deputy qadi, the naqib 
al-sadat, the deputy amir, and the vali. Its membership was change­
able, and in some cases it was ignored by the Ottoman authorities. 
A conviction was referred to Istanbul, where the court's records 
were examined in the office of the chief mufti of the empire, w h  o 
was also the head of the religious hierarchy; then the decision was 
sent to the sultan. Consideration in Istanbul of murder convictions 
in the Hijaz was by no means perfunctory. There were several in­
stances of requests for more information and occasionally reversals 
of, or changes in, sentences imposed in the Hijaz. 
Procedures differed according to the status of the victim and 
that of the suspected killer. In 1857 a Bedouin murderer met his 
victim's brother in Medina and was killed by the latter, w h  o 
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promptly took refuge with the qadi of Mecca from the relatives and 
friends of the Bedouin. The Bedouin'sfriends were refused im­
mediate vengeance by the Ottoman authorities. As a result, the Be­
douins began a riot that ultimately led to a crisis in Bedouin-
Ottoman relations in the area. In 1869 a soldier in Yanbu murdered 
a civilian, perhaps with provocation. H e was tried by a local civil 
government court, the decision was examined by a council, and 
the case went to the civil and religious authorities in Istanbul. H  e 
was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in Jidda. In a third 
case, two of the Medina Haram's eunuchs killed a slave, but they 
were given a reduced sentence offive, rather than fifteen, years. 
There were few murders reported in the Hijaz. A six-year sample, 
arbitrarily selected from the records of the grand vezir for 1867-73, 
showed only eleven murders, but there probably were other un­
reported violent deaths and retribution murders that did not take 
place in areas under Ottoman control.14 
W h e n local Ottoman townspeople died, their property was di­
vided according to Quranic injunctions, with recourse to a qadi or 
mufti if necessary. The situation for foreign pilgrims was different. 
The Ottomans claimed that the special religious status of Mecca 
meant unclaimed property of deceased foreigners should i m m e  ­
diately go to the public treasury; the capitulations to foreign states 
did not apply there. S o m  e groups in practice established com ­
munal treasuries for the effects of their deceased members , as did 
the Tatars and the Tunisians. In other cases the local authorities 
simply refused to send the value of the property overseas to heirs. 
It took an order from the grand vezir to pry loose T. L 986from the 
vali and qadi of Mecca in 1846 for a French Algerian family.15 M a n y 
times the pilgrims were so poor that they left practically nothing 
w h e  n they died. Generally estates ultimately did m a k  e their wa  y 
back to heirs abroad, despite Ottoman religious and legal claims 
for special status. 
Living foreigners posed even more problems for Ottoman jus­
tice than those w h  o died in the Hijaz because the valis claimed the 
independence of the Hijaz from the capitulations that gave special 
privileges to foreigners and their consuls elsewhere in the Otto­
m a n Empire. It was argued in 1864, for instance, that permanent 
inhabitants of Mecca could not be extradited, even though they 
were citizens of foreign states. W h e n an extradition d e m a n d by the 
Jidda consuls was m a d e , it would be sent to Istanbul, and no action 
88 REUGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE INARABIA 
was taken by the vali pending a response from the central govern­
ment. A n angry letter by the British consul in 1864 pointed out that 
Great Britain had more Muslim subjects than any other sovereign 
state, not excepting the Ottoman Empire, and therefore to argue 
for exemptions from extradition on religious grounds was ridicu­
lous. H e said that Muslim Indians living in the holy cities were still 
under British protection. Another problem was the determination 
of nationality in an era w h e  n formal concepts of passports and cit­
izenship were spreading from Europe to the rest of the world. The 
Ottoman Law on Nationality of 1869 said that anyone living in Ot­
toman territory would be considered an Ottoman subject unless 
evidence of being a foreign subject was produced. Resident com­
munities of foreigners then had to choose whether to be consid­
ered Ottomans and, if not, to secure evidence to the contrary. 
Apparently only a few of the m a n y Indian Muslims in Mecca chose 
to become Ottomans, but their status remained a subject for de­
bate between the British and the Ottomans for decades. British 
claims to protect Afghans in the Ottoman Empire were rejected by 
the Hijaz vali in 1890 on orders from the ministry of the interior; 
instead, they were treated as Ottomans.16 
Christian and Muslim foreigners operated under legal restric­
tions in the Hijaz. They could not o w n immovable property there 
after 1867, even though it became possible for them to buy prop­
erty elsewhere in the empire in 1865. The only way around this 
restriction was to convert property into a pious foundation and 
then m a k  e a foreign Muslim its administrator. 
Even more complex was the question of w h o had jurisdiction 
w h e n cases involved both Ottoman citizens and foreigners. The 
Ottomans in I860 felt that they should try such cases, according to 
Ottoman law and in Ottoman courts, although consular observers 
would be allowed. British and French opposition was based on 
allegations of the use of torture on witnesses, local prejudice 
against foreigners, extensive bribery, and ignorant judges. All par­
ties rejected the use of mixed courts in which some judges would 
be Ottomans and some Europeans. In Jidda the foreign consuls 
wanted all Ottoman-foreigner trials to be handled entirely by the 
consuls, but this was rejected by the consuls' o w n embassies in 
Istanbul. However, in the 1880s and afterward, if the consuls did 
not approve of a sentence against one of their nationals, they 
would neither enforce it nor allow the Ottomans to enforce it. Also, 
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foreign consuls' influence was felt in the commercial court of 
Jidda, where the assessors of damages were often foreign subjects. 
T w  o cases involving Muslim foreigners and Ottoman justice 
show h o w law was actually applied. Thefirst concerned Mustafa 
Tilimsani, a French Algerian, w h  o was robbed by Said Mukhtar, a 
Persian, in 1876. In the Hijaz, Persians were tried by regular Otto-
m a  n courts and did not enjoy extraterritoriality in criminal cases. 
Mukhtar was tried in Jidda by a panel of judges that included the 
local qadi, a police official, and three Jidda notables. The French 
consul and a Persian observer were present. The case hinged on 
the testimony of Tilimsani's wife, w h  o testified while behind a 
grille, so that she could be heard but not seen. Mukhtar was ac­
quitted. Another case involved Hajj A b  d al-Aziz, a British Indian 
merchant and the local agent of the Indian state of Bhopal, w h  o 
was accused of stealing m o n e y from an estate of which he was 
trustee. His accusers were the Maliki mufti of Mecca, the head of 
the preachers of Mecca, and numerous other Meccans. W h e n he 
was ordered to produce the accounts of the trust before the Mecca 
tribunal, he refused. As a result, he was threatened by the chief of 
police, w h o pointed out that his shop and h o m e were in Mecca, 
beyone the reach of British protection. His subsequent arrest was 
approved both by the vali and by the amir. The vali told A b d al-Aziz 
that since he was a Muslim he should be ashamed to want to trans­
fer the case to a foreign consulate. Ultimately the case became 
moot because Bhopal selected another person to handle its chari­
ties in Mecca and A b d al-Aziz left. However, even the strong-
minded Vali O s m a n Pasha eventually admitted the right of inter­
vention by the British on behalf of Indian Muslims living in 
Mecca.17 
Punishment by religious courts tended to be more lenient 
than tribal justice and more strict than consular courts. Punishment 
for such crimes as burglary and forgery consisted offlogging and 
short prison sentences. Kidnapping, in one case at least, was pun­
ished by only six months in jail. The harsh justice administered by 
the tribal sheikh was tempered by the alternatives of the blood 
feud, raid, and exile from the tribe. Ottoman political prisoners 
were usually given freedom to m o v e about in the city of their con­
finement, with the notable exception of A h m e  d Midhat Pasha at 
Taif, w h  o was treated harshly in the 1880s on orders from the sul­
tan. Those punished by consular courts were usually given very 
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light sentences. In cases of grave crimes, they werefrequently sent 
to their country of origin for trial. The amir's court sentenced of­
fenders to its o w n prisons in Mecca and Jidda. M o b violence led to 
severe unofficial punishments. A  n example took place in Medina 
in 1884 w h e n a female slave killed afree Muslim w o m a n . The slave 
was turned over by the governor of Medina to a m o  b that de­
manded immediate vengeance rather than a trial. As a result, the 
slave was stoned to death. 
Foreigners often accused Ottoman judges of corruption, fa­
voritism, and accepting political interference in the courts. M u s  ­
lims were allegedly treated more favorably than Christians. The 
low salaries and infrequency of payment of Ottoman bureaucrats 
did cause occasional bribe-taking. Honesty and fairness by judges 
usually went unmentioned by foreigners. A rare exception was 
M e h m e t Cemaluddin Harputli, qadi of Mecca in 1905-6, w h o was 
praised by the consuls. H  e had earlier worked for the Ottoman ed­
ucation council and subsequently became qadi of Egypt.18 
The extreme heterogeneity of justice and education in the Hi­
jaz reflected an underlying social diversity. Tribesmen, Arab towns­
people, Ottoman soldiers, and foreign Muslim merchants had 
strongly differing views on w h  o should judge their controversies 
and on what their children should be taught. 
Most people in the Hijaz learned to do things outside any 
school. Those w h o went to schools primarily received a religious 
education. Children were also educated by parents, relatives, and 
peers by example and by moral precept. Most Hijazis did not feel 
any need to k n o  w about the world beyond their o w  n vicinity, ex­
cept in the realm of religious knowledge, where learning was by 
definition a moral good, and in the areas affecting the pilgrimage. 
Differences in learning and law were somewhat lessened by a 
shared stratum of faith and c o m m o  n identity as Muslims living in a 
holy land. Religion also provided the foundation for law and learn­
ing. S o m  e secularization in education and law along European 
lines took place, especially in Jidda and in the Ottoman state 
schools; but most Hijazis, and particularly the Bedouins and M e  ­
dinans, remained unaffected. The most substantial impact of for­
eigners came in commerce, not in learning or law. 
1. M  . J. Young and A. A. Dohaish, "An Unpublished Educational Dcxument from the 
Hijaz (A. H . 1299)," p. 133; A. A. Powell, "Maulana Rahmat Allah Kairawani and Muslim 
Christian Controversy in India in the Mid-19th Century," pp. 46,64; M u h a m m a  d al-Shamikh, 
Al-TulimftMixkkih wu ulMudinuh, pp. 53,84-85; Carlo Nallino, L'Anbia Saudiann, p. 127. 
LEARNING AND LAW 91 
2. Al-Shamikh, Al-Talim, pp. 90-91; F  O 195/2148, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 10 June 
1903; BBA, Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to amir and vali, 9 Zilkade 1285; Yildiz 14.88/68.88.13; 
Bayram Kcxlaman, "II. Abdulhamid ve ashiret mektebi," p. 258; F O 195/2254, Husain in 
Monahan (Jidda) to O'Conor, 26 April 1907. 
3. BBA, Ayniyat 875, 18 Cemaziyelewel 1291; Al-Shamikh, Al-Talim, pp. 11, 70; Al Ba 
tanuni, Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, p. 60; BBA, Dahiliye 73827, 8 Muharrem 1302; Hurgronje, 
Mekka, pp. 173,184; Ibrahim Rifat, Mirat, pp. 102-6. 
4. Al-Shamikh, Al-Talim, pp. 86-89; Bernard Lewis, Islam in History, pp. 116-17; 
F O 685/3/1, Jidda to Bombay, 31 October 1891; Al-Batanuni, Al Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, p. 26; 
Bayard Dodge, AlAzhar, p. 164. 
5. F  O 195/1514, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to White, 15 September 1885; BBA , Dahiliye 
67085,9 Ramazan 1298; Al-Batanuni, Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, p. 59; Young, "An Unpublished 
Document," p. 133; Al-Shamikh, Al-Talim, pp. 12-17, 31-33; Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 187, 
210-11. 
6. Al-Ansari, Tarikh, p. 152; Al-Shamikh, Al-Talim, p. 33; Max Gross, "Ottoman Rule in 
the Province of Damascus, 1860-1909," pp. 123-24, 353-62. 
7. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, p. 213; Hurgronje, Mekka, p. 192; H o m  a Pakdaman, 
Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani, pp. 100-101; Caesar Farah, "Censorship and Free-
d o  m of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt." 
8. M u h a m m a d al-Shamikh, Al-SihafahftalHijaz, pp. 13-15; Hurgronge, Mekka, pp. 
258, 286-87; Ottoman Empire, Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1303, pp. 202-4; Al Shamikh, Al-
Talim, pp. 17-19. 
9. Ahmad Dahlan, Taqrib al-usul; Ahma  d Dahlan, Duwalal Islamiyyah, A h m a  d Dahlan, 
Khulasat al-kalam fi bayan umara albalad al-haram; Hurgronje, Mekka, pp. 164, 
175-76. 
10. FJP, de Lostalot (Jidda) to ministry, 5 March 1884; Young, "An Unpublished Docu­
ment," pp. 133-34; F O 195/1585, Jago (Jidda) to White, 5 May 1887; Hurgronje, Mekka, 
p. 173; Abd al-Salam Hafiz, Al-Madinat al-Munawwarah fi al Tarikh, pp. 154-56, 158-60; 
Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order," p. 145; C. Brcxkelmann, Geschichte der arabischen 
Litteratur, 2:812,815; Powell, "Maulana," pp. 62-64. Also see the study of eighteenth century 
Hijazi religious thinking in John Voll, "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs," pp. 264-67. 
11. M  y translation from Hafiz, Al Madinat al-Munawwarah, p. 155. 
12. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Umm alQura. 
13. Otto Spies, "Die Bibliotheken des Hidschas," pp. 87-95; BBA, Mesail-i M u h i m m e 
2449, 7 Safer 1262, grand vezir to sultan and 2453, 25 Cemaziyelewel 1264, grand vezir to 
sultan; Al-Batanuni, Al Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah, pp. 58-59, 255. 
14. BBA, Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to vali, 9 Rebiyulahir 1286; Ayniyat 872, grand vezir 
to Medina governor, 12 Rebiyulahir 1289; FJP, Emerat (Jidda) to ministry, 2 May 1857; BBA, 
Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye 330,9 Cemaziyelewel 1289; Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 314609. 
15. Ferman from the sultan to Mehmet Ali Pasha, 1838, in Recueil, p. 204; FJ, Flory 
(Jidda) to ministry, 7 March 1847; F  O 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to vali, 15 April 1864. 
16. F  O 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to vali, 15 April 1864; F  O 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to 
Bulwer, 26 April 1864, and vali to Stanley, 7 April 1864; F  O 195/1610, Vali Safvet Pasha to 
W o o d , 1 and 2 December 1888; F O 195/1689, Wcx>d Qidda) to ambassador, 28 February 
1890. 
17. FJP, Bertrand (Jidda) to ministry, 4 October 1876; F  O 195/1451, Moncrieff (Jidda) 
to Dufferin, 22 February and 22 April 1883. 
18. FJP, Hugonnet (Jidda) to ministry, 31 January 1890; FJ, Beillard (Jidda) to ministry, 
3 January 1856; F  O 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to Bulwer, 20 April 1864; F  O 195/2198, Devey 
(Jidda) to O'Conor, 7 December 1905. 
CHAPTER 5 
COMMERCE 
A L T H O U G H SECULARIZING R E F O R M S in law and education af­
fected relatively few Hijazis, n e w patterns of commerce did im­
pinge substantially u p o n the lives of the Muslim Ot toman 
merchants of Jidda and the pilgrims as they did upon most parts of 
the Middle East. Christian Europeans and Muslims under European 
protection competed for economic influence. Innovations in the 
pilgrimage brought about primarily by Europeans, such as regular 
steamship service and the construction of the Suez Canal, substan­
tially affected the merchant community. The commercial role of 
India and Great Britain as trading partners of the Hijaz increased in 
the nineteenth century. However, some continuity was provided 
because the base of the Hijazi economy continued to be the pil­
grimage to Mecca; religion and religious activity were crucial to the 
economy. W h e  n the numbers and wealth of the pilgrims rose or 
fell, the economy of Hijazi towns and tribes rose or fell in turn. The 
pilgrims frequently brought merchandise for sale in order to defray 
the cost of their trip; they also were the largest and richest con­
sumers. The future was judged by Hijazi merchants according to 
their predictions of the next year's pilgrims. 
Because of the poor agriculture in the Hijaz, society was d o m ­
inated by the sharifs, officeholders, large-scale importers of goods, 
pilgrim guides, and those receiving pensions from the Ottoman 
government. These were the wealthiest members of society rather 
than the agricultural landlords. However, the extreme ethnic diver­
sity of the commercial elite meant that they did not coalesce with 
the chief religious families to form a c o m m o  n front to wrest local 
political power from the amirs of Mecca. Since the Ottoman gov­
ernment in Istanbul played a major role in providing food to the 
Hijaz for religious reasons and the Ottomans supported the amir-
ate, a possible alliance between the central government and the 
merchants was also averted. Individual merchants were co-opted 
into the ruling groups as advisers to the vali and the amir. 
Because of the religious status of the Hijaz and its conse­
quences for Hijazi society, political power and economic-commer­
cial influence were separate. Wealthy individuals in the 
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commercial elite could and did secure special treatment for them­
selves from government, but they did not seek political power. 
Nevertheless, there was a close and complex relationship between 
the commerce of the Hijaz and its government, hinging on the pil­
grimage. 
O n e example of the government's interaction with commerce 
was in the area of the m e d i u m of exchange. Throughout the Hijaz, 
Ottoman m o n e y was legal tender, but it was not the sole currency 
used in commercial exchange. Instead, there was a wide variety of 
coins and paper money, including those of India, Great Britain, 
Egypt, France, Russia, Spain, Mexico, and other countries. Because 
of this diversity and a shortage of coins, the exchange rate between 
currencies was important. As pilgrims arrived, they brought coins 
from their various h o m e countries; this m o n e y was then used to 
pay for the enormous imports needed to support the pilgrims as 
well as the people of the Hijaz. From city to city, the exchange rate 
of the Ottoman pound in terms of the Ottoman kurush and the 
exchange values of foreign coins varied depending upon supply 
and demand. Values of foreign coins in the Hijaz changed w h e n 
the pilgrimage was completed and most of the pilgrims had de­
parted. Coins of all sorts became more valuable because they be­
came scarcer after the pilgrims, w h  o had brought them to the 
country, had left. 
Commercialfrustrations,fluctuations, and crises were also fre­
quent because of several other causes: the absence of large banks 
in the Hijaz, the frequent refusal of merchants to accept bills of 
exchange, a shortage of coins, the Bedouins' insistence on using 
the silver Maria Theresa thaler, and Ottoman government attempts 
to regulate coinage. Often merchants were hampered rather than 
helped by the means of exchange. W h e  n efforts to standardize 
weights and measures failed, as they did in the Ottoman Empire, 
the more difficult task of providing a reliable and regular m o n e y 
supply was beyond the institutional ability of the Ottoman govern­
ment in the Hijaz. 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
The centrality of the pilgrimage to the Hijazi economy and the 
increasing role of Christian Europe and British India in it can be 
seen in the imports and exports of the Hijaz. 
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TABLE 4 
VALUE OFJIDDA IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

T O THE NEAREST T.L 1,000

Year Imports Exports Total 
1855 702 442 1,144 
1856 781 431 1,212 
1857 906 469 1,375 
1859 1,091 618 1,709 
1859-60 1,079 610 1,689 
1861 2,220 199 2,419 
1863-64 1,798 910 2,708 
1868 1,700 1,000 2,700 
1876 2,020 618 2,638 
1878 2,003 1,034 3,037 
1879 1,845 469 2,314 
1880-81 1,867 324 2,192 
1883 912 73 985 
1885 739 130 869 
1886 132 
1887 80 
1890 508 36 544 
1891 473 31 504 
1892 623 34 657 
1893 630 24 654 
1894 771 23 794 
1895 722 31 753 
1896 762 25 787 
1897 709 21 730 
1899 806 28 834 
1900 828 35 863 
1901 872 42 914 
1902 943 46 989 
1903 1,081 25 1,106 
1904 1,546 28 1,574 
1905 2,494 43 2,537 
1906 1,886 79 1,965 
1907 2,166 41 2,207 
1908 2,297 57 2,354 
As with all numbers from nineteenth-century Hijaz, estimated 
amounts of imports and exports need to be viewed with great 
skepticism. Customs officials underreported imports so as to con­
ceal bribery and theft. Another reason w h y the official totals were 
too low was that records did not include Ottoman-owned vessels. 
Many vessels paid customs duties at Ottoman ports other than 
Jidda. C o m m e r c e by land was not included in trade figures. Never­
theless, it is possible to see a clear and steady increase in imports 
and a modest increase in exports from 1855 to the late 1870s (see 
table 4). After 1882 exports fell remarkably and remained at a low 
level. Imports decreased sharply in the 1880s and then remained 
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relatively constant until 1903 w h e  n they began a steady rise until 
World W a r I. 
Export and import fluctuations were caused by a number of 
factors, some of which were religious. Short-run, nonrepetitive 
causes of change included political disturbances that discouraged 
pilgrims, as in the slavery and succession struggle in Mecca in 1856, 
the massacre and bombardments of Jidda in 1858, and the quarrels 
between the vali and the amir in 1880-82. Financial panics, dis­
eases, or unusual prosperity in the Hijaz or in any of the main pil­
grimage countries such as India or Egypt could also affect Hijazi 
commerce. S o m e wars hurt Red Sea shipping, especially the Mahd­
ist-British-Egyptian struggles of the 1880s and 1890s. 
G o o  d harvests or failures of crops, abroad or locally, affected 
prices in the Hijaz, and a drought in the Hijaz in 1903 necessitated 
the importing of sheep from the Sudan. Another example of har­
vests changing prices was the simultaneous failure of the Y e m e n 
harvest and the decline in Indian rice production in 1896-99, 
which brought about a 20 percent increase in the price of rice in 
the Hijaz. W h e  n the number of pilgrims fell because of bad har­
vests abroad, the price of agricultural goods in the Hijaz would rise 
precisely w h e  n Hijazis could least afford it. 
The crucial short-run, repetitive variable was the number of 
pilgrims w h  o came to the Hijaz. For example, the pilgrims brought 
with them about T. L 1,100,000 in 1885 and T. L 2,600,000 in 1901 
for their expenses.1 These large sums fueled all aspects of the 
economy. W h e  n the chief pilgrimage day was to fall on a Friday, 
which was considered especially propitious, m a n y more Muslims 
went on the pilgrimage than normally would be expected. There­
fore in those years, imports were unusually high. 
Long-rangefluctuations in commerce were caused primarily 
by changing currents in world trade. Increased shipping between 
Europe and South and East Asia tended to go through the Red Sea. 
Intermediate stops between Aden and Suez were necessary for ob­
taining coal, and Jidda therefore benefited. However, the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 hurt the trade of Jidda severely. As the 
number of steamships in the Red Sea increased and they could 
more easily go to small ports, so Jidda's role as an entrepot for 
transshipment of goods practically disappeared. Exports drastically 
decreased. Another reason for the decline of Jidda was improved 
steamship technology that eliminated the need for an intermediate 
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stop for coaling in the Red Sea. Ships tended to call only at the 
ports of Aden and Suez.2 
The canal, changed technology, and the political events of the 
early 1880s in the Hijaz led to a marked decline in commerce that 
did not begin to recover until 1903. In the early 1880s, a series of 
quarantines against Jidda by major pilgrim countries, the decline 
in the slave trade, and the fighting in the Sudan combined to create 
a commercial crisis that, with the impact of the canal finally taking 
full effect, ruined Jidda's trade and therefore that of the Hijaz. The 
causes of the increase in exports starting in 1903 have not yet been 
fully determined, however. 
Britain and British India dominated imports and exports after 
the decline of the coffee trade, which had been largely under M u s ­
lim Ottoman control earlier. The planting of coffee outside Arabia, 
especially in the Western Hemisphere in the eighteenth century, 
decreased the importance of Y e m e n coffee and, therefore, Jidda as 
an exporter of it. After 1875 the value of coffee imported into, and 
reexported from, Jidda rapidly declined and stayed quite low, with 
only a slight increase in the years after 1903. Political events in 
Y e m e n , including the Ottoman attempt to reimpose direct rule 
there, adversely affected Yemeni production and sales of coffee. 
The decline in the export of coffee from Jidda was also caused by 
direct sales of coffee in Yemeni ports to Ottoman and foreign pur­
chasers. In 1883 most coffee in the Hijaz came from Java; only 
about one-fourth was from Y e m e n . In 1892 three-fourths of the cof­
fee in the Hijaz was from India and the remainder from Y e m e n . 3 
British and Anglo-Indian dominance of the Jidda marketplace 
(see table 5) continued basically unaltered from the 1840s to 1908. 
In 1864 and 1878, Britain provided 46 percent of the imports mea­
sured by value, Austria was second with 32 and 30 percent, and 
France was a weak third with 16 and 17 percent. India exported to 
the Hijaz great quantities of cloth, wheat, and rice. India's impor­
tance was seen as early as 1855, w h e n with Britain it provided 
nearly all the cotton and silk manufactured cloth imported at Jidda. 
In 1892-95 the peak of Indian imports was reached: they m a d e up 
more than one-half of all imports. India sent especially large quan­
tities of wheat, flour, and rice in those years.4 However,from 1894 
to 1910, India sent only 38 percent of the average value of imports, 
or about T. L 451,000 per year. Thus the relative position of India 
in the Hijaz declined slightly after the middle 1890s but remained 
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TABLE 5 
VALUE OF THE CHIEFJIDDA IMPORTS

T O THE NEAREST T.L 1,000

Year Cotton Goods Rice Wheat Sugar Barley 
1855 265 
1861 272 119 50 
1864 228 
1875 396 158 62 125 
1876 273 209 13 4 
1877-78 303 149 23 3 
1885 165 
1890 96 22 
1891 175 44 12 27 
1892 112 
1892-93 138 68 19 10 
1893 144 146 78 37 9 
1894 196 
1895 173 
1896 175 57 12 
1897 146 41 1 
1900 196 109 326 43 
1892-95* 130 65 61 8 
1894-1910* 211 222 128 82 48 
* Averaged for these years. 
high. British goods replaced Indian manufactures in some cases, 
especially piece goods. In this later period, India kept on average 
30 percent of the piece-goods market, more than 90 percent of the 
rice, and one-half of the wheat and wheatflourimports. 
Wheat, barley, and rice also came from Egypt and Iraq. Egypt 
supplied most of the Hijaz's sugar. Imported dates came from 
Basra and Musqat. Although India and Great Britain provided most 
manufactured cloth, some also came from Egypt and other prov­
inces of the Ottoman Empire. Iran sent the Hijaz tobacco and car­
pets, and w o o d , which was largely used for houses, came from 
Singapore. Glass was listed for thefirsttime as an import in 1895; 
it was used for n e w houses built in the European fashion. 
The imported commodities did not include products that 
could be used for light or heavy manufacturing, agricultural imple­
ments, drugs, and most types of metals and chemicals. Armaments 
of any sort were specifically forbidden to be imported. Neverthe­
less, large numbers of handguns and rifles were smuggled into the 
Hijaz, especially for the Bedouins. Cotton goods and rice were the 
two major imports. Although a good deal of silk was also imported, 
most of it was reexported rather than used locally. Clothing was 
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usually m a d e from cotton. The chief food was rice; wheat was less 
often eaten. Barley was imported almost exclusively for the Otto-
m a  n government's army animals. 
Ironically, in view of the subsequent history of Arabia as a pe­
troleum exporter, the Hijaz imported petroleum products from the 
United States and Russia during the nineteenth century. In 1875, 
1,000 4 cwt. barrels, worth about T. L 9,000, were landed at Jidda, 
and by 1891 imports were up to T. L 17,000, mostly from the 
United States. The United States steamship India delivered to Jidda 
in 1892-93 petroleum valued at T. L 13,200,5 and from 1894 to 
1910 petroleum products worth an average of T. L 22,000 were 
imported every year at Jidda. 
Exports from the Hijaz were consistently low in value. Ex­
ports, as opposed to reexports, were worth only a very small 
amount of money; between 1894 and 1910, they averaged only 3 
percent of imports. Salt, slaves, pearls, coffee, and cloth were sent 
by caravan and ship from Jidda, but in most cases they originally 
had been purchased elsewhere. The chief Hijazi exports were 
henna, g u  m and resinous products, beeswax, shells (including 
mother-of-pearl), and hides. 
By the late nineteenth century, mother-of-pearl, shells, and 
pearls had become the chief exports: they were worth T. L 154,000 
in 1876, and T. L 115,000 in 1879. In 1886 there were 300 boats in 
the Red Sea engaged in harvesting mother-of-pearl, which yielded 
T. L 34,000. After 1902 the mother-of-pearl trade in Jidda was ru­
ined by the government's increased taxes. 
Animals were exported from the Hijaz, but their export was 
occasionally stopped by the local authorities, w h  o feared meat 
shortages. The export of sheep was forbidden in 1884 and at other 
times because of scarcity in the Hijaz, as well as the Ottoman desire 
to stop trade with the Mahdist forces in the Sudan. 
Specie exports in 1902-4 were estimated to be about T. L 
850,000 per year, with at least one-half going to India. S o m  e bul­
lion was sent to officials of the Ottoman government as bribes, but 
most of the money sent from the Hijaz was used to pay for imports. 
SHIPPING 
The most important change in shipping after 1840 was the in­
troduction of steamships, owned mostly by European Christian 
states or businesses, and the decline in the number of sailing ves­
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sels, owned mostly by Muslims from the Red Sea area. The number 
of steamships rose remarkably after 1869 w h e  n the Suez Canal 
opened. Most of the available cargo space and passenger rooms 
came to be in steamships, not in the numerous, usually small, sail­
ing vessels that still called at Jidda. 
Jidda had been an important ship-building center and h o m e 
port for shipowners and crews for all of the Red Sea. Amir Ghalib 
in the early nineteenth century had sent some of his o w n ships to 
India. More than two hundredfifty merchantmen were then based 
at Jidda. In the 1850s about six ships were built per year there. They 
were two-masted, sometimes weighed as m u c h as eighty tons, and 
were m a d e from Malabar teakwood. Since losses caused by the 
dangerous coral reefs and shifting wind patterns of the Red Sea 
were frequent, n e w construction was needed to replace old or de­
stroyed vessels.6 
In the 1880s and 1890s, Jidda merchants owned ten 600­
1,000-ton sailing ships that ventured as far away as Zanzibar, India, 
and Singapore. Small ships of 15 to 100 tons were engaged in the 
Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade, and between 200 and 400 of these 
ships operated out of Jidda. In the 1900s there were also 210 light­
ers, 65 coasters, and 21 fishing vessels at Jidda.7 But n e  w construc­
tion at Jidda had declined to only two or three sailing ships per 
year. Increasingly, local ships were used only for the shipment of 
goods from deepwater ships anchored offshore to the quays at the 
harbor and for the transport of pilgrims in the Red Sea region. 
This change was brought about by steamships, the first of 
which in the Red Sea was the Hugh Lindsay of India, which traveled 
from B o m b a y to Suez via Aden and possibly Jidda in 1830. In 1837 
a regular monthly mail service was established for the same route. 
Steamships had two major advantages over sailing ships in the Red 
Sea: they could ignore the prevailing wind patterns and because of 
their easier maneuverability they could c o m  e closer to reefs. O  n 
the other hand, they were dependent upon supplies of imported 
coal. All large vessels, both steam and sail, had to anchor as m u c  h 
as four miles from the Jidda harbor because of the coral reefs, and 
cargoes were brought ashore by lighters m a n n e d by Jiddawis. As 
the number of steamers increased, they took over cargo routes and 
pilgrim transport from sailing vessels. Steamers began to venture 
even into the small, dangerous harbors of Lit and Qunfuda in the 
1900s. 
A m o n g the steamers coming to Jidda, more were from Britain 
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TABLE 6

STEAM VESSELS ATJIDDA

Year U.K. and Indian Egyptian 
Total 
(includin
others) 
Tons 
(thousands) 
1859 34 
1863-64 35 
1864 38 79 
1875 85 52 205 179 
1876 104 56 220 188 
1877 101 58 205 179 
1878 124 53 218 194 
1879 116 80 241 213 
1880 132 116 328 295 
1881 128 69 251 246 
1881-82 104 96 263 398 
1883 75 67 190 192 
1884 78 57 216 
1890 83 65 207 247 
1894 102 66 269 314 
1895 97 54 258 332 
1896 313 372 
1897 240 299 
1898 106 57 224 253 
1899 105 44 191 232 
1900 128 8 170 211 
1901 158 2 268 354 
1902 154 15 331 
1903 198 9 299 418 
1904 235 8 334 473 
1905 248 0 343 475 
1906 268 0 350 552 
1907 233 0 319 492 
1908 207 0 275 440 
and India than from any other country(see table 6), as was also the 
case in the Y e m e  n port of Hudayda. From 1880 to 1904, the British 
and Indians carried from 40 to 60 percent of the tonnage per year. 
Other countries were far behind, except for Egypt. Even before the 
Suez Canal was opened, the commerce ofJidda had been oriented 
largely toward India. ThefirstFrench merchantman in Jidda since 
the 1820s docked in 1848. There were few German ships in Jidda; 
in 1900-1905 only two visited the Hijaz. Germany was actively ex­
panding its economic influence and activity in other parts of the 
Ottoman Empire, but not in the Hijaz. 
The Ottomans and Egyptians attempted to overcome the Eu­
ropean lead in steamship shipping to the Hijaz, and a company 
owned by Egyptians began regular scheduled stops at Jidda in 
1858. In 1863/64 the company sent ships twice per month toJidda. 
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A n Ottoman imperial order established the steamship company's 
right to serve the ports of the Red Sea. In return the company was 
obliged to transport grain for the holy cities at a reduced rate. 
Scheduled Egyptian passenger service, which included carrying 
the mails, lasted at least until 1899. The Ottoman government sub­
sidized an Austrian run from Trieste to Istanbul to Hudayda, with a 
stop at Jidda, and Austrian ships were also hired by the Ottomans 
to take grain from Basra to the Hijaz.8 
The Ottoman Empire attempted to encourage the expansion 
and economic success of Ottoman-flag shipping. Whenever possi­
ble, contracts to transport grain were given to Ottoman ships, and 
the Imperial Ottoman Steamship C o m p a n y operated an Istanbul-
Red Sea route by 1887. With the pilgrimage of 1894, the Ottomans 
began Jidda-to-Bombay operations in direct competition with Brit­
ish steamers, but this service was suspended in 1896. Though the 
nominal Ottoman agent in Jidda was the merchant Zaynal Ali Rida, 
the de facto agent was Admiral Sami Pasha, of the Ottoman Red Sea 
fleet. The admiral applied pressure on merchants and pilgrims to 
use Ottoman shipping.9 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
Unofficial and official Ottoman intervention in commerce 
chiefly affected the pilgrimage and resulted in the exploitation of 
pilgrims for the personal gain of the ruling and commercial elite. 
The shipping consortium coordinated by the valis and the amirs, 
the rigging of prices for services and goods sold to pilgrims, and 
the limitation of competition a m o n  g pilgrim guides and brokers 
were all examples of the interaction of the ruling elite with the 
separate merchant elite. 
There was a long and deep involvement of local Ottoman of­
ficials in restricting competition and fixing prices for transporting 
pilgrims. Competition in transporting pilgrims was limited in 1883 
by the formation of a shipping pool that set prices and divided the 
resulting profits a m o n g its members . The founders of the pool 
were J. S. Oswald and his partner Hassan Johar; U m a r al-Saqqaf; P. 
N . Van der Chys, the Jidda agent for the Ocean Steamship C o m  ­
pany, w h  o was in partnership with an aide of the British consul; 
and J. A. Kruyt, the Netherlands consul. This group promised to pay 
the amir for every pilgrim transported to the Straits of Malacca and 
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Java by them; in return, the amir ruled that pilgrim guides should 
be Ottoman citizens. H  e was able to apply enough pressure upon 
Ottoman guides to bring them all into the scheme. The amir also 
was able to stop the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jidda if 
they did not book passage with the pool members: the pilgrim 
brokers and the cameleers would not guide or transport these pil­
grims against the amir's wishes. As a result, ticket prices doubled. 
The extra profits were allocated as follows: 25 percent to the amir, 
40 percent to the guides and brokers, and 35 percent to the indi­
vidual members of the pool.10 
The arrangement of 1883 lasted until 1888, w h e n the amir be­
came too greedy and attempted to extend the pool's monopoly on 
shipping Javanese and Malayan pilgrims to those pilgrims going to 
India. The chief pilgrim guide was instructed that no Indian pil­
grim could leave Mecca for Jidda without having already booked 
in Mecca his return passage to India with a m e m b e r of the pool, 
and the price for a ticket was increased by 60 percent. Unfortu­
nately for the success of this plan, two key people were left out of 
the pool—Vali Nafiz Pasha and J. S. Oswald. The latter had left the 
Javanese pool earlier and had even tried to break its monopoly. H  e 
n o  w accused the British consulate of indirectly supporting both 
pools, and, as a result, the consul had to act particularly vigorously 
to show that he opposed the actions of his former aide. O  n 23 Au­
gust 1889, the vali arrested the Indian pilgrim brokers in Mecca. 
According to the vali, the other ringleaders in the Indian pool were 
U m a  r Nasif and Ab  d Allah Banaja. Nafiz Pasha abolished the posi­
tion of chief guide for the Javanese pilgrims and wiped out the 
monopoly. Van der Chys, by then the consul for Sweden and Nor­
way, promptly committed suicide, and his company collapsed. 
However, the apparent victory of the vali was short-lived. The en­
raged amir, acting throughfriends in Istanbul, secured the sultan's 
dismissal of Nafiz. Following this, the old ring was reconstituted 
with al-Saqqaf, Nasif, Abd Allah Arab, and the former clerk of Van 
der Chys, C. R. Robinson, n o w the agent of the Ocean Steamship 
Company. The n e w pool was less greedy; prices for the Javanese 
were lowered, and some pilgrims were occasionally farmed out to 
other companies.11 
In 1893 Knowles and Company, of Batavia, through the liberal 
use of bribes to the amir, temporarily ousted the pool and secured 
its o w n monopoly on Javanese pilgrims. Because of cholera, the 
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detention of pilgrims in Mecca after the end of the pilgrimage so 
as to force them to buy tickets from Knowles seemed particularly 
offensive to the British. Nevertheless, the vali and the amir kept the 
pilgrims in Mecca. Knowles had so few ships that, even if pilgrims 
wished to use their services, it was difficult for all to do so quickly. 
Finally on 30 July 1893, under pressure from the British, the vali 
issued a proclamation saying that passage was unrestricted and any 
pilgrim could book with any shipping line. The local agent of 
Knowles was arrested by the n e w k a i m m a k a m of Jidda and was 
tried by the Netherlands in Java. But all this did not deter the amir 
from extracting T. L 2,000 from the Javanese and Malay pilgrims 
before permitting them to leave Mecca. The vali rejected the accu­
sations of the consuls by pointing out that the pool had been in 
operation for ten years. H  e implied two questions in his letter to 
the British consul: W h  y had the consuls not protested before this? 
Could it have been self-interest on their part?12 
In this fashion there began a bitter contest between the British 
consulate in Jidda, acting on behalf of the Malay pilgrims, and the 
vali and amir of Mecca, acting on behalf of the pool and them­
selves. Initially, the vali and the amir w o n  , for despite the posting 
of a proclamation from the sultan, dated 7 April 1894, that called 
for complete freedom of choice in shipping, the pool continued 
for Javanese, Malay, and Indian pilgrims. The n e w vali, Hasan 
Hilmi, received more than T. L 2,000 as his payoff. With this s u m 
he sent presents and bribes to Istanbul officials so they would over­
look the pool. Hasan's chief protector in Istanbul and afriend of 
the amir as well was Ali, a chamberlain of the sultan. Even though 
the British consul in Jidda recommended the dismissal of Amir 
A w  n al-Rafiq, and the British ambassador exerted pressure on the 
grand vezir to secure a change in the shipping pool, nothing hap­
pened. The vali responded to complaints by saying that the pool 
was n o  w customary and therefore allowable. The amir received T. 
L 5,500 from the pool's profits in 1894.13 
After the murder of the British vice-consul Abdur Razzack in 
1895 and the consequent search for his murderers had died d o w  n 
in 1896, the struggle between the vali and the amir versus the Brit­
ish ended. The pool of merchants and their official friends had 
w o n . The n e w British consul, Devey, said that the pool was accept­
able because pilgrims were not fleeced any more than a tourist 
would be elsewhere in the world; and since there were no taxes 
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in the Hijaz, the pool profits took their place. Also, the arrangement 
m a d  e life simpler for the shipping companies. 
All was tranquil, except for outraged cries from mulcted pil­
grims, until 1899, w h e n a n e w pool for pilgrims bound north from 
Jidda was formed. The members , in addition to the vali, were Gal­
limberti, the Austrian vice-consul; the Ottoman state line; the Egyp­
tian steamship company; the ka immakam of Jidda, Celal Bey; C. R. 
Robinson; and the Ottoman sanitary inspector of Jidda. Higher 
prices for tickets charged by the pool led to a profit of T .L 6,600. 
However, Gallimberti stole the vali's share of the m o n e y and left 
the Hijaz. In the same year, the Straits government required pil­
grims to purchase their round-trip tickets in advance before leaving 
for the Hijaz. The Ocean Steamship C o m p a n y then could no longer 
use the amir's pressure on Malay pilgrims. In order to recoup his 
losses, the amir sought n e w sources of money, and attempted to 
force s o m e of the Malays and Indians to go to Medina rather than 
leave the Hijaz, so as to collect part of the caravan expenses for 
himself. The British embassy persuaded the grand vezir and the 
sultan to order the amir to let the pilgrims leave Mecca for Jidda.14 
After 1899 the pools both to the south and to the north operated 
successfully except for the Indian pilgrims. 
T w o steamship lines stubbornly insisted on competing for the 
pilgrims bound to India. Between 1901 and 1905, Fadl Arab, the 
agent for Esaji Tajbhoy of the Shah Line, fought Zaynal Ali Rida of 
the B o m b a  y and Persia Steam Navigation C o m p a n  y over the Jidda-
B o m b a  y route. As a result, ticket costs fell by 80 percent, and in 
1905 both competitors also started carrying northbound passen­
gers from Yanbu to the Mediterranean at reduced rates. The vali 
hypocritically announced that he had just discovered the existence 
of monopolists w h  o were overcharging pilgrims. H  e then fixed 
prices for tickets at a higher level than the two companies were 
charging! The result of his action was the restoration of the north­
ern pool and a profit of T. L 6,000 per year from the shipping 
rings.15 
In addition to shipping, government officials of the Hijaz at­
tempted to create another source of income for themselves by reg­
ulating the land pilgrimage. The pilgrims were obliged to pay 
more and frequently had to take the most dangerous route avail­
able so as to enrich the amir, the vali, and their agents. The sea 
journey usually was quicker than that by land—five days versus 
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twelve—cost only one-half as m u c h , and was less dangerous. O n a 
number of occasions, the amirs sought to divert the pilgrims from 
going the Mecca-Jidda-Yanbu-Medina route and return by sea be­
cause the amirs wanted to collect special fees from pilgrims trav­
eling by land. If the pilgrims or their consuls objected, the valis 
replied that pilgrims were free to go to Medina by land or by sea, 
and imperial decrees were obtained promising this, but in fact 
pressure was applied in favor of the all-land rather than the sea 
route. O n  e example, taken from many, occurred during the pil­
grimage of 1894 w h e n only one-eighth of the pilgrims were al­
lowed to go by sea and the rest proceeded from Mecca to Medina 
by land. Each pilgrim paid from one-third to one-half of the camel 
rental fee into the pockets of the amir and vali. 
The central government did little to curb the excesses of the 
valis and amirs. It did not m a k  e any long-lasting changes in the 
pilgrimage or in the system of guides and brokers. A commission 
was sent to the Hijaz by the sultan in 1896 to investigate the con­
ditions for pilgrims in the area. A m o n  g its responsibilities were dis­
covering w h y rental prices for camels were so high and ordering 
them lowered, stopping the taking of extra m o n e y for the Mecca-
Medina journey, and ending the fees paid to the chief guides. The 
commission was ordered to distribute a proclamation assuring the 
pilgrims that the sultan-caliph wanted to stop all exploitation of 
pilgrims, particularly by reducing camel rental prices.16 The proc­
lamation was distributed, but none of its goals was realized. 
Certainly the same system of pilgrim guides continued de­
spite repeated official condemnations of it. Chief guides, w h o were 
appointed by the amirs, supervised all pilgrims coming to Mecca 
from a certain geographical region, and a guide often went to a 
region in order to encourage the devout to m a k  e the pilgrimage. 
Rewards were great for the guides, both in terms of m o n e y and 
prestige. At the same time, the possibilities for abuse of their posi­
tions were equally great. Even though the sultan had abolished the 
position of chief guide in March 1894, by June the amir had ap­
pointed a chief guide for the Javanese and Malays and one for the 
Indians in return for gifts from them. Vali Hasan Hilmi Pasha dis­
missed Hasan Daud, the chief of the Indian guides, because of sus­
picion that Hasan was diverting the camel hire money. With the 
help of the highly influential Jidda notable U m a r Nasif, Hasan was 
back in business in Mecca by 1896. Unfortunately for Hasan, he 
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n o  w had ranged against him the British consulate, the vali, the vi­
layet treasurer, and the k a i m m a k a  m of Jidda. Despite these ene­
mies, he remained a close adviser to the amir at least to 1899. 
The vociferous opposition of consuls to the exploitation of 
the pilgrims by the Hijazi authorities took place alongside frequent 
cooperation a m o n  g merchants irrespective of their Christian Eu­
ropean, foreign Muslim, or Ottoman Muslim identities. In light of 
the pious purpose of pilgrims' visits to the Hijaz, their mulcting in 
the latter nineteenth century by the shipping pool and by guides 
was a crass exploitation of religion for personal gain. Although 
these practices were contrary to the regard and esteem for pilgrims 
felt in most parts of the Islamic world, little was done by the central 
or local government to stop the exactions that benefited directly 
the amir and vali, and indirectly, through bribes, Istanbul as well. 
THE MERCHANTS OF THE HIJAZ 
Western European Christian states had a technological, mili­
tary, and industrial superiority over the Ottoman Empire. This su­
periority led to the indigenous Ottoman commercial elite's 
displacement by European Christian merchants and their proteges. 
This took placefirst in international trading and then increasingly 
in the commerce between port cities and their hinterlands. Al­
though there were s o m e exceptions, as in Lebanon, in general this 
pattern existed throughout the Ottoman Empire by the late nine­
teenth century.17 Because of religious prejudice and social sanc­
tions against non-Muslims in the Hijaz, a reversal of the pattern of 
European commercial dominance might well have taken place 
there. Local Muslim Ottoman merchants had seemingly a guaran­
teed monopoly on local trade in and to the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina. What took place was that European proteges became 
increasingly important, especially in Jidda. 
Most long-distance maritime trade in the eighteenth century 
was in the hands of Gujerati Indian Muslims. As the British gained 
control of more and more of South Asia, the Indian Muslim mer­
chants living in the Hijaz c a m  e under British protection. 
The rule of M e h m e t Ali established in the Hijaz from 1813 to 
1840 the system of state monopolies that he built in Egypt and 
stopped discriminatory measures against Christians trading in the 
Red Sea. The private sector of the Hijazi economy was dominated 
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by merchants from India, the Maghrib, and the Hadramawt. The 
two greatest merchants in Jidda in the early nineteenth century 
were Muslims from the Maghrib. Under Mehmet Ali's rule, most 
merchants in the Hijaz became Ottoman subjects. 
The Red Sea was more frequented by Western merchants in 
the 1850s. Greeks and a smattering of Muslims under European 
protection went to Jidda in the early 1850s, and thefirst branch of 
a Western European commercial house was begun in 1853- By 
1856 one European company controlled one-quarter of all Red Sea 
trade, discounting notes drawn on Cairo at only 5 percent.18 Most 
trading, however, in the middle of the nineteenth century re­
mained in the hands of Muslims. Competition between Muslims 
from the Hadramawt and the non-Muslims helped cause the Jidda 
massacre of 1858, which will be discussed in chapter 8. 
Despite the dramatic intervention of the British and the 
French, and the subsequent severe punishment by the Ottomans 
of the murderers of foreign merchants and diplomats, very little 
changed after 1858. The Hadramawtis and Muslim Indians contin­
ued to dominate trade and also continued to live in an uneasy 
peace with each other. Muslims protected by the European states 
came to have more freedom of action after 1858, a development 
that created, according to the vali of the Hijaz in 1861, a n e  w orga­
nization for commerce that was not understood by the people of 
the area. Bills drawn on London were discounted by the 1860s, but 
there were very few European merchants or Muslims with direct 
ties to European houses in Jidda. International trade was still cen­
tered on India. 
The second amirate of Abd al-Muttalib exacerbated the under­
lying tension between European-protected merchants and Otto­
mans even though the basic balance of the merchant community 
was not changed. Abd al-Muttalib was opposed by foreign mer­
chants. By 1883 there was only one British merchant and a few 
Maltese and Greeks in Jidda. France had only three subjects in 
Jidda but also protected some Greeks. The Indian Muslim com­
munity constituted the vast bulk of foreign merchants. In the 1890s 
they controlled perhaps one-half of the trade of the city. There 
were thirty large international wholesalers and sixty retailers there, 
but only four were Europeanfirms. By 1904 a few more Europeans 
had been added, and one of their firms, Gellatly, Hankey, and 
Company, was more active. 
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The credit situation in the Hijaz improved somewhat. The Ot­
toman government ruled in 1852 that 24 percent interest per year 
was exorbitant; 15 percent should be the m a x i m u m allowable.19 
Bills of exchange were drawn on local merchants, but there were 
no banks. Merchants sometimes loaned money and took mort­
gages as guarantees of repayment. Large sums were routinely 
shipped, especially from Mecca to Medina. Bedouin raids and nat­
ural disasters at seafrequently caused merchants severe losses that 
were uncovered by any insurance. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, there were two 
large European merchant houses. The largest was Myrialaki and 
Company, which had numerous offices in India, Western Europe, 
Egypt, and Anatolia. In the Red Sea region, their main offices were 
at Hudayda, with subagencies in Mecca, Wajh, Yanbu, Suakin, and 
Massawa. C. A. Osborne, a British resident of Jidda between 1883 
and 1904, was local agent for Gellatly, Reuters, and Lloyd's, and was 
also consular agent for Italy from time to time. Gellatly, Hankey 
undertook a wide range of services as shippers, brokers, coal im­
porters, marine insurers, bankers, and representatives of the Regie 
Ottomane and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Osborne generously 
helped poor pilgrims return to their homelands, and for this he 
received a medal from the Ottoman government. 
There were more European-protected Muslim merchants than 
Europeans. Faraj Yusr owned vessels of forty to eighty tons that 
flew the Britishflag and carried cargoes throughout the Red Sea 
and to Musqat. Another leading m e m b e  r of the Jidda merchant 
elite was Zaynal Ali Rida. H  e was probably born in Ahwaz in 1837, 
although he claimed that he was born in Aden. H  e became an In­
dian subject in Calcutta in 1873 and was registered as such with the 
British consulate in Jidda in 1874. The Persian consulate, however, 
maintained between 1879 and 1891 that he was a subject of Persia. 
During a long stay in Bombay, 1848-63, he became prosperous; 
during his life in the Hijaz, he became very wealthy. H e married 
the daughter of U m a r Nasif, one of the chief Ottoman merchants 
of Jidda. Zaynal's riches came in large part from acting as the agent 
for shipping companies. His descendants have subsequently 
played a prominent role in the post-Ottoman Hijaz. Zaynal himself 
was famous for his charities, especially his gifts to education. His 
grandnephew became one of the Hijaz's representatives to the im­
perial parliament. Other European-protected merchants were not 
as successful as Yusr and Zaynal, however.20 
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Ottoman Muslim merchants in Jidda were dominated by two 
extensive families: the Nasifs and the Banajas. Abd Allah Nasif was 
the chief agent of, and representative for, the amirate in Jidda be­
fore and during the massacre of 1858; in that year he was already 
elderly. H e was succeeded by U m a r Nasif (1822-1908), perhaps as 
early as 1873, as the amir's agent in Jidda. Because of Umar's ser­
vice, his membership in the administrative council, and his dona­
tions to the building of the rushdiye in Jidda, he was honored by 
the sultan. The death of Amir Husayn and the appointment of Abd 
al-Muttalib, Umar's enemy, temporarily weakened his governmen­
tal influence. There were, however, sources of income for him out­
side government. U m a r owned water storage tanks in Jidda, and he 
participated in the shipping pool of brokers and agents. Even the 
energetic Vali O s m a n Pasha, w h o was convinced of Umar's com­
plicity in a Bedouin uprising, failed to destroy him. O s m a  n con­
demned U m a r to fifteen years in jail and confiscated all his wealth, 
but U m a  r received an imperial pardon thanks to a protector at 
court, A h m a d Asad. U m a r found it expedient to go to Istanbul until 
A w n al-Rafiq became amir, w h e n U m a r once again was restored as 
the amirate's agent in Jidda. U m a  r kept this lucrative post, acting as 
the amir's banker, as well as entertaining amirs, valis, and distin­
guished visitors in his mansion, until at least 1905. His descendants 
were famous for their learning as well as their wealth. M u h a m m a  d 
Nasif (b. 1884) memorized the Quran, then studied religion in 
Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. H e became the Jidda agent for the amirs 
in the 1900s and a major merchant.21 
The Banaja clan was originally from the Hadramawt. Yusuf Ba­
naja had been one of the major merchants in Jidda before 1858. H e 
loaned large amounts of m o n e  y to the provincial government and 
employed agents in Istanbul and Cairo. H e was deeply implicated 
in the massacre of 1858, tried and convicted, and exiled to Crete, 
where he died. His three sons all became Jidda merchants. M u  ­
h a m m a d , the most prominent of them, was an agent for several 
British and Indian firms and for the sultan of Zanzibar. Although 
M u h a m m a  d attempted to gain British protection in 1879 on the 
grounds that he and his family were from Shihr and Mukalla, this 
was refused by the British. After his death in 1891, his brother Abd 
Allah became the head of the family, and by 1906 Abd Allah was 
the most important Ottoman merchant and shipper in Jidda. An­
other brother, Abd al-Rahman, was Vali Ratib Pasha's private banker 
and was therefore arrested during the Revolution of 1908 w h e n an 
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investigation was launched into the vali's personal finances. Abd 
al-Rahman subsequently became minister of finance in 1916 in the 
independent government of the Hijaz.22 
Less prominent Ottoman merchants stillflourishedin the late 
nineteenth century. T w  o smaller merchant houses in Jidda were 
the Badwilan [Ba Duwaylan?] and the Ba Jubayr. The Badwilans 
had branches in Asir and Qunfuda, and exported clarified butter 
and skins in the 1900s. The BaJubayrs were in Asir, Qunfuda, Aden, 
and Jizan and had twenty small ships. The Hazzazis were originally 
from Fez. M u h a m m a d Hazzazi served in the army of Mehmet Ali 
Pasha, and later became the supervisor of the Jidda prison. His two 
sons, Hasan and Abd al-Qadir, were prosperous Jidda merchants. 
Hasan was the Jidda agent for Amir Abd al-Muttalib and, therefore, 
the enemy of U m a r Nasif. His descendants were also merchants in 
Jidda.23 
Merchants in Mecca and Medina had somewhat similar expe­
riences as those in Jidda, though there were no Europeans and 
fewer European proteges there. The widespread interests of Abd 
Allah ibn Abd al-Rahman Bassam provide one example.  H e was a 
Wahhabi w h  o usually lived in central Arabia, but he also owned a 
house in Mecca in the 1870s.  H e engaged in Jidda shipping, cara­
vans between Jidda and the holy cities, and money-lending; and 
he was critical of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. Khalaf ibn Nabal rose 
from being a poor Bedouin to become one of Medina's wealthier 
merchants, even though he was illiterate.  H e accumulated substan­
tial sums by acting as an intermediary between town and tribe, and 
sold clothing and coffee to the nomads and bought clarified butter, 
which he sold in Medina or Jidda.  H e owned 300 camels in the 
1870s and had twice been to Egypt.  H e considered the Rashidis in 
Hail to be his masters. A similar though less successful career was 
that of M u h a m m a  d al-Najumi, of Medina and Khaybar. Since his 
mother was of the Harb tribe, he gained easy access to them for 
trading. His father was a Kurdish military contractor. A m o n g M u ­
hammad's numerous careers were soldier in the Ottoman army, 
cotton goods merchant in Medina, livestock dealer, slave mer­
chant, sweeper in the Medina Haram, garden worker, and guns­
mith. Many of the merchants, even the smaller ones, ventured far 
afield from the Hijaz, going to Egypt, the Sudan, Y e m e n , Aden, the 
Hadramawt, Iraq, and India.24 Certainly the image of Hijazis as ig­
norant and isolated from the world was not correct in regard to 
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merchants. Irrespective of their nationality, the merchants were 
well informed about international events affecting the numbers of 
prospective pilgrims and trading companies abroad. 
The environment of the Hijaz set limits to the growth of com­
merce and, to a degree, influenced its nature. Poor agricultural 
conditions meant that large imports of food were necessary for the 
townspeople, Bedouins, and pilgrims, and these imports were 
paid for by exporting gold and silver received from pilgrims and 
by the charities of Istanbul and Cairo. C o m m e r c e was hindered by 
the slowness and precariousness of transportation and communi  ­
cations. Since the Hijaz was dependent upon pilgrims and imports 
for its welfare and sustenance, external changes over which local 
leaders could have little influence set the level of economic activ­
ity. Little was done by the Ottoman government in the Hijaz to im­
prove commercial conditions. There was a steady decline in 
exports from the Hijaz and a failure to increase local production 
for export. Foreign imports were consumed and were not used for 
production of goods. Even the coins used in most commerical 
transactions were imported from outside the Ottoman Empire. 
The rigors of the environment and the prohibition of Chris­
tians from the holy cities might have enabled the Hijazis to resist 
the worldwide European domination of capital and commerce. 
However, n e w factors such as improved steamship technology, the 
Suez Canal, and the growing power of European navies helped 
maintain and expand British and Indian economic influence in 
Jidda. The Suez Canal injured Jidda's role as an entrepot for the Red 
Sea trade. N e w steamships did not have to coal at Jidda. In addition, 
trade with India and Europe was such a large proportion of total 
commerce that those Muslim merchants w h  o had cultural affinities 
or economic links with foreigners could act as brokers and eco­
nomic mediators between Ottoman-Arab society and the powerful 
imperial European states. Hijazi commercial ties with India were 
so great that the earliest Ottoman representatives in Calcutta and 
B o m b a y were Hijazis appointed on the recommendation of the Hi­
jaz vali.2S Local government officials reinforced the dominance of 
commerce by foreigners by entering into restriction of competi­
tion, as in the shipping pool that favored the existing, larger firms. 
As a result, the Muslim proteges of European Christian states in­
creased their control over the most important aspects of Hijazi 
commerce between 1840 and 1908. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
F O R E I G N O B S E R V E R S of the Middle East in the nineteenth century 
constantly commented on the relative paucity of voluntary corpo­
rative organizations and the resultant fragmentation of Middle East­
ern cities and societies. However, this picture of a highly discrete 
social milieu was warped because foreigners often ignored certain 
types of social groupings that did actually exist. It was true that if 
one searched for economic class consciousness, for professional 
societies based on accomplishment, and for self-governing c o m ­
munes , they were not present in the Hijaz. But guilds and neigh­
borhoods, slavery, status-differentiated hierarchies, families, tribes, 
and Sufi brotherhoods did exist. They not only existed, but in m a n y 
cases they formed a basis for identity, willingness to sacrifice, and 
rules for living. 
Social groups had an organizational and value structure simi­
lar to that of religious organizations. Status and such social institu­
tions as slavery depended to a considerable degree upon religious 
factors. Social groups were often controlled by the amirs of Mecca, 
whose authority was religious and political. However, though most 
social groupings depended ultimately on religious values and the 
pilgrimage, they were organized on nonreligious lines.1 
GUILDS 
M a n  y townspeople belonged to guilds, producers' groups or­
ganized according to skills or crafts. Guilds controlled admission 
to trades, the type and quality of goods, and regulated competition. 
In the Hijaz most guilds provided services for the pilgrims and 
m a d e goods to sell to pilgrims. There were guilds for guides, pil­
grim brokers, muezzins, boatmen in Jidda, Z a m z a m water-sellers, 
camel-hirers, jewelers and goldsmiths, bakers, sellers of prayer 
beads, barbers, butchers, masons, porters, and hawkers of goods. 
In a sense import and export merchants also had a guild; there 
were in Mecca, Jidda, and Medina chief merchants, w h  o were ap­
pointed by the grand vezir on the recommendation of the vali.2 
Guild heads held positions because of leadership abilities 
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and status independent of personal piety. Sometimes they were 
influenced substantially by the amirs of Mecca, whose position in 
turn depended upon religious legitimacy. In the case of the pil­
grim guide guild, which was the largest and certainly the most im­
portant of the guilds in Mecca, each ethnic group had its o w n 
guides, brokers, and deputy guild heads. The chief leaders of the 
guild were controlled by the amirs, w h  o sent them robes of honor 
as a sign of official nomination. In at least one case, the amir forced 
an internal reorganization of the guide guild. The 230 guides work­
ing in the Mecca Haram elected a council of sixteen that selected 
its o w  n head in the 1880s. 
Other guild heads also had extensive powers. The sheikh of 
the jewelers approved major sales, supervised prices, and arbi­
trated differences between sellers and buyers. The chief of the 
Z a m z a m guild, whose post was hereditary, oversaw admission to 
the guild, although joining also required a license from the amir. 
Occasionally the leaders of the guilds played a decisive role 
in fixing prices for pilgrims. The sheikh of the porters ofJidda, w h o 
was appointed by the Ottoman authorities, had a particularly cru­
cial position because of the centrality of Jidda for the pilgrimage 
by sea and the monopoly enjoyed by his workers in the port. Once 
he and his followers had agreed on the rates to be charged by the 
porters, as in 1866, they then secured the approval of the mer­
chants, the kaimmakam, and the Jidda town council. A similar deal 
was arranged in 1886, whereby the sheikh received one-third of all 
the porters' incomes. This procedure seems to have worked until 
1896 w h e n the ka immakam replaced the chief of the porters' guild 
and appointed a n e  w person in his place. Subsequently the fixed 
rate disappeared and endless bickering over charges ensued. 
Perhaps the most intriguing example of the role of the guilds 
took place in 1865 in Jidda, w h e n K a i m m a k a m Nuri manipulated 
the cost of wheat andflourfor his o w n benefit. The bakers' guild 
approached the French consul with complaints about forced sales 
and high prices. S o m  e of the local sympathizers of the kaim­
m a k a m , acting on his behalf, attempted unsuccessfully to bribe the 
guild to drop these complaints. Ultimately, because of the guild 
and the consul, the valifiredNuri. Subsequently, there were no 
more instances ofJidda kaimmakams acting as merchants for their 
o w  n interests. 
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NEIGHBORHOODS 
All three major towns were divided by their inhabitants into 
neighborhoods, or quarters, by criteria other than religion. The 
neighborhoods were n a m e d after the chief landmark of the area, 
usually a gate in the town wall, a topographical feature, or a mos ­
que, market, square, or profession concentrated in the region. 
Jidda was so small that it had only three quarters, with the notables 
concentrated in one district. Unfortunately, little is k n o w n about 
the forty or so neighborhoods of Medina. Mecca provides the most 
information about social organizations by neighborhoods. 
The definition, and indeed the concept, of a quarter changed 
from person to person and from year to year. Neighborhoods were 
especially poorly delimited in Mecca because the city had no walls 
to serve asfixed boundaries. Unlike m a n  y other Middle Eastern 
cities, Meccan neighborhoods were not physically delineated by 
gates that were closed at night to provide security. S o m e Meccans 
identified marketplaces as quarters of the city; others divided the 
city differently. Since the concept was largely informal, there was 
no sure way of listing the neighborhoods. Nevertheless, until the 
enormous growth of the city following the oil b o o m of the 1950s 
took place, there were about twenty neighborhoods that were gen­
erally agreed by most Meccans to be separate entities. 
The townspeople chose their neighborhood for a number of 
reasons. In m a n  y cases they inherited a dwelling place, but volun­
tary choice in housing was more usual. In other places, such as a 
village like al-Ula, a c o m m o  n ancestor, whether real or alleged, 
provided a basis for neighborhood cohesion. Freed slaves and 
strangers were adopted into kinship and quarter. In Khaybar, a vil­
lage of 1,000, there were three such groupings of relatives. Mecca, 
though, was too large to allow such a pattern. Instead, s o m e quar­
ters were based on occupations, such as the transporters of goods, 
w h o lived in Jirwal, Yemeni merchants in Masfalah, potters in Suq 
al-Layl, carpenters in Ghazzah. Others were based on ethnic groups 
or points of origin. The Bedouins tended to live in Jirwal and M u ­
abidah, Persians in Shamiyyah and Shab Ali, Afghans in Sulayma­
niyyah, Anatolian pilgrims in Bab al-Umrah, Takruris and freed 
slaves in a small settlement south of town, and so forth. There was 
some differentiation by wealth and status; those quarters closest to 
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the Haram tended to be most desired for living accommodations, 
especially by the transient pilgrims and by Ottoman officials. The 
richest merchants and ulema were concentrated in Shamiyyah and 
Qararah. Wealthier sharifs lived in Shab Ali and Shab al-Mawlid. At 
the opposite end of the status ladder, the poor were especially lo­
cated in those areas where disliked occupations also clustered. 
S o m e examples were prostitutes and undertakers in Khandarisah, 
clothes-dying and milling in Shab A m r , and charcoal production in 
Suq al-Sughayr. Emptied petrol tins were used to construct housing 
for a small village of poor people near Mecca—an early example 
of a bidonville.3 
The neighborhood people tended to identify with each other. 
W h e n people from the Meccan quarters m a d e the pilgrimage to 
Medina, the caravan was divided into contingents by quarters. Par­
ties and outings were given by districts. The defense of Jidda 
against external attack included plans for the quarters to mobilize 
m e  n to defend separate sections of the city's walls. Perhaps the 
most extreme example of loyalty to the neighborhood was fighting 
between youths from different quarters of Mecca. Sulaymaniyyah 
and Shamiyyah quarters wouldfight,with quarterstaves in the case 
of the adults, and with stones in the case of the youths. Such small 
riots were usually not political, but rather were caused by personal 
clashes. The most extreme case was in 1881, w h e n political turbu­
lence associated with the n e w Amir A b d al-Muttalib created an at­
mosphere conducive to social upheaval. For three days two 
neighborhoods battled each other using handguns, and the amir 
did nothing. At the end of the fighting, there were fifteen dead and 
fifty wounded. Most battles, however, were considerably less 
bloody. O n e reason for this was the necessity either to carry on 
feuds indefinitely or to reconcile them by the payment of blood 
4money.
The quarters were semiofficially recognized by the Ottoman 
government. In at least a few instances, the government used the 
sheikhs as intermediaries to the population and as alternatives to 
the ulema. The vali of Mecca placed a young Indian girl under the 
protection of a neighborhood sheikh while the legality of her mar­
riage was being discussed. The local sheikh was supposed to re­
port deaths and suspected cases of communicable disease to the 
sanitary officials. 
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SLAVERY 
Slavery was considered by most Middle Easterners and most 
Hijazi Muslims to be natural, inevitable, and necessary. The 
Prophet M u h a m m a d had recommended mercy, justice, and charity 
toward slaves. Enfranchisement was a positive moral act, but the 
institution of slavery itself was not opposed by the religious. 
Changes in attitudes toward slavery resulting from the Enlighten­
ment of the eighteenth century, and the humanitarian movement 
of the nineteenth century led the European countries, particularly 
Great Britain, to seek to abolish the slave trade outside Europe, 
including the Middle East. 
In the case of the Hijaz, most slaves were kidnapped or pur­
chased in Africa and then transported across the Red Sea. The most 
notable instances of brutal treatment took place while the slaves 
were being captured and taken to the African coast. 
Once the slaves reached Jidda, they were sold to one of three 
major groups of buyers: pilgrims, Hijazis, and administrators of the 
Harams. Pilgrims bought slaves partially as investments: the hope 
was that the slave could be sold for more than the pilgrim's ex­
penses w h e n he returned h o m e . Hijazis chiefly wanted servants for 
work in the h o m e , though s o m e slaves were used for manual, ar­
tisanal, and agricultural labor. In s o m e cases slaves were concu­
bines. The overseers of the Harams sought slave eunuchs, and 
m a n y of the staff of the Harams were eunuchs removed from Istan­
bul because of their age or as a form of polite exile. 
The restoration of Ottoman control to the Hijaz in 1841 did 
not immediately affect the status of slavery in the province, but in 
1855 the slave trade became a major issue. Vali Kamil Pasha tried 
to carry out the orders of the central government to stop the im­
portation and sale of slaves, but Amir A b d al-Muttalib, fearing that 
orders for his deposition were soon to be announced, favored the 
popular view that slavery and the slave trade were both permissible 
and necessary. Ab  d al-Muttalib linked his o w  n retention in office 
to the suppression of the anti-slave trade decree; his opponents, 
the backers of Sharif M u h a m m a  d ibn A w n  , supported the vali and 
the imperial government. The vali ordered the public reading of 
the order closing the slave markets and forbidding the importing 
of slaves. In Mecca the ulema forced the qadi to declare the sultan's 
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order void, on the grounds that it was contrary to holy law. Wide­
spread rioting broke out, and houses belonging to French and Brit­
ish proteges were looted. The ulema of Mecca demanded the 
removal of the qadi and Ottoman soldiers from Mecca, complete 
freedom for the institution of slavery, and the permanent expul­
sion of the consuls and all Christians from the Hijaz. The vali 
agreed, for the m o m e n t , to thefirstdemand, but he denied the 
others.5 
The Meccan ulema did not act in a vacuum. They were secretly 
supported by the amir from Taif, and publicly were joined by some 
sharifs and sheikhs of Mecca's neighborhoods. The head of the 
ulema, in addressing the notables of Mecca, called for a jihad, or 
holy war, against Christians and idolaters. A b  d al-Muttalib asked the 
Bedouins to rise in the n a m e of M u h a m m a d and Islam, since the 
sultan had become like a Christian. Thus the slavery controversy 
openly assumed what had been its basic character from the start— 
a battle for political power expressed in religious terms. Further 
evidence of this could be found in the relative peacefulness of op­
position to the Ottoman orders on the slave trade in Medina, where 
the deposition of the amir was not a problem.6 
T o assure the inhabitants of the Hijaz that slave-owning itself 
was not under attack, the Ottoman chief religious jurisconsult 
wrote a letter to the qadi of Mecca in which he argued that the just 
holding of property (i.e., slaves) was permissible. The alliance with 
Great Britain and France, the chief opponents of slavery, was 
needed in the Crimean W a r to crush the Russian enemy, and, there­
fore, it too was permitted. With the capture of A b d al-Muttalib in 
1856, the Ottomans ended the rebellion that ostensibly was begun 
on the slave trade issue.7 
Since after 1855 the slave trade continued to be openly con­
ducted in Jidda, Istanbul repeatedly ordered the Hijaz vali and his 
subordinates to end the African slave trade. Orders to this effect 
were sent in 1857, 1859, 1862, 1865, and 1880. In 1859 the acting 
British vice-consul, Polat, transmitted the grand vezir's letter on the 
slave trade to the vali directly. A general decree outlawed the slave 
trade in 1871. 
As a result of these orders, the open landing of slaves at Jidda 
and their public sale were abandoned in favor of secret landings 
and private sales. Those slaves that were still brought into the Hijaz 
were landed at small villages, marched to Jidda or Mecca, and sold. 
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There were slave sales nearly every morning in Jidda, even though 
the slave market was officially abolished in 1874. Ottoman govern­
ment officials, Indian Muslims, and even Europeans continued to 
buy personal slaves. S o m e slaves were exported to Syria by the re­
turning pilgrimage caravans; others, provided with false letters of 
enfranchisement, were transported by ship to Suez and beyond to 
Istanbul. 
In thefirst phase of the slavery controversy, from 1855 to 1877, 
the European states and the central Ottoman government failed to 
stop the slave trade in the Red Sea. There were a n u m b e r of reasons 
for this failure. Perhaps the most important was that the motives 
that impelled the central government to its position did not act 
upon the Hijaz with equal weight. Sometimes officials would en­
force the imperial orders, as w h e  n the k a i m m a k a  m of Jidda seized 
eighty-five slaves coming from Massawa and returned them to Af­
rica in 1865. But more often government officials collaborated with 
the slave traders.8 
The second phase of the slavery dispute involved a direct con­
frontation between the slave traders and purchasers on the one 
hand and the British consuls on the other, with the valis in the 
awkward position of intermediaries. A n e w treaty against slavery in 
1877 opened the period, and the anti-consul incident of 1895 
closed it. Eventually external events in Egypt and the Sudan de­
creased the slave trade significantly. In 1877 the Egyptian and Brit­
ish governments agreed to ban the slave trade on the high seas. If 
an Egyptian ship suspected of carrying slaves refused to stop, Brit­
ish ships werefree to use force to search it for contraband slaves. 
Slavery and the slave trade enjoyed popular and elite support, 
partially because they were sanctioned by the ulema. In one case 
in order to get freed slaves out of Jidda, the Ottoman garrison took 
the extreme step of boring a hole in the wall of their barracks that 
faced the sea, so that the slaves could leave the town directly and 
would not have to be taken through Jidda's streets. If the public 
saw thefreed slaves, the authorities feared a riot would result. After 
this, four additonal companies of troops were sent to Jidda to in­
crease the small force there. The n e w vali, Nashid Pasha, arrested 
the Jidda chief of police, fired the ka immakam, and closed the 
slave market at Mecca. N o slaves were landed on the Hijaz coast 
between M a y 1879 and March 1880. Freed slaves were provided 
with work in the Hijaz if they did not wish to return to Africa. The 
120 RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE INARABIA 
slave wasfirst registered asfree; he was then hired by private citi­
zens w h o provided a bond and guaranteed to treat him as a free 
servant and to pay him a monthly salary.9 
The newly reappointed Amir A b d al-Muttalib did nothing in 
the early 1880s to oppose Ottoman policy on the slave trade, even 
though he had led the pro-slave trade riots in the middle 1850s. In 
private A b d al-Muttalib favored slavery; he was also strongly anti-
British and anti-Christian. During his tenure, the British consulate 
secured the freedom of at least thirty-five slaves, reconciled slaves 
and their masters in twenty other cases, and arranged the transfer 
of a slave to a n e w owner several times. The liberated slaves had 
worked in a number of types of jobs as water-carriers, doorkeepers, 
pearl divers, makers of straw mats, masons, carriers of heavy goods 
in the port, and personal slaves of Bedouins or townspeople. In 
s o m  e of the instances of reconciliation, the slave returned to his 
master on condition that he be paid wages for his work.10 
As a result of the activism displayed by the consuls and the 
Indian navy, the numbe  r of slaves imported decreased, slaves in 
the Hijaz were treated better, and the employment offree servants 
became more widespread. The fighting in the Sudan between the 
Mahdists and the Egyptian administration cut the roads and drasti­
cally reduced the numbe  r of slaves sent from the Sudan to Jidda. 
The British blockade of the Sudanese coast after 1886 and the oc­
cupation of the slave-exporting ports also reduced the slave trade. 
However, Ethiopian slaves captured by the Sudanese were sent in 
large numbers to Arabia in 1888. The Hijaz vali tried to stop the 
flood of slaves in the late 1880s. W h e  n he learned of the arrange­
ment between the Jidda customs chief and the chief of police split­
ting a bribe for every slave sold, the open sale of slaves was 
forbidden and the slave market closed. Similarly, the Jidda kaim­
m a k a  mfreedfifty-eight newly landed slaves and arrested three 
slave dealers. But a group of notables threatened civil war and the 
intervention of the Bedouin tribes if the order was not rescinded, 
and since Istanbul refused to support the ka immakam, the order 
closing the slave market was repealed and the market was re­
opened.11 
The 1890s saw a further decrease in the slave trade throughout 
the Ottoman Empire. The British conquest of the Sudan closed a 
major source of slaves, as did European expansion into Eritrea and 
Somalia. In 1894 only aboutfive hundred slaves were brought into 
the Hijaz. Most of these slaves were females; some were eunuchs. 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 121 
As the supply of n e  w slaves decreased, prices rose. S o m  e Arab M u s  ­
lim children and w o m e n in Y e m e n were enslaved in the 1890s and 
1900s and sold in Jidda and Mecca. M a n  y slaves, including runa­
ways from owners, were legally manumitted by the Ottoman au­
thorities, pilgrims, and the British. O  n rare occasions eunuchs were 
still purchased locally to be sent to the imperial palace.12 
The Ottoman administration in the Hijaz upheld the rights of 
slaves and freed slaves in accordance with Muslim and Ottoman 
law. The murderer of a slave girl was sentenced to fourteen years 
in jail. There was a good deal of freedom for m a n y slaves despite 
their servile status. 
Private ownership of slaves continued to be religiously sanc­
tioned, legal, and widespread even though the slave trade was 
curbed. The status of the thousands of slaves o w n e d by the towns­
people, villagers, and Bedouins was not substantially affected by 
measures directed against the slave trade. Freed slaves could rise 
in social status and even b e c o m  e wealthy, but most remained 
poor. The institution of slavery and the condition of most slaves 
remained in 1908 as it had been in 1840, although the numbe r of 
slaves imported fell drastically. 
STATUS 
Slaves were at the bottom of the complex Hijazi town social 
organization, which was based on status and on a status-arranged 
hierarchy of groups. In allocating status, religious position was not 
the key factor for all groups, but it did decisively influence the sit­
uation of sharifs, Haram workers, Shiis, and w o m e n  . The status of 
other members of the elite, ethnic groups, and nomads was deter­
mined basically by nonreligious factors. Government pensions and 
salaries and private wealth were important in determining status. 
C o m m o n religious purposes were in the background of Hijazi so­
ciety, and personal piety was greatly admired and respected. 
At the top of society in Mecca and Taif were the sharifs. As 
direct descendants of the Prophet M u h a m m a  d and co-rulers of the 
region, they c o m m a n d e d both awe and obedience. Other descen­
dants of the Prophet and of early leaders of Islam also existed, but 
they enjoyed a lesser status. Still, the family that provided the door­
keepers of the Kaba could trace its descent and duties to pre-Is­
lamic days, and it was highly regarded in Mecca. Other old families, 
especially in Medina, were proud of their ancestry, but m a n y were 
poor. These families possessed not only family pride, they also re­
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ceived subsidies from the imperial government and from private 
individuals because of the religious prestige of their ancestors. 
In Mecca and Medina, s o m e members of the upper classes 
were associated with the two Harams as officials and recipients of 
gifts. The upper classes in Mecca and Medina also gained income 
from agriculture and from urban rental property. In Jidda the upper 
status groups consisted of merchants and officeholders in the Ot­
toman government. The actual political ruling elite consisted of 
Ottoman officials, but because they were usually only temporary 
residents and because of the disdain with which they were re­
garded by local elites, they had only a grudging public acknowl­
edgment of their status. Indeed, the great pride felt by Meccans and 
Medinans in being residents of the two holiest Muslim towns m a d e 
them feel that all outsiders were inferior.13 
The order of ranking of the recipients of imperial charity in­
dicated their social status. In Medina the muftis, chief preacher, 
and deputy judge chose the families that were entitled to charity, 
the number of persons eligible, and the amount. The m e n of reli­
gion and teachers were the highest class; then followed the prayer 
leaders and preachers, descendants of the Prophet, m e  n learned in 
law and the teachers of reading, the notables, those born in M e d  ­
ina, and those resident in the holy city though born elsewhere. 
Pensions were given not only to the m e  n of religion and officials 
but also to their children. Payments were inheritable and divisible 
a m o n  g the descendants of the original recipient. In the eight years 
for which information is available in the late nineteenth century, 
more than 319,000 okas of barley and 3,000,000 of wheat were dis­
tributed in Medina. A small numbe  r of people received a large part 
of these amounts. In most years 20 percent of the people received 
more than 50 percent of the grain. The most extreme example was 
the 8 people from a total of 228 recipients w h  o received one-third 
of all wheat in 1902. Although initially m a n  y of those receiving 
grain were exiles or retired officials from Istanbul, some local Sufis, 
teachers, and students were also named.1 4 
Those w h  o were in the middle-status groups were most of the 
pilgrim brokers, some wholesale and retail merchants, the actual 
(as opposed to the honorific) servants of the two Harams, shop­
keepers, small proprietors of real estate and renters offlats, heads 
of religious brotherhoods, teachers, and so on. Lower-ranking mil­
itary officers and government clerks were also in this group. 
The lower-status occupations usually did not include people 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 123 
directly associated with religion or the pilgrimage. Such occupa­
tions did include boatmen and builders in Jidda, peasants and por­
ters in Medina, street sweepers and funeral workers in Mecca, and 
such. Below these people were the very poor, either slaves or those 
w h  o had no regular job of any type. The poorest pilgrims fre­
quently had no m o n e y by the end of their stay or had arrived pen­
niless after paying for their transport to the Hijaz. They depended 
upon charity and lived in appalling conditions. Frequently they 
were clustered around places where they thought they might ob­
tain assistance, such as the Mecca Haram or the Jidda consulates. 
In addition to occupation, there were several external, visible 
signs of status. Foremost was attire. During the holy days, all pil­
grims were dressed in the same style of clothing and were thus 
indistinguishable except by sex. During the rest of the year, the 
style of the clothing, the colors, the m o d e  s of wearing turbans, and 
the quality of cloth and decorations frequently indicated status. O  n 
official occasions medals that had been awarded by the sultan were 
worn. Since there were m a n y sent by Istanbul to the Hijaz for pri­
vate as well as public figures, the award of honors by the imperial 
government was a widespread sign of distinction. Male Meccans, 
especially the descendants of the Prophet, had distinctive facial 
scars, and could thus be distinguished at a glance from non-Mec­
cans. Skin color was not usually a guide to status. Although it was 
true that black slaves cost less than white, it was also the case that 
interracial marriage and concubinage frequently resulted in the 
children of the wealthy and notable being of varying skin colors 
and features. A mesalliance in marriage was related to ancestry and 
ethnicity rather than to color; of course, in m a n  y instances there 
was an overlapping of these categories. For the daughter of a sharif 
to marry anyone w h o was not of that religiously prestigious lineage 
was considered to be a loss of status for her and for her family; if 
she married a non-Arab, the loss of prestige would be even greater, 
no matter what the color of his skin.15 
Religion did determine status for the very few Jews and Chris­
tians in Jidda, and for the Shii Muslims, all of w h o  m were held to 
be of very low status. The Shiis of Medina were agricultural workers 
and butchers, and claimed to be descended from the Abbasid side 
of the Prophet's family. They married a m o n g themselves, had their 
o w n teachers and clerics, were buried in their o w n cemetery, 
tended to be poor, and in general were considered a group apart 
from, and inferior to, the rest of the Medinans. Persian Shii pilgrims 
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had to pay more for services than did Sunnis and were frequently 
insulted for their beliefs. There does not seem to have been any 
noticeable mistreatment of Wahhabis, Ibadis, or other pilgrims be­
longing to minority sects within Islam. 
Ethnicity and language were strong links a m o n g people, 
though they were not associated with European concepts of na­
tional identity. There was a tendency for ethnic and language 
groups to live together in the major towns. The most numerous 
foreign communities were the Indians, Javanese, South Arabians, 
and Turks. Larger communities were able to maintain some of the 
customs of their homelands. The Indians preserved their o w n lan­
guages, dress, and social mores longer than other ethnic groups. 
S o m  e Indians even wrote Arabic in Hindi characters. Male Indians 
resident in the Hijaz often returned to India to secure brides and 
then brought them back to Arabia. Indian w o m e  n in Medina fre­
quently did not wear veils. Ethnicity in m a n  y cases overlapped with 
occupation. A particular accent in Arabic differentiated Javanese 
from other groups, as did clothing and customs. Indians and Ja­
vanese, as well as Turks and even Syrian Arabs, were ridiculed by 
the Meccans for their Arabic accents and their poor c o m m a n  d of 
Arabic, despite being fellow Sunni Muslims. 
W o m e  n were a group with low status. M e  n held the view that 
Islam supported and ordained this situation. So little was said 
about their lives that it is almost impossible to tell whether the 
actual status of w o m e  n corresponded to the publicly stated views 
of m e  n about them. Supposedly w o m e  n were more restricted in 
their freedom of movement than m e n , had no role whatsoever in 
public questions, and in general were completely subservient to 
males. However, some exceptions to this pattern are known. Nafi­
sah bint A b  d Allah Khalifah, the spirited wife of Ibrahim Awliya, 
refused to join Ibrahim in Bombay, where he was then living, and 
sued him for support and repayment of a debt in the Medina qadi's 
court in 1883. Then there was the wife of Zayn, a pilgrim guide 
from West Sumatra, w h  o in actuality transacted most of his busi­
ness, mixed with m e nfreely, and displayed great energy. There is 
also some evidence that family financial matters were transacted 
jointly by husband and wife.16 The seclusion of w o m e  n in towns, 
the great value placed on privacy, the domination of economic and 
political life by m e n  , and the fear of loss of family status if w o m e  n 
committed adultery, all kept the roles of most w o m e  n in society 
tightly restricted. 
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Another way in which social groups ranked themselves was 
by moral behavior. Those w h  o were most law-observing and pious 
were respectable; those w h  o broke religious commandments , 
laws, and customs were not.17 
Sexual behavior was crucial in establishing claims to religious 
respectability. Sexual relations during the pilgrimage days were 
forbidden, but before and after that time pilgrims could have sex 
without forfeiting the benefits of the pilgrimage. Most m e  n making 
the pilgrimage were not accompanied by their wives. The Egyptian 
and Syrian pilgrimage caravans had prostitutes a m o n g them in the 
early nineteenth century, but with the Wahhabi seizure of the Hi­
jaz, prostitution disappeared. In the 1810s there were prostitutes in 
one of the quarters of Mecca. Homosexuality was also present. 
Conditions differed a m o n  g the three cities in the 1850s: in Jidda 
alcohol and prostitutes were openly available; in Mecca and M e d ­
ina there were no prostitutes, but some alcohol was secretly drunk 
by Ottoman officers. In the 1870s in Medina, there was card-play­
ing, alcohol, the use of drugs—all originating with, but not re­
stricted to, the Ottoman soldiery. Although in 1884 there were 
public brothels in Jidda featuring both males and females, prosti­
tutes were later sent outside Mecca and Jidda and forced to live 
away from the central areas of the towns. In 1902 drummers, sing­
ers, and dancing girls accompanied the pilgrims to M u n a  . Even 
marriages sometimes were somewhat transitory in the Hijaz; the 
rapid coming and going of so m a n y people encouraged a similar 
rapidity of change in personal relationships. The assemblage of 
thousands of persons unfamiliar with the area w h  o traveled with 
substantial sums of m o n e y also encouraged thieves, w h o were nu­
merous during the pilgrimage season.18 
O n  e social group considered itself to be outside the moral 
and social status hierarchy of the towns. For the Bedouins of the 
Hijaz, all the townspeople, with the exception of some religious 
figures, were equally deserving of contempt for their soft lives, 
cowardice, failure to preserve Bedouin standards of purity in lin­
eage, and differing codes of behavior. The views of the townspeo­
ple were usually just as antipathetic toward the Bedouins, w h o  m 
they considered to be riotous, ignorant, poor, and savage. H o w  ­
ever, there were some groups between these two extremes. They 
consisted of villagers w h  o preserved tribal organization, as in the 
fishing villages south of Jidda, and the few Bedouins w h  o actually 
settled in towns. 
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Given the extraordinarily diverse social groups and values in­
dicated above, one might well ask h o w towns existed at all. The 
differences and enmities created, or at least reinforced, by these 
factors might well have led to constant tension and disputes. There 
were m a n y causes for the relative social tranquillity of the towns. 
Ottoman military forces ultimately ensured the existing political 
and economic system irrespective of the wishes of the local pop­
ulation. A  n overarching unity of purpose, beyond all economic, 
ethnic, neighborhood, sexual, and status differences, was achieved 
through the pilgrimage and religious fervor that permeated Mecca 
and, to a lesser degree, Jidda and Medina. The Muslim faith was a 
c o m m o  n bond that united Hijazis: its public rituals stimulated a 
sense of c o m m o n identity. There was a great deal of intermingling 
of people in legal and educational institutions, in arranging large-
scale commerce, and in handling the floods of pilgrims w h o in­
undated the Hijaz annually. A widespread knowledge of languages 
furthered this process. Nevertheless, there was a social mosaic in 
the towns that involved the separation of most groups from each 
other in important ways. 
The categories of social organization were overlapping: the 
residents of neighborhoods, members of guilds, ethnic minorities, 
and the various status group members in actuality found them­
selves belonging to several categories at the same time. Certain 
divisions, especially voluntary corporative organizations such as 
ideological or professional associations, did not exist as such in the 
Hijaz. The consequences of this absence were momentous. If, as 
Hisham Sharabi has argued, professionals, Westernized students, 
and journalists in other parts of the Middle East helped lead to a 
desire for Western, secularizing reforms, their absence in the Hijaz 
explains the absence of such a desire there.19 Instead, religious val­
ues and occupations often helped influence which kinds of social 
organizations would flourish and gave their structures legitimacy, 
as in the case of slavery. 
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PART TWO 
THE POLITICAL HISTORY 
OFTHEHIJAZ 

CHAPTER 7 
RESTORATION A N  D REBELLION, 1840-1858 
B E T W E E  N 1840 A N  D 1908, the religious-political basis of the cen­
tral Ottoman state was substantially affected by selective borrowing 
from secularizing Western Europe. However, in the Hijaz seculari­
zation of politics did not take place. W h e  n the Ottomans attempted 
secular reforms that were locally felt to be antireligious, such as the 
banning of the slave trade in 1855 and the favoring of foreign mer­
chants in 1858, riots and rebellions broke out as a result. 
Such nonreligious factors as personal ambition, family rival­
ries, and raison d'etat played a major role in the nineteenth-century 
politics of the Hijaz after the Ottoman restoration of 1840, but they 
were part of a pattern of politics that had existed earlier and were 
not innovations from Europe. The importance of religion to poli­
tics was especially seen in the financial aid of the Ottomans to the 
Hijaz, the prestige of the amir of Mecca as a descendant of the 
Prophet M u h a m m a d  , the dual administration of the amir and the 
vali in Mecca, and the enmity felt toward merchants w h  o were 
Christians or Christian proteges. 
A version of Islam and a ruling dynasty n e  w to the Hijaz had 
replaced the Ottoman religious-political system w h e n the Wahha­
bis under the leadership of the House of Saud conquered the prov­
ince in the first decade of the 1800s. The Ottoman pilgrimage was 
interrupted, and the empire felt its religious legitimacy and pres­
tige to be so damaged that a major counterattack was urgently 
needed to regain the Hijaz. By the orders of the sultan, M e h m e t Ali, 
the independently-minded Ottoman governor of Egypt, con­
quered the holy cities, defeated the Wahhabis in their homeland 
of Najd, and ruled the Hijaz nominally on behalf of the Ottomans 
from 1811 to 1840. 
Neither Saudi nor Egyptian administrations basically changed 
the Hijaz. It is true that in 1827 M e h m e t Ali ousted the D h a w u Zayd 
clan of the Hashimite family, which had provided the amirs of 
Mecca since 1718, and installed as the n e w amir of Mecca M u h a m ­
m a d ibn Abd al-Muin ibn A w n , of the D h a w u A w n Hashimite clan. 
The leader of the D h a w u Zayd, Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib (b. ca. 
132 RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE INARABIA 
1794), fled to Istanbul. M e h m e  d Ali's control of the Hijaz subse­
quently became so firm that in 1836 Amir M u h a m m a d was de­
tained in Egypt and the Hijaz was governed by secular Egyptian 
appointees with no amir in Mecca. However, few Hijazis viewed 
favorably such Egyptian interference with the amirate, just as ear­
lier few had become Wahhabis under Saudi control of Mecca and 
Medina. The failure of both Saudis and Egyptians to create n e w 
institutions that couldflourish in the region, the social diversity of 
the towns, the general opposition to all religious and political in­
novation, a vested interest in maintaining ties with the Ottoman 
treasury, the religious esteem felt for the amirs, and the overriding 
concern with pilgrimage affairs rather than with political power 
made the restoration of Ottoman and Hashimite power both pos­
sible and welcome to most of the population of the Hijaz. 
The political system of the Hijaz was changed as a result of the 
intervention of most of the European powers on the side of the 
Ottomans against Mehmet Ali, w h o was forced to give up his e m ­
pire outside the Nile River valley, though he was allowed to stay as 
the Ottoman governor of Egypt. The Egyptian forces left Y e m e n in 
May, and they left Najd in September 1840. O n 2 August 1840 M e h  ­
met Ali wrote M u h a m m a d ibn A w n , then still a prisoner in Cairo, 
that he had full authority in the Hijaz as amir from that date for­
ward. Amir M u h a m m a  d returned to Mecca, where he oversaw the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian forces and the restoration of the amirate 
under Ottoman overlordship. 
RESTORATION 1840-54 
The Ottoman restoration in the Arab lands took place under a 
n e w sultan, Abdulmecid (r. 1839-61), and a n e w order. The mili­
tary superiority of the European powers had become so clear by 
then that the reforms of the Tanzimat, aimed at achieving Euro­
peanization, including secularization, began in earnest. Changes 
that had started in most of the Arab lands during the Egyptian oc­
cupation were modified or expanded by returning Ottoman gov­
ernors and generals. In the Hijaz, however, the restoration was 
precisely that—the reinstallation of an ancien regime based on 
shared power, religious legitimacy, and minimal expenditure of 
imperial resources. 
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M u h a m m a d ibn A w n was reconfirmed by the sultan as amir of 
Mecca, perhaps because his imprisonment by Mehmet Ali in Egypt 
had cleared him in Ottoman eyes from the guilt of previous insu­
bordinations. At any rate, the sultan did not appoint Abd al-Muttalib 
ibn Ghalib to be amir, though he was kept in Istanbul in readiness 
to supplant M u h a m m a d should circumstances warrant it. The for­
mer sheikh of the Medina Haram, O s m a n , w h o had served in that 
post under both Egyptians and Ottomans, was named governor of 
the whole province. A n Ottoman was named sheikh of the Medina 
Haram and governor of the city. Ahmet Izzet became kaimmakam 
of Jidda and sheikh of the Mecca Haram at the nomination of the 
sultan. 
Upon arriving in April 1841, Vali O s m a n asked Istanbul for 
more m e n , arms, and ships so that Ottoman control could be en­
forced. H e was able to assume power only gradually. The official 
resumption from the Egyptians of Ottoman financial responsibility 
for the Hijaz finally came on 1 September 1841.' 
During the interval before full Ottoman restoration, the amir 
expanded his authority to the m a x i m u m  . H  e quelled the tribes be­
tween Mecca and Medina and regained control over the region 
south of Taif toward Bisha, in Asir. It was only with the arrival of 
2,000 Ottoman troops in late 1841 that the balance of power began 
tilting toward the central authority. In 1842, in accord with orders 
from the sultan, the chief fortress of Mecca was turned over to an 
Ottoman garrison by the amir. The vali then built a small fort on 
Mount Hindi in Mecca to serve as an additional safeguard. 
A proposed investigation by Istanbul into the whole govern­
ment and military of the Hijaz was discussed in all the chief organs 
of state. The Ottomans decided to leave things as they were, since 
the townspeople and Bedouins were tranquil under the supervi­
sion of the amir. The only areas of difficulty were recurring finan­
cial troubles; the water system of Mecca, which needed repairs; 
and the administration of the outlying regions of the vilayet—Asir, 
Ghamid, Zahran, Qunfuda, Massawa, and relations with Najd. The 
vali controlled the army, the customs of Jidda, and little else; the 
rest of the administration of the towns was in the hands of the amir. 
In 1844 responsibilities were again allocated: the vali and amir 
were jointly put in charge of security on the roads, the Bedouins, 
and the administration of the holy cities. Justice for most Meccans, 
the distribution of imperial honors, and the reading of the imperial 
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order appointing the amir were solely up to the vali. Conflict be­
tween the two leaders was to be resolved by joint agreement.2 Thus 
Istanbul created fertile grounds for rivalry, misunderstanding, and 
confusion in administration by refusing to clearly specify tasks for 
each person, but the empire obtained the religious prestige of the 
amir as an adjunct to Ottoman power in the Hijaz. 
Until 1845 there was surprising tranquillity as the power-shar­
ing arrangement between governor and amir functioned satisfac­
torily. The amir relied upon information gained from tribal 
sources, reports from his sons on conditions in Istanbul after they 
returned from a visit there, and regular correspondence with the 
French consuls about European developments. The populace 
credited the amir for the pilgrimages of those years that were rela­
tively problem-free. Since he was responsible for the ceremonies 
and relations with the Bedouins, this seemed reasonable. Amir M u  ­
h a m m a  d did everything he could during this peaceful time to 
groom his son A b d Allah for eventual succession to the amirate. 
Abd Allah traveled to Istanbul, led the Egyptian and Syrian caravans 
back from Mecca to Medina, and was named deputy governor of 
Mecca. In 1844 the amir secured the exile to Egypt of Ali ibn 
Ghalib, a potential rival to A b  d Allah. 
Vali O s m a n , on the other hand, faced a series of nearly intract­
able problems centering on finances. A military revolt in 1842 for 
back pay was quickly suppressed, but the corruption of the vali's 
advisers and the growing expenses of the military m a d  e it impos­
sible to meet all the vilayet's obligations. However, the crisis that 
brought about the downfall of O s m a  n emerged from a different 
problem—stormy relations with the nomads. 
Rumi, a leader of the Harb tribe, revolted in 1844 to secure 
payment of debts owed him by the Ottomans, but he was then paid 
by the vali and a public reception for him at Jidda was designed to 
show that peace n o w existed. At a later feast, Rumi, his three broth­
ers and all their followers were killed, and their heads were exhib­
ited at Mecca to show the results of opposing the empire, as well 
as the foolhardiness of trusting the protestations m a d  e by Ottoman 
governors. The Harb rose against the Ottomans, and it was only 
with the greatest difficulty that the amir of Mecca mediated the dis­
pute and ended it. 
Since Amir M u h a m m a  d felt he was responsible for negotia­
tions with the nomads, he was antagonized by Osman 's methods 
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as well as his general policies. A further problem ensued w h e  n 
disturbances in Asir led to a withdrawal of Ottoman forces to Taif 
in 1845. Istanbul received complaints against the vali mad  e by the 
amir, the sheikh of the Medina Haram, and Mehmet Ali of Egypt. 
O s m a n had done his o w n cause harm by complaining about the 
poor state of the fortresses and the paucity of supplies precisely 
w h e  n these areas had already been dealt with by the central gov­
ernment. The grand vezir decided to dismiss the vali, but before 
this could happen, O s m a n died in Jidda on 25 June 1845. At nearly 
the same time, the grand vezir was contemplating the replacement 
of M u h a m m a d by Abd al-Muttalib as amir, but finally rejected the 
move as being too m u c h of a change w h e n added to the replace­
ment of the vali.3 The n e w vali was Sherif, the governor of Medina 
and sheikh of the Haram there; O s m a n had held the same posts in 
his o w n earlier career. Troop riots were suppressed, and more 
troops were sent to the Hijaz. Thefirst crisis of the restoration sub­
sided rapidly. 
The amir managed the pilgrimages successfully in the 1840s, 
though there were some complaints about the arbitrary fixing of 
camel-hire prices. Relations with foreigners were also amicable, at 
least by comparison with the stormy years that followed. Minor at­
tacks upon the foreign consuls in Jidda took place in 1846 and 
1851, and in 1849 the Ottoman government ordered the vali to 
apologize for the confiscation of an Indian ship.4 Vali Osman 's two 
immediate successors were both dismissed by Istanbul; they were 
so weak and incapable that the amir and his son Abd Allah man­
aged most public questions. 
The end of the decade's peace and tranquillity came because 
of a Bedouin uprising in the north and Ottoman expansion in the 
east and south. Medina was besieged by the tribes. Military detach­
ments were sent from Jidda, but eventually it became necessary to 
pay the tribes to bring about their withdrawal. As a result, troops 
were ordered to the Hijaz from Syria, the Meccan garrison was ex­
panded, and the central government became concerned about the 
authority of the amir. The amir had been quite successful in a cam­
paign against the Saudis in Qasim. It was true that he had not in­
stalled his protege Khalid ibn Saud (d. 1865) in place of the ruling 
Saudi prince, but M u h a m m a  d had secured from the Saudis recog­
nition of Ottoman sovereignty and payment of tribute. Next, the 
Ottomans obtained M u h a m m a d '  s help in 1849 for the reconquest 
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of coastal Y e m e n  . With a relatively small force numbering 4,200, 
the expedition was successful, in large part because of the coop­
eration of Asiri tribes gained by the amir's tact and influence. A b  d 
Allah, the son of Amir M u h a m m a d  , became the governor of the 
coastal region for the Ottomans.5 
It might be thought that these successes would have been suf­
ficient to ensure continued Ottoman backing of the Amir M u h a m  ­
m a d . In fact, however, he was dismissed, arrested, and exiled to 
Istanbul in the middle of 1851. A number of theories have been 
put forth to explain his dismissal: an Ottoman desire to have a 
weak amir, intrigues against him in Istanbul by competitors for the 
amirate, rivalry with the vali, his o w  n intrigues with the Bedouins. 
Certainly M u h a m m a  d had persecuted the sons of the late Amir Ya­
hya in Mecca. A b  d al-Muttalib, the leader of their clan in Istanbul, 
intrigued strongly and continually for the amirate. A number of 
meetings had been held in Istanbul by the chief reform councils 
to discuss M u h a m m a d '  s tenure. They concluded that the position 
of the amirate depended upon historical justification and that a di­
vision of authority between the amir and the vali was justified both 
historically and in terms of current expediency. However, the 
rights of the amirs did not detract from the absolute right of power 
over the Hijaz inhering in the caliphate that they believed to be 
held by the Ottoman sultans. The reason to dismiss the current 
amir was not his theoretical power but rather his inability to main­
tain law and order in the Hijaz. Also, Amir M u h a m m a d , w h o was, 
after all, an Egyptian appointee originally, had exceeded his au­
thority and had claimed excessive power. T o a certain degree, it 
was admitted, his power had been justified by the difficult circum­
stances of the 1840s, but n o  w there was no longer any reason for 
the situation to continue. A b d al-Muttalib should be appointed, 
M u h a m m a  d arrested, and troops sent to the Hijaz to ensure that all 
went smoothly. The arguments of Agah Pasha, vali of the Hijaz, 
against M u h a m m a  d carried particular weight.6 
The Amir M u h a m m a  d was arrested with no resistance. The 
succession to the amirate was equally smooth: A b d al-Muttalib ibn 
Ghalib, w h  o had long been in Istanbul, had the support of the in­
fluential British ambassador, Stratford Canning (1786-1880), as 
well as that of the sultan. A b d al-Muttalib was appointed amir of 
Mecca officially on 4 July 1851. His cousin Mansur acted for him in 
Taif and Mecca until his arrival in the Hijaz. 
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W h e n the Ottoman Empire entered the Crimean W a r against 
Russia in 1854 with Britain and France as allies, Ottoman weakness 
became clearer as most of its troops were withdrawn from the Arab 
lands to Anatolia. Local conflicts and particularly the continual 
quarrels between the Amir A b d al-Muttalib and the valis exacer­
bated political tension. A  n attempt to implement the n e  w imperial 
regulations requiring advisory councils in local government led to 
riots and disturbances in Mecca in 1853- The very first item to ap­
pear before a n e  w Tanzimat council in Istanbul, the Meclis i M a h  ­
sus, in November 1853 was a general examination of the Hijaz and 
the appointment of Kamil Pasha as the n e  w vali after the resigna­
tion of his predecessor. But things were no better for the n e w 
vali—no sooner had Kamil arrived than A b  d al-Muttalib fired off a 
letter of complaint against him to Istanbul.7 
The natural tensions between amir and vali were m a d e m u c h 
worse by the pressures exerted upon the vali by the central govern­
ment to conciliate Great Britain and France, the empire's allies in 
the war. The vali lost status because of the need to appease the 
Christians but still had sufficient military force at his disposal to 
keep control. For two years running, the amir absented himself 
from the pilgrimage by going to Taif, so as to avoid having to deal 
in any way with Vali Kamil. According to the account given by Ka-
mil to the French consul, the grounds for this enmity were that the 
amir had ordered some Bedouins executed without gaining the 
sultan's approval, the amir's friends were protected against justice, 
and the amir was inciting the population against the empire by 
accusing it of being pro-Christian. At the same time, the amir alleg­
edly was illegally taking large sums of m o n e y from the local trea­
sury. As a result, neither soldiers nor government employees had 
been paid in twenty-two months, and the Bedouins and the pious 
in the holy cities were not receiving their payments from the sul­
tan. The crowning touch was the murder of Ishaq Efendi, the head 
of the descendants of the Prophet M u h a m m a  d in Mecca and a sym­
pathizer with the former amir, by orders of A b  d al-Muttalib. Vali 
Kamil wrote to Istanbul asking for the deposition of the amir.H 
REBELLIONS, 1855-58 
The rebellions of 1855 and 1858 were caused in part by local 
rivalries for power, but a major factor involved was the detestation 
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felt by the Muslim Hijazis for innovations desired by Christian Eu­
rope and the rising position of European proteges in commerce. 
Similar causes were behind the massacres and fighting in Damas­
cus and Lebanon in I860. This mixture of political and religious 
motivation was first seen in the Hijaz in 1855, w h e n the question 
of changing the amir became involved with the n e w issue of abol­
ishment of the slave trade, as desired by the British. The merchants 
of Jidda w h  o wanted to keep the slave trade viewed Abd al-Muttalib 
as an ally against anti-Islamic innovation. According to a letter from 
the merchants to the amir, abolition of the slave trade was a prel­
ude to interference in holy law, religious customs, relations be­
tween m e  n and w o m e n  , marriage with nonbelievers, and 
unconventional clothing for w o m e n  . W h e  n the amir received this 
letter, he is said to have remarked to the head of the ulema of 
Mecca, " O n  e can not carry out this duty" (i.e., the duty of stopping 
the importing of slaves).9 
Istanbul sent Reshid Pasha, a m e m b e  r of the imperial military 
council, to investigate the political situation in the Hijaz under 
cover of a mission to conduct a military review. H  e landed in Jidda 
one day before the last ship full of legally imported slaves arrived. 
A large-scale protest ensued in early November 1855; it was led by 
the Meccan ulema and sharifs. Fighting in Mecca took place be­
tween the rioters and the Ottoman garrison and police, and the 
houses of Ottoman officials were sacked. Turkish merchants and 
their families were assembled for protection in the house of Sharif 
Abd Allah ibn Nasir, the son-in-law of the former Amir M u h a m m a d , 
w h o also protected the Haram from looting.10 
In the meantime, the vali rejected the rioters' demands. The 
amir gathered 2,000 Bedouins at Arafat, and the Ottomans strength­
ened the Jidda and Mecca fortresses. The Ottomans concluded that 
the amir was secretly in collusion with the rioters, especially after 
one of the amir's agents conferred with the sheikhs of the Meccan 
neighborhoods. In mid-November the vali, with the approval of 
Reshid Pasha, announced the appointment of the Sharif M u h a m  ­
m a  d as amir for a second term. 
S o m e skirmishing took place between Abd al-Muttalib's Be­
douins and the Ottoman regulars, but since the Ottoman garrison 
of 700 m e n had retained control of the chief Meccan fortress, there 
was little doubt of their ultimate victory. There was also a large 
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garrison of 2,000 troops in Jidda. Abd al-Muttalib's resistance was 
further weakened by a lack of money, though he had sections of 
the Utaybah, the Hudhayl, and some of the Asir tribes, totalling per­
haps 6,000 m e n . O n the other hand, Abd Allah ibn Nasir, the dep­
uty for the n e w amir (who had not yet arrived in the Hijaz), 
commanded regular Ottoman cavalry and artillery, the Bisha 
guards of the amirate, and tribesmen from the Hudhayl. Reshid 
Pasha entered Mecca with reinforcements on 13 December, read 
the ferman investing M u h a m m a  d as amir, and appealed to the 
ulema, sharifs, nomads, and quarter leaders to support the Otto­
m a n state. A night curfew was enforced, and the caravan routes 
were reopened. Abd al-Muttalib returned to Taif, where the out­
numbered Ottoman garrison had surrendered to the Bedouins. 
Small skirmishes were interspersed with two large pitched battles 
in February and April 1856 that were inconclusive. The n e w amir 
arrived in Jidda on 13 April. H e then went to Mecca and to Taif, 
distributed money at large, and promised amnesty to the tribes, 
w h o finally deserted Abd al-Muttalib and thus ensured Ottoman 
victory. Taif fell to the amir and the Ottomans on 22 May. Abd al-
Muttalib was at last captured and brought to Mecca on 15 June 1856 
after seven months of leading a rebellion against the imperial or­
ders, though not against the legitimacy of the state.'' 
Since Istanbul blamed the vali for the length of the insurrec­
tion, he was replaced in August. The n e w vali was M a h m u d Pasha, 
former military commander of Mecca and current vali of Y e m e n . 
This veteran of Arabian service was a military m a n w h o knew noth­
ing of Europe, but w h  o had been active and energetic in the 
Y e m e n . 
The most profound consequence of the 1855-56 crisis was 
the heightening of anti-Ottoman resentment among the supporters 
of Abd al-Muttalib, since he and his clan were discredited in the 
eyes of the Ottomans. The pro-Abd al-Muttalib faction in the Hijaz 
included the slave merchants of Jidda and Mecca, the members of 
his clan of the Hashimites, most of the southern nomads, and all 
w h o disliked the Ottomans. This resentment was fully expressed 
two years later in the massacre of Europeans at Jidda and the con­
sequent conflict between the merchants of that city and the British. 
For the next twenty years, the Ottomans chose amirs from among 
M u h a m m a d ' s relatives and not from those of Abd al-Muttalib. 
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The association of the m e n of religion of Mecca with the failed 
uprising weakened them while at the same time prompting many 
of them to support Ottoman rule as inevitable even w h e  n they op­
posed its policies. Abd al-Muttalib was unable to raise revolt in the 
towns, although the subservience of the Ottomans to the British 
on the slave trade question was extremely unpopular there. Aban­
donment of old social institutions, such as the slave trade, was not 
liked but neither was it regarded as an occasion for all-out insur­
rection. Only the tribes, w h  o were ever ready to oppose authority, 
rose for Abd al-Muttalib and his interpretation of Islam. 
The following two years were not particularly quiet. The Amir 
M u h a m m a d was elderly, and increasingly administration was trans­
ferred into the hands of Ali, his twenty-three-year-old second son. 
Abd Allah, the eldest, was in Istanbul, where he was being 
groomed to be the next amir. Ali's mismanagement of the 1857 
pilgrimage compelled the pilgrims to take a longer and drier route 
because a better one was controlled by hostile tribesmen. The di­
lemma of the pilgrims was compounded by a full-scale fight be­
tween the Medinans and nomads that arose over a blood feud. Ali 
refused to aid Medina w h e n the vali requested him to do so. In­
stead, the ethnic groups in Medina founded a civil guard and 
threatened to expel from the city anyone refusing to swear an oath 
of membership in the guard. 
The vali also caused problems by his inactivity and his ap­
pointments of m e  n poorly equipped for the duties he gave them. 
The collector of customs at Jidda was the vali's nephew; he was a 
young m a n n e w to the Hijaz, and he did not k n o w Arabic. The vali 
named his follower Shams Ali as governor of Medina, where he was 
responsible for the continuing trouble with the Bedouins. Only the 
arrival of twenty barges of grain in Yanbu ended the Medina fight­
ing. Political tensions were compounded by commercial ones: the 
Hadramawti merchants of Jidda, supported by the vali, undertook 
a boycott of the two British shipping companies there; and the mil­
itary, the basis of order, was not being paid. Sometimes they did 
not even get their rations on time and had to resort to begging in 
the streets of Mecca.12 
The arrival of Namik Pasha in October 1857 as the n e w vali 
brought not only promises of n e w policies but also of more money 
to local government. His arrival in Mecca ended a demonstration 
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by 1,200 unpaid troops at the Haram. N e w troops also arrived to 
replace soldiers whose terms of service had ended. But the death 
of the Amir M u h a m m a d on 28 March 1858 ended any chance of 
quietly reforming the conditions of the Hijaz. 
The events of 1858 represented the high-water mark of Chris­
tian intervention in the Hijaz before World War I. They also raise 
in an acute form the issue of economic versus religious and polit­
ical causes for major happenings. 
Resentment against Christians had increased during the 1850s 
even though England and France were the allies of the Ottomans. 
The Christians' greater status in the eyes of the central government 
was perceived in the Hijaz as a blow to Islam. What was worse was 
that Ottoman officials themselves were trying to Europeanize the 
empire in response to European pressure. 
In the 1850s Christians or Muslim proteges had played an in­
creased role in Red Sea commerce. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, 
was the chief merchant of Jidda and probably the richest person 
there, with a capital of between T. L 132,000 and 165,000. H e was 
a banker for the Hijaz Vilayet and was on such good terms with the 
British that he acted as vice-consul occasionally.13 
The chief European commercial house was T o m a Sava and 
Company. It was a branch of the Cairo-based firm of T o m a Myri­
alaki, A. D'Antonio, and Company, which had been trading in the 
Red Sea for at least twenty years. By 1856 it was estimated that 
about one-quarter of all Red Sea commerce was in their hands. 
T o m a Sava had branch offices in Mecca, Qusayr, Wajh, Yanbu, 
Suakin, Massawa, and Aden. S o m e Hadrami merchants, the Banaja 
family, and the muhtasib of Jidda quarreled with them in 1856. The 
Muhtasib Abd Allah led a boycott directed against T o m a Sava; it was 
ended only by the intervention of the local authorities. 
The extent of foreign commerce in Jidda m a y b e seen in ship­
ping statistics. In 1855 twenty-four British flag vessels came to 
Jidda. By 1858 there were twenty-two in Jidda harbor on one day 
during the pilgrimage and thirty more in the Red Sea enroute to 
Suez.14 
In a small town like Jidda, with 15,000 or fewer people, the 
resident foreign community was highly noticeable. Several inci­
dents in preceding years had revealed the strength of the tensions 
between the foreign communities and the people of Jidda. A  n Ot­
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toman soldier tried to murder the British vice-consul in 1856. The 
British and the Jidda Muslims blamed each other for mutually of­
fensive enterprises. O n 15 M a y 1858, Muslim merchants com­
plained to the kaimmakam of Jidda that a shooting had just taken 
place in a shop selling liquor, and the vali ordered all such shops 
closed. The scandal of liquor sales in the center of the Muslim 
world was matched, in Christian eyes, by the scandal of a flourish­
ing slave trade conducted between the African coast and Jidda. 
The communal tensions between Hijazi Muslims, foreign 
Muslims, and Christians were exacerbated by the fear of technolog­
ical and economic change. In 1856 an Egyptian-owned steamship 
line was chartered to begin regular operations in the Red Sea. More 
passengers and freight used the Red Sea route to Egypt and the 
Mediterranean from India in the 1850s than in the 1840s. As the 
Suez Canal came closer to reality, it became clear that the area 
would witness an increasing European presence. Shipowners, 
crews, and stevedores from Y e m e n and the Hadramawt feared they 
would lose jobs and money. 
Politically, the instability of the later 1850s had heightened 
tension along with economic changes. The Amir M u h a m m a d ' s son 
Ali served as acting amir pending the arrival of his brother Abd 
Allah, the successor to their father. Since Abd Allah did not c o m e 
to the Hijaz until 28 October, there was a period of seven months 
w h e n the amirate was filled only by a deputy w h o necessarily 
lacked the full authority and power of the post. Moreover, the ad­
herents of the former Amir A b d al-Muttalib were still present and 
numerous. 
The valis of Jidda, w h  o led the other half of the dual sharifial-
Ottoman power structure, had caused problems in the 1850s. From 
1850 to 1858, there were five valis. Lacking knowledge of the 
unique political circumstances of the country, they no sooner be­
came familiar with the Hijaz than they were dismissed. Frequently 
they inherited in the bureaucracy their predecessors' mistakes. 
W h e  n M e h m e  d Namik Pasha, a former commander of the Ottoman 
army in Syria, arrived in Jidda as the n e w vali on 20 October 1857, 
he found that the post of muhtasib already had been filled by Vali 
M a h m u d Pasha. 
The muhtasib was second in rank in Jidda only to the kaim­
m a k a m . A certain Abd Allah had held the post up to 1854 w h e n he 
was dismissed for fraud in government shipping contracts. H e sup­
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ported Amir A b d al-Muttalib in 1855, and was said to have had a 
hand in the Mecca rioting. Vali Kamil Pasha exiled him for his al­
leged plan to lead a massacre of Christians. In October 1856 Vali 
M a h m u d Pasha reappointed him as muhtasib of Jidda. A b d Allah 
had close contacts with the Hadrami merchants and was also the 
holder of the salt extraction monopoly for the Red Sea region in 
1856.1S 
O  n 15 June 1858, a massacre of Europeans and European pro­
teges took place in Jidda. The immediate cause was a dispute in­
volving the contested nationality of the Irani, a ship then in Jidda 
harbor. According to British sources, the half-owner of the vessel, 
Salih Jawhar, was an Anglo-Indian subject and the ship was British. 
In 1858 Salih was called to account for his supervision of the finan­
cial interests of his nephews. Fearing adverse action by the acting 
vice-consul, Faraj Yusr, w h  o was a personal enemy, Salih claimed 
he was an Ottoman citizen. H  e secured the permission of the Ot­
tomans to change the ship's registration and to allow it to fly the 
Ottoman flag. The case went to the qadi of Jidda, w h  o ruled in 
Salih's favor although Fara) Yusr argued that the Ottomans had no 
jurisdiction. According to British law, if someone tried to change 
the nationality of a British ship in order to escape legal action the 
ship could be confiscated. Stephen Page, the vice-consul, and Cap­
tain William Pullen of H . M . S  . Cyclops informed the vali that the 
Irani accordingly had been seized. The Ottomanflag was lowered 
and the Britishflag once again raised.16 
Ottoman and Arab accounts present a version of the Irani dis­
pute that differs from that of the British. According to the vali, the 
ship was placed under the Britishflag afterfirst having flown the 
Ottomanflag. Salih Jawhar was a Jidda merchant and therefore an 
Ottoman. In granting his request for permission to change registra­
tion and to raise the Ottomanflag, the vali felt that the k a i m m a k a m 
had been perfectly correct. Since Salih was an Ottoman and o w n e d 
half of the ship, it seemed natural to count it as Ottoman. A council 
of Jidda notables w h  o m a d  e a careful investigation of the Irani case 
came to the same conclusion in their report to the vali, although 
they conceded that Salih did have foreign travel papers. The Otto­
m a n flag, it was alleged, was trampled upon by the sailors w h o 
lowered it and raised the Britishflag on the Irani on 15 June.17 
The evening of that day, twenty-two people were murdered in 
Jidda; twenty-one were Christian foreigners or foreign proteges. 
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They included the British vice-consul and the French consul and 
his wife. Other Christians under European protection managed to 
escape temporarily only to be killed later; a few were sheltered by 
friendly local inhabitants. Although the house of Faraj Yusr was at­
tacked, he and his family escaped harm and were rescued by his 
neighbor, Ab  d Allah Nasif, the Jidda agent of the amirs of Mecca. 
Ahmet Aga, the chief of the government storehouses, protected 
two of the Christians from death. The bodies of the victims were 
dragged naked through the streets and then cast into pits.18 The 
murderers were urged on by a crowd of w o m e n  . 
O n  e survivor described his experiences vividly to the British 
consul at Cairo. Sottiri Moldovano had fainted from fear at the time 
of the massacre. All the people w h  o had been around him were 
killed or robbed, but he escaped unharmed and managed to reach 
the qadi of Jidda. Atfirst the qadi wanted him killed, but w h e n 
Moldovano converted to Islam, the qadi protected him. H  e was 
then sent through the streets of Jidda to the kaimmakam's with a 
guard of soldiers to protect him from the people. W h e n the qadi 
learned that Moldovano intended to board the Cyclops he accused 
him of intending apostasy, but Moldovano still managed to reach 
the ship.19 
Captain Pullen offered on the morning after the massacre to 
assist the kaimmakam in putting d o w n the rioting. Not only was his 
assistance not accepted, but the boats of the Cyclops were fired 
upon by the crowd. The Ottoman garrison at Jidda was too small 
to be of m u c h use. O f its usual complement of 100, some had been 
withdrawn to Mecca for the pilgrimage, and guards were needed 
at the gates of Jidda to protect them against the Bedouins. The head 
of the garrison refused to send his m e  n into the streets or to inter­
fere in any way. 
The vali heard of the killings w h e n he was in Mecca making 
plans for the pilgrimage. Namik Pasha'sfirst reaction was to send a 
letter threatening punishment to the notables of Jidda if peace was 
not immediately restored. A council was held in Mecca by order of 
the vali to deliberate on the next steps. The assembled notables 
are said to have suggested mobilizing the Bedouins, sinking the 
British ship, and defying the European powers. This plan was ve­
hemently opposed by the vali, w h  o pointed out that the Christians 
could attack any of the other cities of Islam in response; besides, a 
hundred ships could take the place of the Cyclops. W o n over by 
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his arguments, the council approved the vali's caution in a report 
to the sultan.20 
The vali then left for Jidda with more troops. Namik sent fif­
teen Christians w h  o had been sheltered in the town to the Cyclops, 
and then turned to reestablishing order in the streets. Finally his 
attention was given to the stream of messages coming from Cap­
tain Pullen and the still unsettled issue of the Irani. Referring to the 
joint sacrifices so recently m a d e by Ottoman, British, and French 
forces in the Crimean War , Pullen demanded the vali's help in 
going to the consulates to m a k  e a complete investigation of d a m  ­
ages. The vali arranged for this, but the British deputation was mal­
treated in the streets. The Irani remained in Jidda harbor under 
Ottoman control pending afinal decision on its legal status. This 
victory for the Ottoman side of the dispute m a y have had a decisive 
effect in achieving quiet in Jidda. The Cyclops left Jidda for Suez 
with m a n  y refugees aboard as well as a courier with messages from 
the vali to Istanbul. After ordering that an investigation of the 
whole incident be conducted by the ka immakam, the vali left for 
Mecca, where pilgrimage preparations were under way. 
The British foreign secretary ordered Pullen to go to Jidda and 
obtain summary punishment of the murderers, by use of force if 
necessary. The British threatened the Ottomans with the seizure of 
Jidda if justice was not speedily obtained. By 26 July the sultan's 
emissary had full powers, and Ottoman troops were on the way to 
the Hijaz. A policy of Anglo-Franco-Ottoman cooperation was ap­
proved by all parties; however, the British Admiralty was not in­
formed of this until 7 August.21 
In the meantime, the energetic Pullen had returned from Suez 
to Jidda with his orders to secure the execution of the murderers. 
The vali and the acting amir had a conference with him on 22 July. 
They pointed out to Pullen that although the murderers were 
known, all death sentences in the empire had to be confirmed by 
the sultan. Therefore they could not carry out the executions until 
the arrival of orders from Istanbul. Pullen assumed this to be what 
he considered typical Ottoman procrastination. H e delivered a 
thirty-six-hour ultimatum to the ka immakam on the twenty-third, 
and forbade ships to leave Jidda harbor. T w  o days later he began 
to bombard Jidda. By the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, there were 
at least seven k n o w n deaths caused by the bombardment. Jiddawis 
fled to nearby villages, the desert, the mountains, and Mecca. Pul­
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len issued a proclamation in which he promised that as soon as the 
assassins were executed the bombardment would cease; until then 
the town and ships in the harbor would continue to be under fire.22 
The vali explained in a report to the grand vezir that the b o m ­
bardment was the result of Pullen's rashness, not Ottoman lethargy 
or reluctance to execute Muslims w h  o had killed Christians. Inves­
tigation of the murders had been delayed because of the pilgrim­
age, w h e n everyone was in Mecca. Even though witnesses had 
been interviewed, there was not enough evidence to successfully 
try the guilty before the court. Namik Pasha had pointed out to 
Pullen that he would be bombarding the pilgrims as they returned 
from Mecca to Jidda. Despite this plea the British shipfired more 
than one hundred cannon shots into the town of Jidda.23 The Ot­
toman fort and batteries at Jidda were not hit, and in return they 
did not shoot at the attacking British ship. 
At length Pullen did consent to a temporary cessation of fire 
so that the pilgrims could leave Jidda. During this pause Namik 
arrested those w h  o were accused of the murders, and they were 
tried and found guilty. The cease-fire was prolonged, but just as 
Pullen was about to resume the bombardment on 5 August, Ismail 
Pasha, the Ottoman officer sent from Istanbul, arrived in Jidda. 
Ismail read his instructions from the sultan to the vali, came 
to an agreement with Pullen about the executions, and thus ended 
the threat of bombardment. The next day, 6 August, eleven m e n 
were publicly executed. Following this there was an exchange of 
salutes to the Ottoman and Britishflags to indicate the establish­
ment of peaceful relations. 
In the ensuingfive months, many aspects of the massacre and 
subsequent bombardment were resolved. While a search for his 
replacement went on in Istanbul, the sultan ordered Vali Namik 
Pasha to improve security. The British ambassador apologized to 
the Ottomans for the bombardment of Jidda, and said that Pullen's 
impetuosity was the cause. Ismail Pasha left Jidda for Istanbul on 6 
September with prisoners accused of complicity. Even the vexa­
tious Irani case wasfinally settled. O  n 2 November it was taken to 
B o m b a  y and an Anglo-Indian court.24 
There remained, however, the question of whether those w h  o 
were really guilty of the murders had been punished. Three sepa­
rate investigations of the massacre were conducted in Jidda by the 
leading notables and government officials of the town. The report 
of thefirst, on 20 June, purported to describe the Irani dispute, the 
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way in which the riot broke out, and its suppression. A second 
council began its sessions on the following day. By 15 July it had 
interviewed eyewitnesses to the murders and established the guilt 
of sixteen individuals. It also began to draw up a list of damages. 
The third report in early October recounted still more interroga­
tions of Jiddawis and sought to discover the ringleaders of the 
rioters. There served on all three councils the ka immakam of Jidda, 
Ibrahim Aga; the religious judge, A b d al-Qadir; the naqib al-sadat, 
Abd Allah ibn A h m a d Baharun; and the chief Ottoman merchant of 
Jidda, A b d al-Ghaffar. The other leading merchants of Jidda w h o 
were on all three councils were U m a r ibn A b d Allah Ba Darb, Yusuf 
ibn A h m a d Banaja, and Salim Ali Sultan. In addition, A b d Allah Na­
sif served on two of the councils; and Ahmet Aga, director of the 
government storehouses, Said ibn Husayn al-Amudi, the leader of 
the Hadrami community, and Faraj Yusr signed at least one of the 
reports.25 
Thefirst two reports resulted in the arrest and conviction of 
sixteen people, mostly from the lower class of Jidda. They included 
two sailors, two pilots, three artisans, a bead-maker, and a slave. 
Ottoman eyewitnesses and the foreigners w h  o had escaped agreed 
that these persons were a m o n g those guilty. It seemed unlikely, 
though, that they would have undertaken the massacre without ap­
proval from higher authority. The rioting was selective; it did not 
spill over against any of the notables except Faraj Yusr. 
As early as 25 June, Pullen, on the basis of talks with survivors, 
accused some of Jidda's leading notables of complicity. Their re­
port of 20 June was an elaborate cover-up hiding their o w  n guilt. 
By late July w h e  n Pullen had returned to Jidda with orders to en­
sure that the murderers would be punished, he included a m o n g 
the guilty the names of the muhtasib, the chief merchant, the shar­
if s agent, and the qadi. The vali indignantly denied that they had 
had anything to do with the case. Although the vali did not have 
firsthand evidence, he said that the kaimmakam's assertion of their 
innocence was sufficient. Pullen ultimately agreed that Nasif was 
innocent; the others, according to the refugees in Cairo, were 
guilty of inciting the rioters. Pullen thought the kaimmakam's tes­
timony was worthless since he himself had been one of the chief 
instigators. His testimony could not exonerate the muhtasib and 
the chief merchant, for instance, because they had actually led the 
attacks against the consulates.26 
Bulwer, the British ambassador, agreed with Pullen. The Brit­
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ish threatened to have their naval forces at Jidda take strong action 
so as to obtain justice. The only way the Ottomans could avoid this 
was to appoint an independent commissioner w h  o would join 
British and French commissioners in Jidda. Sitting together, they 
were to investigate all aspects of the case independently of the Hi­
jaz vilayet administration. 
Said Hamdi Pasha left for Jidda as the sultan's agent on the 
commission. A fourth investigation was undertaken, with those 
w h  o had signed the reports of thefirst three being the chief targets. 
By January 1859 the commissioners concluded that the rising had 
been planned. The religious judge, the naqib al-sadat, and the Had-
rami leader confessed and then accused the muhtasib, w h  o in turn 
implicated the kaimmakam. O  n the day of the massacre, they said, 
Muhtasib Abd Allah, acting in the n a m e of the kaimmakam and 
with his knowledge, ordered Said al-Amudi to rouse the Hadramis. 
They were armed and led to the customs area at the port. There a 
council consisting of the three chiefs and Abd Allah Baharun, Abd­
al-Ghaffar, Yusuf Banaja, U m a r Ba Darb, Said Baghlaf, Bakri al-
Shami, and Salih Jawhar, of the Irani, met to discuss the massacre. 
Even though they all knew what was planned, none of those pres­
ent did anything to prevent it. Other guilty persons included a 
colonel of artillery w h  o refused to rescue a European w h  o was 
killed in front of his barracks; the qadi, w h  o supposedly encour­
aged the killing of Christians w h  o had converted to Islam; and an 
Ottoman officer w h  o refused to defend the British consulate. The 
report called for death for the main instigators, life imprisonment 
for those present at the council, andfive years in prison for the qadi 
and the officers.27 Although the vali was guilty of negligence, he 
was only to be removed from his post. It took the threat of a n e w 
bombardment of Jidda m a d e by the French commissioner to force 
the vali to agree to execute the muhtasib and al-Amudi. 
O  n 12 January 1859, the muhtasib and the leader of the Had­
ramis were publicly executed. The kaimmakam was removed from 
office, taken to Istanbul, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The 
others w h  o had been present at the council on 15 June as well as 
the qadi and Baghlaf were exiled from Jidda and were to be in 
prison or under supervision in Istanbul.28 
Compensation was hard to calculate because the records that 
were needed had been destroyed. After Ottoman delays in Jidda 
and Istanbul, the British reduced their claims to T. L 139,150. The 
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other commissioners rejected H a m d  i Pasha's attempt to introduce 
the issue of compensation for the Ottoman victims of Pullen's 
bombardment of Jidda. In I860 the Ottoman government agreed 
to pay T. L 315,360 in settlement of all French and British claims. 
Disputes about individual claims lingered on for years afterward.29 
The immediate consequences of the massacre of 1858 were 
spectacularly obvious in the bombardment of Jidda and the sub­
sequent international investigation that led to the punishment of 
the massacre's instigators. However, the long-term political, com­
mercial, and religious results of the massacre were atfirst glance 
almost nominal. The consuls were reestablished, with the n e w 
British vice-consul Stanley moving into the executed muhtasib's 
house for good measure. Namik Pasha was finally replaced as vali 
in early 1859 by Ali Pasha. In rapid order a n e w ka immakam of 
Jidda, vilayet treasurer, and qadi of Jidda were appointed. The 
kaimmakam's selection had formerly been m a d e by the vali; n o w 
it was to be m a d e directly by Istanbul as a guarantee of his in­
creased independence, responsibility, and prestige. This arrange­
ment, however, lasted only two years; the vali was dismissed in 
1861-62. H e had spent most of his two years in Mecca rather than 
in Jidda. Not only was the ka immakam w h o had been appointed in 
1858 ousted in 1861, but the n e w vali was authorized to choose his 
replacement. The instability in the Ottoman bureaucracy was not 
matched in the amirate. Amir Abd Allah was building the power 
that would eventually result in a long and relatively peaceful reign; 
however, in the early 1860s he had only begun to do so. The polit­
ical situation in the Hijaz resembled that existing before the death 
of Amir M u h a m m a  d in March 1858: the balance between amir and 
vali was unchanged. 
The massacre caused little harm to the commerce of Jidda. 
The total of exports and imports in 1859 was about 25 percent 
higher than in 1857, and most shipping continued to be British. 
S o m e of the same firms disrupted in 1858 reestablished their agen­
cies in Jidda. Luca Paleologo were there again, though in a difficult 
financial position because of severe competition in the early 1860s. 
Faraj Yusr remained one of the principal merchants of Jidda. His 
ships regularly sailed under the Britishflag to Suez, Hudayda, and 
Musqat. However, in February 1861 he lost his position as chief 
banker to the vilayet. The cause was not his pro-British role in 1858 
but rather what was considered by Istanbul to be the excessive 
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commissions on m o n e y loaned to the vilayet. Steamship service to 
Jidda continued in the early 1860s but became very irregular be­
cause the Egytians lost m o n e y on Red Sea operations. Foreign 
commerce and merchants and the n e w steamboat service seemed 
to be unaffected by the massacre. Unfortunately it is not k n o w n 
whether the small Hadrami shippers and sailors really lost anything 
as a result of the 1858 incident. It has been suggested that they 
started the massacre in fear of commercial destruction, but if their 
interests were truly damaged, that fact was not recorded.30 
What would seem to be the most obvious result of the mas­
sacre was the death, exile, and imprisonment of the notables of 
Jidda. Even this judicial process that seemed sofinal in January 
1859 was, however, subject to change. Four of the exiles died 
abroad. A b d al-Qadir, U m a r Ba Darb, Said Baghlaf, Bakri al-Shami, 
and Salih Jawhar eventually returned to the Hijaz. The last three 
n a m e d came to Jidda in 1866, but they were ordered to live in 
Mecca or in Taif. Salih Jawhar returned to India. The other returned 
m e  n enjoyed great popularity in Jidda and in Mecca. Popular opin­
ion in Mecca had declared the muhtasib and al-Amudi to be mar­
tyrs for the faith w h e n they had been executed in 1859.31 A b d Allah 
Baharun was on the administrative council of Jidda in 1879. 
It is in the relationship between Christians and Muslims that 
the events of 1858 had their greatest impact. The great Indian m u  ­
tiny was being crushed in early 1858. The I860 uprisings against 
Christians and Jews in Damascus and Lebanon were two years 
away. In all these cases, an initial deep religious resentment was 
intensified by political and economic rivalry between elite Muslim 
or Druze circles against foreigners and their proteges. Violence by 
Muslims was followed by even greater retributive violence by the 
European powers. The idea of successful, direct, violent destruc­
tion of the Europeans was tried and discredited. With the partial 
exception of an incident in 1895, there were no similar riots, mur­
ders, or large-scale anti-foreign incidents in Jidda after 1858. The 
m e m o r y of the Jidda bombardment was widespread, and Charles 
Doughty found it one of his chief protections in 1877 as he ex­
plored the northern Hijaz.32 
Even though with the opening of the Suez Canal foreign influ­
ence increased, it did so in peace. For m a n  y Muslims the possibility 
of eventual Christian incursions inland and the growing economic 
strength of Christian proteges on the coast remained a source of 
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fear. The events of 1855 and 1858 demonstrated that the Ottoman 
government would suppress religious opposition to change and 
that under the pressure of Europe outright resistance would be se­
verely punished. At the same time, the restoration from 1840 to 
1855 and subsequent tranquillity between 1859 and 1882 showed 
that the religious bases for politics and society remained as accept­
able to Hijazis as they had been before the Wahhabi and Egyptian 
incursions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE TRANQUIL AMIRATE, 1859-1882 
POLITICAL P O W E  R A N  D LEADERSHIP in the Hijaz between 1859 
and 1882 was primarily in the hands of the amirs of Mecca. They 
relied for the continuation of their power upon their religious 
prestige and the support of the Hijazis and the central Ottoman 
government that ensued from it. The political consequences of 
power in the hands of the amirs were able administration in Mecca, 
relative security in the desert compared with either the preceding 
or succeeding periods, the expansion of Ottoman power with the 
help of the amirs to other parts of Arabia, and the failure of the 
central government to change local administration in the Hijaz. Se­
vere political, military, and financial strains on Istanbul in the 
1870s had few results for the amirs, whose power was not greatly 
challenged until after 1882. 
The tempest of 1858 in Jidda was followed by gradually sub­
siding waves leading eventually to a period of relative tranquillity. 
In the context of the Ottoman empire, the 1860s were also calm, at 
least by comparison with the storms to c o m e in the 1870s. The 
credit of the empire was pledged to finance costly programs of mil­
itary modernization, and civil government was supposedly re­
formed by decrees of the Tanzimat councils. The financial, military, 
and political bases of the state were not transformed but merely 
changed to a minor degree. As a result, the increasing challenges 
posed by foreign powers and domestic liberals were not satisfac­
torily met. The budgetary crisis of the 1870s helped weaken the 
power of the Ottoman valis with respect to the amirs. The program 
of military modernization improved thefleet in Istanbul and per­
haps the army along the Danube, but had little discernible impact 
in the Hijaz. Although civil government was reorganized on paper 
in provinces such as Syria, most of the changes specifically ex­
cluded Arabia from their application. 
Ab d Allah ibn M u h a m m a  d (r. 1858-77) ruled as amir with in­
creasing determination and ability. The n e w amir, born in 1822, 
had grown up in a Hijaz dominated by the Egyptians, w h o had 
m a d e his father's first period as amir ineffectual. However, A b d Al­
lah had seen the way in which M u h a m m a  d had transformed the 
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amirate back into a powerful position after 1840. A b d Allah had 
occasionally acted as his father's deputy in Mecca; he also had lived 
in Istanbul long enough to gain a detailed knowledge of the im­
perial political process. H  e was a patron of the ulema and himself 
a student of the Quran, Islamic law, and the sayings of the Prophet. 
These religious distinctions were bolstered by his status as a 
holder of the Ottoman rank of Vezir, his marriage with the Aid fam­
ily of Asir, and his good knowledge of the three most valued lan­
guages a m o n  g the Ottomans—Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. After 
1873-74 A b d Allah's health was undermined by acute sciatica that 
forced him to travel only by carriage and also caused him to live in 
great pain. 
THE NOMADS AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
The basic life of the Hijaz—the pilgrimage, international com­
merce, the supply of food from abroad, the brotherhoods, and so 
on—quietly flourished under A b d Allah's leadership. But the no­
mads grew restless in periods of relative tranquillity. 
The imperial military forces in the Hijaz were able to maintain 
Ottoman authority and sovereignty in the towns and some of the 
villages, but often not in the countryside. W h e  n M e h m e  d Ali, of 
Egypt, had controlled the area, he had had a garrison of 20,000 m e n 
in the Hijaz; under the Ottomans the total of all regular army units 
seldom reached as high as 8,000 and was usually about 6,000. Yet 
the Ottomans felt it was impossible to impose conscription in the 
Hijaz so as to raise troops locally. 
The chief problem facing the Ottoman military was that of 
limited resources. Istanbul did not wish to spend the m o n e  y or 
divert the manpower to the Hijaz that would be needed to subdue 
the tribes; it did, however, strongly desire to keep control over the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. A large majority of the troops 
were garrisoned in Mecca, Medina, Jidda, and Taif. S o m e were sta­
tioned in forts on the paths going between these places, and only 
a few troops lived in the small desert oases. 
Mecca had the largest contingent of troops, in part because of 
its religious importance, but also because it was relatively open to 
nomadic penetration since it had no walls. The size of the Mecca 
garrison was increased during the pilgrimage season w h e n outly­
ing detachments from Taif and Jidda were brought to the city; dur­
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ing the exceedingly hot summers, if there was no pilgrimage, most 
of the garrison joined the government in summering in cooler Taif. 
The Mecca-Taif troops numbered about 3,000. 
Medina and Jidda were both walled cities, though their walls 
were not particularly well-designed to resist artilleryfire. Still, the 
gates could be closed, and the walls served as effective barriers 
against a sudden coup de main by nomads. Plans to strengthen 
Medina's fortifications were discussed in 1878, but inconclusively; 
by the 1900s extant photographs indicate somewhat dilapidated 
walls, towers, and battlements that nevertheless seemed servicea­
ble. Medina from the 1840s to the 1870s had a small garrison of 
only about 1,000 m e n  ; in the later phase of Ottoman control, it 
averaged about 2,000-3,000. Jidda was protected not only by sea 
and land walls but also by the Ottoman navy. However, its position 
on the coast m a d e it vulnerable, as the bombardment of 1858 had 
demonstrated. In 1879 the walls of Jidda were strengthened, but 
the chief concern of the Ottoman authorities was not the nearly 
hopeless task of securing Jidda from a British naval attack but rather 
of maintaining law and order in the town itself. In Jidda the influ­
ence of the consulates and the privileges of their proteges were 
bitterly resented. Despite periodic complaints by the consuls, the 
Jidda garrison was usually small, fewer than 800 m e n . 
The numbers by themselves, however, do not tell the whole 
story, for the Ottomans had troops of differing quality with differ­
ing abilities tofight, and they moved these troops frequently in 
order to deal with pressing problems in one area or another of the 
empire. In thefirst thirty years after Ottoman occupation of the 
Hijaz, as was the case in Ottoman Syria as well, m a n y troops were 
irregulars w h  o were recruited, trained, and led in the casual fash­
ion that had dominated the Ottoman army before the reforms of 
Selim III and M a h m u  d II at the beginning of the nineteenth cen­
tury. They were mercenaries, not conscripts, and the detachments 
consisted of members of one ethnic group. 
The predominant section of the army in the Hijaz became the 
regular infantry. The scarcity of cavalry, whether horse- or camel-
borne, caused a major problem w h e  n the army tried tofight the 
highly mobile nomads. In the 1890s and 1900s, an attempt would 
be made to overcome this problem by mounting infantry on mules 
that could also be used for transport. Mobile artillery was also in­
troduced, and by 1908 in the major towns and forts, there were four 
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batteries of 6 n e  w guns each, along with 150 old immobile fortress 
guns. Medical and supply services were lamentably poor. In partic­
ular, the extremely high death rate a m o n  g Anatolian recruits 
caused by diseases was widely commented upon by foreign ob­
servers. Moreover, the small detachments along the Red Sea coast 
at places like Aqaba, Yanbu, Rabigh, and Lit or at the forts on the 
pilgrimage routes were isolated, deprived of supplies, and under­
manned. The reason for the relative scarcity of cavalry, artillery, and 
supply services was a simple one—money. Infantry was cheaper 
on its o w n  , even though largely ineffectual outside towns in the 
circumstances operative in the Hijaz. 
The police also helped support Ottoman power in the towns, 
but they were few in number and low in prestige compared with 
the army. In the entire province, there were only 300 police in 
1883; 60 of those were in Jidda. More were sent to the Hijaz in 
times of stress.1 In light of the security problems posed by the pil­
grimage, the police and army were still too few. However, crises in 
Istanbul, wars in Europe, problems in such provinces as Y e m e  n 
and Macedonia, and the financial stringency following Ottoman 
state bankruptcy limited the availability of troops. 
Plans for military reforms had been mooted on several occa­
sions. A report by an investigator sent to Mecca in 1844 recom­
m e n d e d that more troops be sent to the area, that the military be 
reformed, and that the growing influence of the British be op­
posed. There was an increase in the number of troops in the mid­
dle 1840s. The several administrative changes that took place then 
in the c o m m a n  d hierarchy to which the Hijaz military reported had 
no discernible consequences; whether orders and supplies were 
filtered through Baghdad, Sana or Damascus ultimately m a d e no 
difference. Istanbul ran the army. It was Istanbul that in the 1860s 
suppressed the Albanian bashibozuk irregulars because of their in­
subordination; the problem then became finding replacements for 
them. Particularly pressing, according to reports from the Hijaz, 
was the need to gain more mobility through the addition of at least 
1,000 cavalry.2 In the 1880s a large and costly military construction 
plan that included barracks, repairs to forts, and military hospitals 
was inaugurated by Vali O s m a n Pasha. N o n e of the suggested or 
implemented reforms led to a substantial change in the strength of 
the Ottoman armed forces. 
The Ottoman c o m m o  n soldier in the Hijaz not only had to 
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face a harsh and unfamiliar climate, hostile nomads, and bands of 
robbers, he also was treated poorly by his o w n government. Sol­
diers were kept under arms beyond their term of duty, and m a n y 
were not paid on time. Funds were embezzled by military leaders 
w h o overreported the size of their c o m m a n d s ; an example was the 
Medina garrison in 1856 that had listed on the payrolls 1,100 m e n , 
but had only 410 present. The soldiers in Medina were paid in pa­
per currency that was locally worth only 40 percent of its face value. 
Provisions for the troops in the 1850s were raised by forced contri­
butions. W h e  n the troops protested about pay, the governors 
bought rice from dealers, with a kickback to them and to the gov­
ernor, and the soldiers were given the rice in lieu of money; then 
the soldiers, in order to raise cash to purchase necessities, had to 
sell the rice back to the original dealers at a substantial loss. By the 
1870s the impending imperial bankruptcy m a d  e conditions worse. 
Supply contracts for the Medina garrison were not let in 1872 be­
cause there was no m o n e y to pay the contractors. The ministry of 
war k n e w of the shortages in the Hijaz but could do little about 
them.3 
A possible cause for weakness in the Ottoman armed forces 
might have been language and ethnic differences, but there is no 
evidence to indicate that any serious conflicts arose for such rea­
sons. There is no doubt at all, however, that the weakness of the 
Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea was a source of worry to Istanbul. 
In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman navy had provided a firm 
basis for ruling the Hijaz and most of the rest of the coasts on both 
sides of the Red Sea. The decay of the military power of the empire, 
the loss of effective control over Egypt in the eighteenth century, 
and the growing technological superiority of Western Europe in 
naval armament left the coasts open to both indigenous rebellions 
and western imperialism. The British conquest of Aden in 1839 
and Egyptian expansion into the Red Sea in the 1810s and 1830s 
and again in the 1860s indicated the reduced status of Ottoman 
naval power. 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 facilitated the move­
ment of European, Egyptian, and Ottoman troop carriers and war­
ships. It was extremely unlikely that the Ottomans expected to gain 
naval superiority over the Indian navy, especially after the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. Instead, they aimed at a sufficient na­
val presence to protect the Hijaz against attacks by minor powers. 
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They wanted a navy that could stop smuggling and piracy, and a 
quantity of shipping great enough to m o v e and supply the garri­
sons along the eastern coast of the Red Sea. These limited goals 
were met only in part. 
In the 1860s in the Hijaz, there was only one Ottoman cor­
vette, which was used for the health commission's inspection of 
pilgrim vessels. In the 1870s the naval contingent based at Jidda 
gained the lofty distinciton of an admiral as commander for the 
Red Sea, but he still had only one ship permanently under his com­
mand. This vessel, a gunboat, was used against slave and arms run­
ners after the importation of arms was forbidden by imperial order 
in 1875. In 1883 two corvettes arrived, and in 1888 two more steam 
corvettes swelled the fleet tofive corvettes and one gunboat. These 
numbers were somewhat deceptive, however, for most of the ships 
simply sat in Jidda harbor and were not used. Transport and supply 
of the army was carried out reasonably well, especially w h e n 
m o n e y was available to hire civilian ships. 
If the navy was of only limited utility, the land forces under 
the control of the amirs were m u c h more valuable. By 1859 the 
amir controlled 2,200 m e n : 500 Ottoman regulars; 1,150 Bedouins; 
150 sharifs and guards; 150 from the Meccan quarters; and 250 Bis­
has. Bishas were recruited from Wadi Bisha, in Asir, from freed 
slaves, and from a m o n g blacks in the Hijaz. They were used for 
guard duty on the caravan routes, especially those between Jidda 
and Mecca and between Mecca and Taif. The Bishas were paid by, 
and were directly under the c o m m a n d of, the amirs. A similar 
group, the Aqil, also k n o w n as Ageyl, were located in Medina and 
were mostly recruited from central Arabia; they acted as cavalry 
guards and messengers on the Medina-Yanbu and Medina-Mecca 
paths. S o m  e of the Aqil served in the pilgrimage route forts north 
of Medina, garrisons paid by the vilayet of Syria. The Aqil in Medina 
numbered from 150 to 200 m e n . It is unclear whether they were 
under the authority of the amir of Mecca or the governor of M e ­
dina, but more probably the latter.4 
The amirate was on good terms with most of the tribes to the 
south and east of Mecca, where there were relatively few pilgrims 
passing through n o m a d territory. It was usually able to recruit 
tribes from these regions to attack their mutual enemies a m o n g the 
tribes to the north of Mecca. Ottoman military support and the 
countervailing weight of tribal rivalries were needed by the amirs 
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to exert force, although the amirate generally relied on religious 
prestige and political and financial maneuvering to achieve its 
goals. 
The alternative was to have increased dramatically the garri­
sons, a step that would have been both futile and even more ex­
pensive than tribal subsidies. By bribes, manipulation of tribal 
factions, limited raids during the cooler parts of the year, short-
term troop movements, and the prestige and abilities of the amirs, 
the Ottomans had sufficient influence even in the tribal regions for 
their o w  n purposes. 
But an incident in Rabigh in 1859 involving the murder of an 
Ottoman soldier by a Harb tribesman created a major and contin­
uing difficulty. The paths between Yanbu and Medina were effec­
tively closed, even for the n e w sheikh of the Haram, Mustafa Pasha 
Ishkodrali. The Juhaynah nomads were unable to get Mustafa 
through the hostile Harb Bedouins. Reinforcements to Yanbu, an 
escort of 2,000 soldiers for Mustafa, mediation by the amir—all 
failed to assuage the Harb, w h o demanded blood m o n e y and pay­
ment of back subsidies before ceasing their raids. It was only in 
April 1864, following the payment of T. L 10,900, that the amir se­
cured a real peace in the north.5 
Part of the reason for the ineffectuality of the Ottoman troops 
lay in problems of supply. The military storehouses were short of 
grain, fodder, and materiel of all sorts, and the troops were seldom 
paid. A mutiny for back pay took place in Taif in I860 but failed 
w h e n loyal troops supported the local commander . The leaders of 
the mutiny sought refuge with the amir, but he turned them over 
to the army. Although funds were soon found to pay them, the obe­
dience of the troops to their commanders was a matter of concern, 
especially to the foreign consuls, w h  o were worried about the 
spreading of the massacres of I860 in Syria to the Hijaz. Reinforce­
ments under the c o m m a n d of the vali's son were sent to Jidda. The 
governor of Jidda assured the consuls that "this town is in the pos­
session of the Sublime Porte, that in it are soldiers to guard it, and 
that by force of the [Ottoman] authority no one can molest an­
other, m u c  h less attack a Consulate."6 
Istanbul realized there were too few troops in the Hijaz to pro­
vide minimal safety, especially in the Medina region, and therefore 
ordered more forces sent with the next pilgrimage. Whether it was 
because of the additional troops or perhaps merely the settlement 
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of the Harb dispute, there was relative peace on the main caravan 
routes for the next dozen years, from 1865 to 1877. 
In fact the only major problem in internal security in the cen­
tral part of the Hijaz took place in Mecca, not in the desert. O  n 26 
April 1871, a stabbing in a market was investigated by an Ottoman 
policeman, w h  o attempted to bring the instigator of the attack to 
the nearest government offices. The policeman was attacked, the 
inhabitants of a neighborhood turned out in force, stores closed, 
and several soldiers were wounded. A general strike by the bazaar 
merchants ensued. The uproar was ended by the amir, w h  o per­
sonally visited the areas concerned and restored peace. Subse­
quently a special tribunal was formed. It was composed of the amir 
as chairman, the vali, the chief judge, the muftis, and the major 
ulema. More thanfifty people were found guilty of violence; some 
were executed, others were exiled, and a few were imprisoned.7 
The visits of three prominent leaders of Muslim resistance to 
Western imperialism seem to have had minimal impact upon the 
political situation of the Hijaz. A b  d al-Qadir, the head of the anti-
French uprisings in Algeria, m a d  e the pilgrimage in 1864. Shamil, 
w h  o had led the Caucasian Muslims'fight against Russia, died in 
Medina during the pilgrimage of 1871. Furthermore, Jamal al-Din 
"al-Afghani" (or al-Asadabadi) m a y have visited Mecca sometime 
between 1861 and 1865, and again in 1871.8 Jamal al-Din was the 
foremost ideologist of Pan-Islam in the world. Although these visits 
were too brief to m a k e an impact upon the Hijaz, their mere oc­
currence indicates the attractive power of the pilgrimage to draw 
Muslims from great distances to the region. 
OTTOMAN EXPANSION 
Neither the presence of incendiary leaders nor strained rela­
tions with the tribes was enough to seriously disturb the peace of 
the somnolent 1860s. However, expansion outside the central Hi­
jaz did become a major activity. The areas of Asir, Najd, Massawa, 
and Suakin, which had been under the control or influence of the 
Hijaz, became the focal points for the practical testing of military 
vigor. A policy of expansionism in the Red Sea was adopted by the 
Ottomans because expansion elsewhere was at an end, the amirate 
helped them in this purpose, and they thought these areas were 
threatened by the European powers and by Egypt. As early as 1849, 
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the vali and the amir had expressed their concern over possible 
foreign aggression in the Red Sea area. 
M u h a m m a d ibn Aid had detached the Ghamid, Bisha, and 
Zahran regions of Asir from the Hijaz in 1863. In 1864-65 the amir 
of Mecca successfully c o m m a n d e d in person a mixed Ottoman-
n o m a  d force of 4,300 in the reconquest of northern Asir for himself 
and for the empire, despite the appalling heat of summer, w h e n 
the fighting took place. Egypt assisted the effort by providing 
steamships for transport and 4,200 of its o w  n troops. M u h a m m a  d 
ibn Aid soon seized back the disputed territories following the end 
of the fighting. The Amir Abd Allah again requested aid from Egypt 
and received a military mission; this caused the Ottomans to be­
c o m  e suspicious of the amir, since they feared the expansion of 
Egyptian influence in the Red Sea. Abd Allah was able in 1865 to 
retake Jizan and Abu Arish.9 
The opening of the Suez Canal and threats to Hudayda 
brought about a large commitment of Ottoman troops in 1870. In 
two years all of Asir and Y e m e n were absorbed. The Ottomans 
used 15,000 troops to conquer Asir. After the death of M u h a m m a  d 
ibn Aid in 1871, the Asiri resistance collapsed. In April 1872 Sana, 
in Y e m e n , fell to the Ottomans. At nearly the same time, the vali of 
Baghdad and reform leader Midhat Pasha conquered the north­
western coastal region of the Persian Gulf for the Ottomans. 
The second area of Ottoman expansion outward from the Hi­
jaz was into central Arabia, the region lying between Hofuf and the 
Hijaz. Since the departure of Egyptian troops from Najd, the con­
tacts of the Saudi dynasty with the Hijaz had been limited. Khalid 
ibn Saud (ca. 1811-57) had been installed by Egypt as their agent 
in Najd. From 1841 to his death, he lived in the Hijaz as a refugee 
and received a pension from the Ottomans. H e was a constant in­
triguer against his relatives w h  o ruled as amirs in Riyadh. At times 
he was joined by other Saudi exiles w h  o sought assistance from 
the Ottomans or from the amirs of Mecca. The only time Khalid 
received any concrete aid was in 1847 w h e n an Ottoman-sharifial 
force of 1,000 invaded Qasim for about three months. After nego­
tiations the amir of Mecca was promised in vague terms a renewal 
of the tribute and was sent substantial presents by the Saudi leader; 
the Hijazis then withdrew. Although some of the tribute was occa­
sionally paid, as in 1855, most of it was never seen in Mecca. As a 
result, Wahhabi pilgrims were sometimes not permitted to make 
the pilgrimage.l() 
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The other part of Arabia that witnessed Ottoman expansion 
was the northern Hijaz, but here the amir of Mecca played no part. 
Small pilgrimage fortresses had been under Ottoman control con­
tinuously since the sixteenth century. N o  w some additional vil­
lages were taken for brief periods. Khaybar was seized from the 
Rashidis of Hail by a party of soldiers from Medina in 1874 with the 
support of the local Wuld Ali nomads. The fortress was repaired, 
taxes were levied, gates were installed, a local garrison was estab­
lished, and a military governor was appointed. Jawf was held for 
one year before the Ottoman garrison there mutinied for back pay. 
These attacks against the Rashidis failed. By the late 1870s, the 
Rashidis, the amirs, and the Ottomans were once again on fairly 
good terms. The Rashidis maintained an agent at Jidda to protect 
their interests. They saw the Ottomans as a balancing force against 
the Saudis, w h o , although weak from internal quarrels, posed the 
major threat to Rashidi dominance of Qasim and Najd. 
Massawa and Suakin on the western shore of the Red Sea 
played a part in the expansion of Egyptian authority and influence 
beyond the borders of the vilayet of Egypt. Ismail, viceroy of Egypt 
from 1863 to 1879, sought to gain an African empire in the Sudan, 
upper Egypt, and along the shores of the Red Sea as well as influ­
ence in western Arabia. Egypt began to rival the Ottomans in aiding 
the amirs of Mecca. 
Even before Ismail's ambitions prompted overt interest in the 
Hijaz, his two predecessors, Abbas (r. 1848-54) and Said 
(r. 1854-63), had had a considerable personal involvement in the 
Hijaz. Abbas visited the Hijaz in November-December 1848 just 
before becoming governor of Egypt, and his mother m a d  e the pil­
grimage in 1850. Egypt maintained an agent in Jidda from at least 
1850. Said toured Medina, Wajh, and Yanbu in 1861, though he did 
not go to Mecca. The vali and amir met him in Medina, and the 
amir, with the knowledge and approval of Istanbul, accompanied 
him back to Egypt. 
Egyptian military interest in the Hijaz increased in the 1850s 
and 1860s. At the time of Said's trip, the Egyptian army officer, m a p  ­
maker, and photographer M u h a m m a  d Sadiq Bey had embarked on 
the first thorough exploration of the coastal regions of the north­
western shore of the Red Sea from Aqaba to Yanbu. Small Egyptian 
garrisons manned the fortresses there that protected Egyptian pil­
grims making their way toward Medina. S o m e Egyptian troops 
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were sent by request of the Ottomans to the Hijaz, Asir, and Y e m e n . 
Abbas sent troops to Jidda in 1853- Conditions of service were so 
bad that mutinies occurred in the 1850s. Said sent 500 troops dur­
ing the Jidda massacre. By 1859 there were 1,800 Egyptian soldiers 
in the Hijaz; they acted as the police force of Jidda until their with­
drawal in 1861. From 1863 to 1866, Egyptian forces in Taif and 
Jidda operated in support of the Ottoman campaign in Asir, but 
Ismail refused Amir A b d Allah's request for more help in 1867, 
even though the amirs of his clan were on good terms with the 
house of M e h m e t Ali in Egypt.'' 
The Suez Canal was said both by the Egyptians and by the 
canal company to be an asset to Ottoman rule of the Hijaz rather 
than a threat. Ferdinand de Lesseps, its engineer and guiding spirit, 
sent a copy of his book on the canal to the amir of Mecca. Said 
Pasha, of Egypt, argued in it that w h e n the canal was opened the 
provisioning of the Hijaz would become easier and so would the 
sending of troops from Anatolia to Arabia. The lessening of the bur­
dens of the pilgrims would also redound to the benefit of the sul­
tan-caliph.12 
Ismail was especially interested in obtaining the ports of 
Suakin and Massawa from the Hijaz. This issue had been raised in 
1842-43 w h e  n Istanbul rejected the Egyptian claim to administer 
the coast opposite Suakin; taxes and customs duties then went to 
Jidda. But from 1846 to 1849, both Suakin and Massawa were 
leased to M e h m e  t Ali, w h  o appointed governors there, though 
upon his death they reverted to the Hijaz. Egypt probably wanted 
them to stop refugees from the Sudan from going there. A tele­
graph line reached Suakin in 1859, regular steamship visits started 
in the 1860s, and some reforms were initiated. In 1865 Ismail re­
gained control over the two towns from Jidda on condition that he 
stop the slave trade and pay T. L 37,500 to the Hijaz in lieu of the 
lost taxes, customs revenues, and salt monopoly profits. The pay­
ment was only one-twentieth of the yearly tribute Egypt paid Istan­
bul every year after 1866. The amir and the vali of the Hijaz were 
consoled for their loss of territory by a bribe of 5,000 ardebs of 
wheat from Egypt.13 Thus the two Ottoman Hijazi possessions 
opening onto the continent of Africa were lost forever, for w h e n 
Egypt was occupied by Britain, the posts fell into her hands and 
never came under Ottoman control again. 
British interest in the Red Sea was growing, or at least the amir 
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and grand vezir thought so. At the suggestion of the amir, the Ot­
toman grand vezir ordered the Basra docks in 1868 to send a war­
ship to the Red Sea so as to counter the British presence there. 
Even before the opening of the canal in 1869, the Ottomans were 
reasserting their old claims on the Red Sea's western coast. In 
southern Arabia the Ottomans sent a warship to Shihr and Mukalla 
in 1867 at the request of a group of local notables to the amir of 
Mecca. The Ottomans then claimed sovereignty there, but this 
claim was opposed by Britain. However, despite these incidents, 
Ottoman and British expansion in Africa and Arabia seldom in­
volved the Hijaz except through the slave trade. Foreign policy 
concerned chiefly the vali and Istanbul, not the amir. 
ADMINISTRATION 
In the 1860s and 1870s, the rapid turnover in the governorship 
of the Hijaz decreased the power of the valis with respect to the 
amir. While Abd Allah was amir continuously during the nineteen 
years from 1858 to 1877, there were nine valis. Thefirst of these, 
Kutahyali Ali Pasha, had been vali of Syria, was a vezir, and held the 
Hijaz post until 1861. His successor, Hakkipashazade Ahmet Izzet, 
had had some experience in Y e m e n and returned there after serv­
ing in the Hijaz. Mehmet Vecihi Pasha (1864-67) died at Taif. His 
successor, after an eight-month gap, was Mehmet M u a m m a r , w h o 
had been a m e m b e r of the Istanbul Meclis-i Vala and was primarily 
a military figure. H  e commande  d the Hijaz forces directly in the 
field. After the short regime of Hurshid Pasha, w h  o had served in 
Edirne, Izmir, and Istanbul, Kasim (1871-72) succeeded. H  e had 
considerable experience in the Hijaz as governor of Medina and 
also of Jidda. Mehme t Reshid (1872-73) formerly had held the 
post of vali of African Tripoli. The next vali, Shirvanizade Mehmet 
Rushdi, had been grand vezir as well as vali of Damascus. His im­
pact on the Hijaz was minimal, for he died after being there only 
one and one-half months. Vali Takiyuddin Pasha had been gover­
nor of Baghdad. From 1864 on the valis had the title of sheikh of 
the Meccan Haram as well as that of governor. 
The governorship of the Hijaz, like many other provincial gov­
ernorships, was viewed as a kind of exile for losers in the game of 
political intrigue in Istanbul. Real power was in the hands of the 
amir. Those w h  o sought to become grand vezir attempted to re­
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m o v e potential rivals by having them appointed vali of the Hijaz. 
In the 1860s provincial governorships throughout the empire be­
came less important; instead, consulates, reformers, and the army 
gained in power. 
The elderly M e h m e t Vecihi as vali in 1864-67 delegated 
power to his son, w h  o proceeded to auction off the highest posts; 
even the kaimmakam of Jidda had to pay for his post. Vecihi's per­
sonal weakness contrasted with his formal strength: he had also 
been appointed sheikh of the Medina and Mecca Harams. H e was 
the only vali in the nineteenth century to hold all three posts si­
multaneously. But nothing was done to consolidate or coordinate 
Ottoman power in the Hijaz. Vali M u a m m a  r resigned in disgust in 
1870 because all effective power was in the hands of the amir. The 
n e w vali was ordered by Istanbul to live in Jidda so as to decrease 
controversy with the amir. Since A b d Allah seldom visited Jidda, far 
preferring to live in Taif and Mecca, this might have worked; but 
the pilgrimage, the presence of government offices and workers in 
Mecca, and the extraordinarily unattractive combination of heat 
and humidity in Jidda m a d  e it an impracticable idea. 
The appointment of Kasim Pasha as vali in late 1871 might 
have m a d e a very substantial difference if he had stayed as gover­
nor. H  e had served in two other crucial positions as governor first 
of Medina, then of Jidda, and he had the energy and military ability 
to play an active role. Kasim had benefited from a general person­
nel change following the death of Grand Vezir Ali Pasha on 7 Sep­
tember 1871, a change that opened the way for him at least to gain 
control of the local Ottoman machinery of government. Unfortu­
nately for him, Istanbul's mania for shuffling personnel during the 
later reform period led to yet another change in the status of the 
vilayet and, in the process, a n e w vali. Amir A b d Allah remained 
secure in his power, therefore. 
In the appointment of the ka immakam of Jidda, the valis 
played a decisive role after 1861. After the 1858 massacre, the for­
mer system whereby the vali selected the ka immakam had been 
abolished. Instead the n e w kaimmakam, Suleyman Bey, was ap­
pointed directly by Istanbul. The European consuls felt that this 
method of selection would certainly improve the quality of the 
kaimmakams; it would also enhance the role of the Europeans in 
the selection process, since they enjoyed greater influence in the 
central government than in Mecca, the seat of the vilayet and the 
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amir. However , in September 1861 the central government 
changed back to the previous system. Suleyman, w h  o had been 
liked by the consuls, was dismissed. The n e w kaimmakam was to 
be appointed by the vali; however, in the 1860s the advice of the 
British and French consuls was still solicited. Their intervention in 
1867 persuaded the vali to keep in office the then current governor 
of Jidda rather than replace him with someone from the vali's o w n 
staff. In the sixteen years between 1861 and 1876, there were at 
least eleven regular or temporary appointees to the post of kaim­
m a k a m  , thereby weakening this post and comparatively strength­
ening the amirate's influence in Jidda. 
The third most prestigious position in Ottoman administra­
tion, that of the sheikh of the Haram of Medina, also was often 
changed. Between 1858 and 1877, there were eleven sheikhs, w h  o 
usually served as governors of the town of Medina. The longest 
term in office was four years, but most sheikhs served only one 
year. In June 1862 the manner in which the n e w sheikh was se­
lected illustrated the general pattern of appointments. The incum­
bent died in Medina, and on the following day, a council met there 
to recommend his deputy for the promotion. The council sent pe­
titions for this purpose to Istanbul; they were signed by the qadi, 
muftis, head of the preachers, the deputy naqib al-ashraf, and other 
leaders, as well as by sixty descendants of the Prophet and seventy 
prayer leaders and preachers. All this did little good, for Istanbul 
appointed another person to the post. However, the same year, 
w h e  n the naqib al-sadat of Medina died, a similar council, followed 
by petitions to Istanbul, was successful in securing the appoint­
ment for a local candidate.14 
Perhaps the chief difference between the two situations was 
the intervention in the later case by the amir of Mecca on behalf of 
the petitioners. Certainly the amir's opinion, as well as that of the 
vali, was solicited by the grand vezir in 1869 w h e n replacement of 
the sheikh of the Haram was being considered because of com­
plaints received against him. In 1874 Amir Abd Allah's complaints 
against Halet Pasha, the Sheikh of the Haram, resulted in the latter's 
dismissal. 
The demands placed upon the sheikh were also considered 
in appointments; the Ottomans felt that the Medina job demanded 
someone more conversant with local administration than a person 
to be appointed as kaimmakam of Jidda. The latter position was 
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viewed as being concerned primarily with Y e m e  n and foreigners. 
The only external concern for the Medina sheikh was relations 
with Najd and Hail, and these were minimal compared with Jidda's 
external affairs, though diplomacy and tact were necessary in deal­
ing with the Bedouins. T w  o military m e  n w h  o were appointed to 
the combined posts of sheikh and governor of Medina in the 1870s 
were so ineffectual with the tribes that they were rapidly dismissed. 
Factors that affected all Ottomans from the humblest store­
house clerk to the amir himself were the financial crisis of the Ot­
toman Empire in the 1870s and the resulting pressure on 
individuals to compensate for delayed or reduced salaries by tak­
ing bribes. Special "donations" by employees to the state were not 
really voluntary; as they mounted and as salaries became ever 
more in arrears, pressure to solicit bribes grew. 
Although the bankruptcy of the empire also signaled the 
bankruptcy of the Tanzimat, in its more flourishing days that series 
of administrative reforms imposed by Istanbul officialdom did 
have some impact upon the provinces, even those in distant Ara­
bia. The most revolutionary change on the imperial level was the 
theoretical equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law; this had 
no importance in the all-Muslim Hijaz. Second was the steady en­
croachment of the central government upon the more distant prov­
inces. Most provinces came to have one of the following positions: 
they were under effective control of Istanbul, as in Syria; they left 
the imperial system altogether, as in Rumania; they achieved some 
autonomy, as in Lebanon, but remained under the over-all control 
of the state. The Hijaz fell into the third category because of the 
semiautonomous power of the amirs of Mecca. Another change in 
the Tanzimat period came in the increase in the efficiency and 
power of the state. This was not visible in the Hijaz, although the 
conquest of nearby Y e m e  n demonstrated the potentialities inher­
ent in the n e  w Ottoman strength of the 1860s. 
Istanbul's never-ending debate about the ideal amount of 
power to be given to the provincial governor versus the power to 
be retained by the central ministries meant little to the Ottoman 
officials of the Hijaz up to 1868, w h e n the Provincial Reform Law 
of 1864 and the Law of Vilayets of 1867 finally came partially into 
effect locally. The reorganization of the Ottoman bureaucracy and 
administrative divisions of the Hijaz into a new-style vilayet began 
in 1868 and ended only in 1873­
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Reorganization raised the complex issues of the linkage of 
Medina and Y e m e n to the Hijaz, the status of the holy law, and the 
relationship between the amir and Istanbul. W h e  n debate began 
in 1868, the vali objected to instituting the n e w reforms also on the 
grounds of added expense. The central government's treasury de­
partment wanted to m a k e it clear that Y e m e n would be separate 
for tax purposes, and, revealingly, it wanted the same status for 
Medina—perhaps because it hoped eventually to institute taxes 
there. Istanbul officials also pointed out that police duties were 
presently divided between the amir and the vali, and to specify the 
allocation of responsibility might be difficult. Still, it was decided 
to go ahead with the changes. W h e  n the grand vezir wrote the vali 
and the amir about this, he told them that the council of state had 
concurred. H  e also assured them that thefirst order of business 
was still the maintenance of security by the police and that the sec­
ond was financial probity. In other areas instructions could be car­
ried out in accordance with circumstances. Religious law was to be 
applied as formerly, but a civil criminal court was to be established. 
The civil andfinancial aspects of administration in Medina were to 
be taken away from the sheikh of the Haram and turned over to a 
governor responsible to the Hijaz vali. Thefirst governor was to be 
Kasim Pasha, w h  o had had experience with the nomads while serv­
ing on the staff of the army in Damascus. H  e also was to have com­
m a n d of the military around and in Medina. The sheikh of the 
Haram would retain jurisdiction only over religious matters and 
the Haram itself. S o m e aspects of Yemen's government might still 
be handled by Mecca. A n e w and more elaborate financial organi­
zation was to be set up in Mecca, and a council (later k n o w n as the 
Meclis-i Idare-i Liva Medine) would be established to advise the 
vali about affairs in Medina.15 After the adoption of these changes, 
there ensued a general rearrangement of personnel in the top po­
sitions. 
The actual consequences of the provincial reorganization 
were small. After one year the offices of sheikh of the Haram and 
governor of Medina were once again held by one individual. There 
was no discernible increase in the power of the valis with respect 
to the amirs, the tribes, or anyone else. Financial changes m a  y have 
had s o m e marginal impact in terms of efficiency, but m o n e y was 
in such short supply that government was hamstrung no matter 
h o  w efficient its bureaucrats were. Y e m e  n did gain a separate 
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administration, but Qunfuda, lit, and parts of Asir remained in the 
Hijaz Vilayet. A n advisory council (Meclis-i Vilayet) was formed in 
Mecca for the vilayet as a whole, and a local council (Meclis-i Idare­
i Liva Cidde) was established in Jidda in 1873, but they seem to 
have done nothing up to the turbulent years of the 1880s. 
PROVINCIAL FINANCES 
Money, as always, was a major concern of government. The 
financial relations of the Ottomans with the Hijaz were central to 
the existence of the people of the area as well as their attitude to­
ward the amir and vali. From the local point of view, subsidies from 
the central government to Mecca and Medina showed that the Ot­
toman Empire was the economic support of the chief religious 
sites of Islam. The Ottomans sent food for the subsistence of the 
Hijazis and for the thousands of pilgrims w h  o came to the Hijaz 
every year. In return the Ottoman sultan gained religious prestige. 
The Ottomans had m a d e of the Hijaz the most privileged 
province in the empire. It enjoyed internal autonomy and a low 
rate of taxation, and was the recipient of subsidies not only from 
the Ottoman government but also from Egypt, Indian Muslim 
states, and Muslim private citizens throughout the world. 
The support extended to the Hijaz varied somewhat as the 
financial fortunes of the empire changed. The empire was reason­
ably solvent through the 1840s and 1850s, but it began increasingly 
to borrow m o n e y from Europe to finance military reforms. Be­
tween 1854 and 1908, the Ottomans borrowed T. L 297,000,000. In 
the 1870s the empire went bankrupt. It was only with the Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration in the 1880s that order returned to Ot­
toman finances, although steady deficits continued. Abdulhamid 
II's financial goals were the repayment of the debt in order to attain 
financial freedom and the building of an economic infrastructure 
that would help productive capacity grow. A n expanding military 
consumed about 40 percent of the budget, and little was left for 
provincial administration.16 
The Hijaz was perpetually short of funds. Local revenues were 
inadequate to cover local expenditures; usually the deficits were 
two-thirds of the total expenditures of the province. Even with the 
strictest economies, the Hijaz was dependent upon the central gov­
ernment for subsidies to maintain local administration, though the 
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sums involved were relatively small. In the year of greatest expend­
itures, only about T. L 236,500 were spent on all aspects of govern­
ment, including the military and gifts to Bedouins. Local revenue 
averaged about T. L 55,000. By comparison, Egypt's tribute to the 
Ottomans was T. L 400,000; after 1866 it was T. L 750,000. The 
revenue of Cyprus, perhaps more comparable in number of inhab­
itants, was T. L 211,370 in 1868/69.17 
The sources of income locally available were limited by the 
religious, political, and economic position the province occupied 
in the empire. Even if the central government had wanted to col­
lect large amounts of taxes, it would have been difficult to do so. 
The Hijaz was too poor, too distant, and too accustomed to near-
autonomy to submit to taxation. Hijazis paid taxes through the dis­
guised form of higher prices for goods taxed on entry to the Hijaz 
by sea. At the Jidda customs house, more than two hundred m e  n 
were usually at work. 
Although customs revenues were by far the largest source of 
revenue, there were other taxes as well. M e h m e  t Ali had created 
before 1840 a levy of 7 percent on livestock and 10 percent on 
agricultural yields; the m o n e y was split equally between the gov­
ernment, the amir, and the tax collectors. These taxes were re­
tained for the Mecca and Taif areas, but they raised only about 
T. L 500-1,000 per year, depending upon the power of the amirs 
for collection. 
Every year the vali faced the problem of securing the m o n e  y 
needed to balance his expenditures (see table 7). W h e  n the 
changeover to Ottoman administration occurred in 1841/42, the 
financial and grain contributions of Egypt to the Hijaz once again 
became an issue. M e h m e t Ali had annually sent T. L 40,000 or the 
equivalent in grain as a gift. H e had, however, suppressed the waqf 
income from Egypt for the holy cities and had taken all the Jidda 
customs revenues rather than dividing them with the amirs of 
Mecca as had formerly been done. In 1841/42 he withheld the sub­
sidy despite protests from Vali O s m a  n Pasha. Actual receipts for 
1841/42 were as follows: (1) Jidda customs, T. L 52,480; (2) other 
local sources, 1,235; (3) Istanbul treasury, 22,550; (4) Egypt, 
28,465; (5) grain from Egypt on hand in the Hijaz, 14,280. The total, 
even if Egypt's missing contribution was soon to arrive, would still 
be far short of expenditures. Short-term one-time measures were 
taken to raise about T. L 35,000, but the remaining deficit had to 
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TABLE 7

TOTAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

FOR THE HLJAZ IN OTTOMAN POUNDS

Year Local Revenue Expenditure Deficit

1841/42 53,715 171,805 118,090

1842/43 45,000 171,894 110,945

1845 64,955 140,950 75,995

1846/47 35,000 189,630 154,630

1850/51 67,090 227,545 160,455

1851/52 33,345 228,145 194,800

1852/53 36,945 209,400 172,455

1853/54 31,315 182,530 151,215

1855/56 20,000 250,000 230,000

1859/60 86 015

1860/61 96 275

1861/62 42,565 192,450 149,885

1862/63 68,035 236,485 168,450

1863/64 71 730

1864/65 212 100

1865/66 83,230 208,860 125,630

1866/67 90,000 210,000 120,000

1869/70 80 000

1871/72 55,095 241,110 186,015

1872/73 205,700

S O U R C E S  : B B A  , Meclis-i Vala 504; Dahiliye 3548; Meclis-i Vala 4889; Meclis-i Vala 
2948; Meclis-i Vala 6334; Dahiliye 17876; Meclis-i Mahsus 1; Misir Defter 592, enclosure 
26; Meclis-i Vala 18661; Meclis-i Mahsus 1120; Meclis-i Vala 24702; Meclis-i Vala 22429, 
enclosure 22; Dahiliye 37893; Dahiliye 45412; Mesail-i M u h i m m  e 2430; FJ, de Monbrey 
(Jidda) to ministry, 21 October 1856; Yildiz 18.525/213.128.25; Ayniyat 871, grand vezir 
to vali, 3 Shaban 1289. 
be met by Istanbul.18 The burden of the deficit fell on groups that 
frequently had to wait years to receive the m o n e y that was due 
them. 
The records of the local revenues for 1852/53 showed the re­
sults of separating the Y e m e  n ports' revenues from the Hijaz. That 
year a severe drop in revenue naturally resulted. Over five-sevenths 
of what revenue was left came from the customs of Jidda, Suakin, 
and Massawa. Another important source of local revenue was the 
tribute of T. L 2,300 paid by Najd to the Hijaz in recognition of 
nominal Ottoman sovereignty. Zakat (alms taxes) receipts were 
only T. L 1,030. The Istanbul treasury in 1851/52 also paid Egypt 
for the shipment of wheat and barley. In 1852-54 the Ottoman mil­
itary treasury supplied T. L 100,000, and Egypt, an equal sum, for 
grain to be sent to the Hijaz.19 
The need for cash led the valis to borrow m o n e y from local 
merchants, for it was difficult to transfer funds from Istanbul to 
Mecca. Payments were months and sometimes years in arrears, 
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with the threat of an audit awaiting the vali w h  o manipulated his 
accounts. The defterdar of the provincial administration possessed 
independence of action and a separate channel of communication 
with Istanbul. The risky business of providing credit could be un­
dertaken only by merchants w h  o had capital such that delays in 
payment would not ruin their other businesses. 
More preferable than relying on one person to provide credit 
was a consortium of lenders w h  o could share the risks and w h  o 
also could apply more pressure on the vali in the event of an alter­
cation than could one m a n . Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, was the 
chief merchant of Jidda in the 1850s. H  e and the vali were involved 
in profitable joint business undertakings. Yusr and another local 
merchant, Salim Sultan, lent the province T. L 8,000 in 1853/54, 
and in 1854/55 Yusr advanced T. L 21,500 more to the vali for the 
payment of soldiers and military expenses to be repaid by drafts 
on Istanbul. In 1855/56 Yusr was asked for the large s u m of T. L 
72,505. Yusr's profit on exchange was estimated at 18 percent. O n 
a loan of T. L 20,000 to the amir for military operations, Yusr 
wanted a 2 percent commission plus a favorable rate of exchange. 
In Istanbul, Yusr's agents allegedly bribed the minister of the trea­
sury. The profitability of most of the loans was high; a 5 percent 
profit seems to have been the m i n i m u  m expected.20 
The year 1862/63 m a y be taken as an example of the financial 
situation of the Hijaz province in the 1860s. Local revenue came 
chiefly from the Jidda customs, which yielded a profit of T. L 
30,000, and those of Y e m e n , which also provided T. L 30,000. The 
customs of Massawa and Suakin declined to only T. L 665. Al­
though the Najd's tribute was listed as a source of income, it was 
not paid that year. Egypt continued to be the chief source of pay­
ments. Every year T L 100,000 from the Egyptian tribute was used 
for the purchase of grain for the Hijaz. W h e  n grain was sent from 
Iraq rather than Egypt, part of the now-free m o n e y was sent to Jidda 
for current operating expenses.21 
A juggling act began in the middle 1860s with elaborate 
switching of surpluses, or what was hoped would be surpluses, 
from one province to another. Thus the Hijaz deficit of 1865/66 
was met by issuing drafts on Baghdad. In 1867/68 the central gov­
ernment owed the Hijaz T. L 70,000; by 1874 the debt had 
mounted to T. L 88,000. The grand vezir promised the vali that he 
would receive all the m o n e y owed plus coverage for the current 
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deficit by telegraphed drafts on the Syrian and Baghdad vilayets. In 
1875-77 the bottom fell out with bankruptcy. The income of the 
Ottoman Hijaz was reduced, although economic and fiscal condi­
tions there did not become as catastrophic as they were in Otto­
m a n Syria at the same time. 
By far the largest single expenditure of the Hijaz provincial 
government in the 1860s was the cost of the military (see table 8), 
but the central imperial government spent more on the pilgrimage 
caravans' expenses and gifts to the holy cities. Since security and 
sovereignty were the Ottomans' chief political goals, the primacy 
of the military w a  s understandable. A n  d since the chief 
benefit the Hijazis returned to the Ottomans was the public ac­
knowledgment of the piety and generosity of the ruler and state, 
gifts to prominent religious individuals also were important. 
Expenditures on the army took m a n y forms. In 1851/52 T. L 
132,940, more than one-half of all spending, was for the military. 
However, at least throughout the 1850s, the military budget was 
artificially inflated by T. L 20,000: the expenses of one regiment 
were billed to the Hijaz, even though it was stationed in Istanbul, 
because the other regiments of that division were in the Hijaz. The 
level of spending on the military remained at more than one-half 
of vilayet expenditures in the 1880s. 
The cost of protecting the overland pilgrimage caravans from 
Damascus was large. Every year there were official receptions for 
TABLE 8 
EXPENDITURES OF THE JIDDA EYALET, 
1862/63, IN OTTOMAN POUNDS 
Category In Medina In Mecca 
Amir, sharifs, and others 80 26,880 
Servants of the Haram 390 
Residents of Mecca and Medina 3,910 3,085 
Civil servants 2,530 21,040 
Military 50,580 84,810 
Grain and transport 12,130 1,300 
Living and travel expenses 3,915 10,075 
Bedouins 760 
Miscellaneous 2,000 13,000 
Total 75,905 160,580 
(Grand total 236,485) 
S O U R C E : BBA, Meclis-i Vala 22429, end. 14. Allfigures have been rounded to the 
nearest pound. 
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the arrival and departure of the caravans, and camels were rented 
by the government from the nomads for the escorts of the caravans. 
W h e  n disputes with the Bedouins of these regions arose, military 
spending was increased. Twenty-five thousand Ottoman pounds 
was added to the military's share of the Medina budget for 1863/ 
64 after there were problems with the Bedouins w h  o controlled 
the pilgrim routes leading to Medina.22 
Annual spending by the central government on the pilgrim­
age and allied expenses in the 1880s included donations, gifts, and 
pensions to the sharifs, sayyids, and the ulema worth T. L 17,776. 
Wheat, barley, beans, and lentils distributed in the holy cities and 
Jidda cost T. L 25,558. The sums spent on food, gifts, and the pil­
grimage were in addition to the regular budgetary amounts sent to 
the province. O  f the total allocated by Istanbul, T .  L 29,000 to 
35,000 was spent in Mecca and Medina. The chief group receiving 
m o n e y was the officialdom of the two Harams. Charity to the poor 
and religious education were given only T. L 8,470. Hospitals, Sufi 
brotherhoods, the ulema outside the Harams, and those w h  o 
prayed on behalf of the royal family were paid T.L. 4,480. 
The sources of these funds were primarily the central govern­
ment's treasury and a special waqf treasury in Istanbul. Waqfs for 
the benefit of the holy cities had been established by the Ottoman 
dynasty and others throughout the empire. Waqfs donated by for­
mer sultans, and those whose income was allocated specifically to 
the Hijaz, were supplemented by funds from the imperial treasury, 
the sultan's private treasury, the treasury of the holy cities per se, 
and drafts written on the Syrian vilayet. 
The Egyptian government sent every year with the Cairo-
Mecca pilgrimage caravan a n e w covering for the Kaba that cost 
more than T. L. 5,000. Guards for the caravans, fortresses in the 
northern Hijaz (up to the 1890s w h e  n they reverted to the Otto­
mans) , and gifts to the sharifs, the inhabitants of the holy cities, and 
the Bedouins cost Egypt at least an additional T. L 9,000. Egyptian 
charities in Mecca and Medina received more than T. L 3,500. 
M u c h of the cost was borne by Egyptian waqfs especially estab­
lished for these purposes. Nearly every family in Mecca and Medina 
received some benefit from Egypt, including in m a n y cases direct 
pensions.23 
In addition to the regular donations from Istanbul and Cairo, 
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there were gifts from other areas and on special occasions from the 
Ottomans. Tunisia, various religious brotherhoods, central Asian 
rulers, and prominent pilgrims supplied funds. Indian Muslims 
were generous toward the Hijaz: m o n e y was given for famine re­
lief, schools, the Hijaz Railroad, Quran recitations, physicians to 
attend indigent pilgrims, and hostels. W h e  n natural disasters took 
place, as the flood in Mecca in 1861 or the drought of 1886-89, the 
Ottoman central government sent m o n e y or food. 
Imperial charity in the Hijaz was also channeled in part 
through gifts to n a m e d individuals. The descendants of the 
Prophet, imams, preachers, managers of charitable institutions, ser­
vants of the Harams, and those w h o prayed in the holy cities were 
eligible for the most. Those w h  o held no office but simply were 
born in Medina and in Mecca received less, and those w h  o were 
settled foreigners living in the cities received still less. Former gov­
ernment officeholders received pensions w h e  n they retired to the 
Hijaz. 
False names sometimes were entered on the registers. Recip­
ients sold their rights to agents in Istanbul w h  o tried to collect 
m o n e y w h e n they were not entitiled to it. Formerly,five years of 
residence in the holy cities had been a prerequisite to claiming to 
be a settled inhabitant and thus eligible for gifts, but in 1881/82 
newly arrived Central Asians were presenting certificates of settled 
status. T  o reform these practices, the central government estab­
lished n e w procedures for giving money . Forms had to be pro­
duced in person in the Hijaz in order to collect money . The 
following groups were forbidden to receive subsidies: employees 
of the Hijaz treasury, small children, slaves, servants, merchants, 
and those living for less thanfive years in Mecca or Medina. Across-
the-board reductions were also m a d e . Actual distribution of the 
m o n e y for Mecca was m a d e by the amir, the supervisor of the 
Haram, the chief judge of Mecca, and the agent of the central gov­
ernment in charge of imperial charities. In Medina the chief judge, 
the supervisor of the Haram, the charities clerk, and the local agent 
of the amir supervised the distribution of the presents.24 
Expenditures on public works were low, sporadic, and con­
centrated on projects for the rebuilding of mosques, strengthening 
the military, and improving the water supply. A shortage of skilled 
local artisans throughout the period m a d  e it necessary to import 
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them from Egypt, which increased expenses. In thefirst years after 
the Ottoman return to the Hijaz, the major program undertaken 
was the renovation of the Medina Haram. A succession of engi­
neers supervised the repairs under the guidance of the governors 
of Medina from the late 1840s to I860. O n  e of the gates of the city 
was also rebuilt. 
The main public works projects concerned water. The great 
heat of the Hijaz and the extreme fluctuations in demand for water 
caused by the pilgrimage m a d  e a guaranteed and healthy water 
system essential. Unfortunately, rainfall was scarce and erratic. Un­
derground springs, well-maintained transmission pipelines from 
them to the towns, and clean storage tanks to keep the water for 
years were the key elements in government action to help the Hi­
jazis and pilgrims. 
About one-half of Mecca's water came from the spring Ayn Zu­
baydah through conduits to the taps of Mecca. The Ayn Zubaydah 
water system had received an extension in 1846, w h e  n a n e  w well 
was added. The chief source of water for Medina was repaired in 
1867 at a cost of T. L 5,600. Medina was relatively better supplied 
than Mecca because of the wells that m a d e possible irrigated agri­
culture and the smaller population of the town. The waterflow into 
Mecca decreased because of failure to keep the conduits repaired 
and cleaned. In 1878 the generous Abd al-Rahman Sarraj, the Han­
afi mufti of Mecca, employed Indian pilgrims and Bedouins as la­
borers to restore the water system. After the restoration, in order to 
obtain a greater supply of water, the sultan created a commission, 
headed initially by Sarraj, to supervise substantial alterations to Ayn 
Zubaydah. 
The commission raised the money for the proposed changes 
from the donations of rich Muslims in the Hijaz, Egypt, and India: 
at least T. L 24,000 was given. The commission did not ask for 
mone  y from the Ottoman treasury because of the financial di­
l emma of the empire at that time. Many aspects of the water system 
were improved: conduits were repaired, and water from the nearby 
wadis was brought to Mecca by building n e w underground pipes, 
diversionary canals were dug, and n e  w reservoirs and water taps 
were built throughout the city. In the middle 1880s, a large reser­
voir was built at Muna ; it had a steam p u m p to lift water onto the 
pilgrimage mount itself.25 
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The water supply to Jidda was in deplorable condition 
through most of the nineteenth century. During the Wahhabi oc­
cupation of the Hijaz, the water channels from Wadi Fatimah had 
been severed, and apparently they were not rebuilt for some time. 
Jidda depended upon rainwater stored in privately owned cisterns 
and water brought in by camels. Thus in 1869, even though there 
was no rain that year, the stored water could be drunk after it was 
filtered. Obviously it was in the interest of the cistern owners to 
stop the repair and construction of aqueducts. Proposals by a 
Cairo-based, Christian-owned company to build an aqueduct were 
rejected by the amir and the vali in 1880. Nevertheless, in 1886-87 
water was brought from seven miles away through earthenware 
pipes to Jidda. Later, the government brought in the water from 
another spring; the cost was paid by local townspeople.26 
Salaries to government employees also constituted a major 
type of expenditure. The total number of employees of the Hijaz 
Ottoman government in 1871/72 from the vali to a coffee-maker in 
Medina (but excluding the police and army), was about one 
hundred seventy. They shared T. L 32,140, with a wide gap be­
tween the vali and a water-carrier, w h  o was paid under T. L 10 per 
year. Intermediate ranks included clerks w h  o received between 
T. L. 50 and 100, a translator with T. L. 60, and teachers in Mecca, 
w h o were paid T. L 150 each. Religious-legal figures such as the 
deputy judges of Mecca and Medina had only T. L 150 per year in 
salary. The Hanafi mufti of Mecca was paid the suprisingly low s u m 
of T. L 30. 
At the top of the hierarchy stood the vali and the treasurer and 
their staffs, whose salaries were supplemented by grain allotments. 
Halet Pasha, the head of the Medina Haram, received T. L 2,400 per 
year in 1882, but also got about 7,200 okas of wheat and 16,200 of 
barley per year. 
Ascertaining the income of the amirs of Mecca was a most dif­
ficult task. The Hashimite family, including the ruling amirs, pos­
sessed land, animals, and villages in Mecca, Wadi Fatimah, and Taif. 
They were also the beneficiaries of waqfs and received pensions 
from the empire, although the amirate had since 1841 lost any 
share of the Jidda customs revenues. 
Estimates of the income of the amirate varied widely for the 
later nineteenth century. Unofficial sources of money, such as a 
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share in the camel rentals or in the shipping price-fixing ring, were 
other sources of income besides salary. 
IMPERIAL TURMOIL AND ITS LOCAL IMPACT, 1877-82 
From 1875 to 1882, the Islamic world and the Ottoman state 
experienced severe political crises. Egypt and Tunisia were occu­
pied by Britain and France, and the Egyptian Sudan rebelled under 
the leadership of M u h a m m a d A h m a d , w h o claimed to be the 
mahdi. The Ottoman Empire fought a disastrous war with Russia, 
lost a great deal of its richest territory in Europe, suffered from the 
bankruptcy of 1875, and saw three sultans c o m e to power in rapid 
succession. Also, the state experimented with a constitutional 
monarchy, only to return to autocracy. In the Hijaz three amirs held 
power and there was a high degree of change in government per­
sonnel. The tranquillity of 1859 to 1877 was challenged; but the 
amirs retained the upper hand, and there was no immediate threat 
to their authority. 
The imperial crises affected the Hijaz through the inability of 
Istanbul to send m o n e  y to pay bureaucrats, soldiers, and the tribes. 
Even though a returning high-ranking pilgrim reported to the 
grand vezir in 1876 that the Hijaz needed to m a k  e improvements 
in health, in the maintenance of the two Harams, and in storing 
wheat, the central govenment simply ordered the vali to do these 
things without providing any m o n e  y for them. Instead, the impe­
rial government in December 1876 asked the Hijaz to provide 
m o n e y to it. The appeal for donations was said to be necessary to 
save Islam and the state from the Russians, and to secure the sul­
tanate and the community (millet) from danger. Printed acknowl­
edgments were to be given to those w h  o donated; it was expected 
that the rich would contribute the greatest sums. By M a y 1877 the 
Hijaz had sent in T. L 8,200, slightly more than its quota. At the 
same time, the vali wrote to complain that state expenses had not 
been met in nearly two fiscal years.27 Surprisingly enough, no large-
scale insurrections broke out, though raids by the Bedouins in­
creased; those few soldiers still in the Hijaz continued to fight 
w h e n asked to do so. 
The war with Russia in 1877 even led the Hijaz authorities 
with no success to attempt to recruit volunteers for the Ottoman 
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army. Other Arab provinces provided large numbers of troops for 
the war, and the ulema at the Kaba and elsewhere prayed for the 
victory of Ottoman arms. 
Coincidental with financial crisis and military threat were the 
political changes of 1876-78. The former amir A b d al-Muttalib was 
present at the W a  r Ministry building in Istanbul in M a  y 1876 w h e  n 
the oath of allegiance to the n e w Sultan Murad V was taken after 
the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz. The subsequent removal of 
Murad in favor of Abdulhamid II in August had no immediate re­
percussions in the Hijaz. O  f considerably greater local interest 
were the two successful pilgrimages of late 1876 and late 1877, 
w h e n the numbers of pilgrims were high and their health was 
good. 
W h e n the news of the Amir A b d Allah's death was received in 
Istanbul on 8 July 1877, the question of his successor was easily 
resolved. A b d Allah's brother Husayn (b. ca. 1839/40), w h o was a 
m e m b e r of the Council of State, was recommended by the vali of 
the Hijaz and approved by Sultan Abdulhamid. A n e  w vali, Halet 
Pasha, was appointed. A w n al-Rafiq, brother both to A b d Allah and 
to Husayn, had served as acting amir; upon the arrival of Husayn, 
he went to Istanbul, where he gained the rank of vezir and joined 
the Council of State. Thus, in short order an heir apparent to the 
amirate, a n e  w amir, and a n e  w vali had been selected. Also, inves­
tigations into the conduct of the governors of Yanbu and the 
sheikh of the Haram of Medina were ordered by the grand vezir. 
Certainly the administrative hierarchy in Istanbul was not incapa­
citated by the extraordinary strains it was undergoing—it was still 
quite able to make rapid choices. 
The three years of Amir Husayn's rule were notable for their 
quietness. Imperial developments and particularly the suppression 
of parliament and the suspension of the constitution were greeted 
with complete apathy in the Hijaz. Husayn retained the custom of 
large public audiences at which the conduct of public business 
took place. H  e was personally in touch with, and favorable toward, 
the ideas of the n e  w Arabic-speaking intelligentsia being formed 
in Beirut. S o m e public works were carried out, most notably the 
paving of part of the trail between Mecca and Taif, and others were 
planned. 
Vali Nashid Pasha, the former governor of Damascus and of 
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Aleppo, arrived in Jidda in 1879, m a d  e the pilgrimage, and began 
actively to m a k e changes in the port of Jidda. The municipality 
acted together with the foreign merchants of the town to institute 
a n e w tax on imported goods; the proceeds of this were used to 
build a sea wall, tear d o w  n old houses in the quarantine grounds, 
and construct public latrines. Istanbul gave the vali the freedom to 
m o v e the administration from Mecca to Jidda as circumstances war­
ranted. 
O n 15 March 1880, Amir Husayn died in Jidda after being 
stabbed by Khurasani Fakhr al-Din, an Afghani, whose reasons for 
the murder were unknown. It has been suggested that the assassi­
nation was inspired by Sultan Abdulhamid II because of the amir's 
reputation for favoring Great Britain.28 There is, however, no evi­
dence of imperial involvement in the assassination. 
W h e  n the British consul was asked by the vali to write the 
ambassador in Istanbul to oppose the choice of A b  d al-Muttalib as 
successor to Husayn, Consul Zohrab did so, but for reasons of his 
o w  n in addition to those of the vali. Zohrab feared that A b  d al-
Muttalib was fanatical in religion, capricious, and anti-British. The 
British ambassador did oppose A b  d al-Muttalib, but with conse­
quences that were opposite to those intended. It seems likely that 
one of the chief motives for Abdulhamid's support of A b d al-Mut­
talib was precisely the British opposition to him. In addition, the 
sultan wanted to change those groups supported by the Tanzimat 
leaders, such as the A w  n clan of the amirs, in favor of the Zayd side 
of the Hashimite family, to which A b d al-Muttalib belonged.29 The 
grand vezir and the sultan's chief advisers also favored A b  d al-Mut­
talib, despite his role in the rising of 1855. By balancing the 
strength of the Zayd and A w  n clans of the Hashimites, the central 
government increased its power. 
The aged and irascible A b d al-Muttalib returned to the Hijaz 
in M a  y 1880 after long years of exile. H  e immeidately had to deal 
with a vali w h  o had opposed his selection as amir. Vali Nashid 
Pasha was uncooperative; he refused to lend troops to A b d al-Mut­
talib for the repression of the Bedouins. The amir appealed to 
Istanbul for the dismissal of the vali and threatened to resign if 
Nashid was notfired. In October 1880 he was replaced as vali by 
Safvet Pasha, w h o was a friend of the amir, but w h o was also a mil­
itary m a n of wide experience w h o had already been vali elsewhere 
eleven times. 
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Ab d al-Muttalib rapidly alienated a wide variety of individuals 
and groups in the Hijaz. In addition to the followers of the A w  n 
clan of the Hashimites, w h o were natural enemies of any m e m b e r 
of the Zayd clan, the amir antagonized the n e  w vali, the merchants 
of Jidda and Mecca, and the foreign consuls. Safvet refused to allow 
the A w  n clan to be completely crushed, and he objected to perse­
cution of the Jidda merchant U m a r Nasif. After one year Safvet was 
ousted and replaced nominally by Ahmet Izzet, of Erzincan, w h  o 
had been vali in 1852-53 and w h o was n o w perhaps ninety years 
old. Real leadership a m o n g the Ottomans was in the hands of the 
n e w commander of the troops, O s m a n Nuri (1840-98), 
a personal favorite of the sultan, w h o became vali six months later. 
O s m a n Nuri was determined to gain power from the amir and for 
the first time to establish the direct rule of Istanbul in the Hijaz. 
The Jidda merchants and the consuls were upset by Bedouin raids 
on the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Taif routes, arbitrary confiscations 
of property, forced gifts, arrests and beating of individuals the amir 
considered to be enemies, and the transfer of patronage from 
those formerly enjoying it to n e w agents for the amirate. The n e w 
business manager of the amir was M u h a m m a  d Jabir al-Yamani, for­
mer treasurer of the Hudayda customs, w h  o had been dismissed 
from that post for stealing. S o m  e of the sheikhs of the pilgrim 
guides were dismissed and new, pro-amir individuals w h  o gave 
substantial gifts to him were appointed in their places. Anyone 
w h o criticized Abd al-Muttalib was harshly punished. The Hanafi 
mufti of Mecca resigned in protest against the amir's actions. U m a r 
Shaybi, the keykeeper of the Kaba, was arrested by the amir and 
held prisoner. The governor of Yanbu, w h  o had held that post for 
twenty years,was abruptly dismissed.30 Since the tribes did not re­
ceive their promised payments, they too began to turn against A b  d 
al-Muttalib. Taif was besieged by the Bedouins in early 1881; fa­
mine prices were charged for food in its markets. The amir sus­
pected his Hashimite enemies of stirring up these troubles against 
him, but his o w n greed, rigidity, tactlessness, and haste were the 
chief causes of his difficulties. 
O n the other hand, Abd al-Muttalib did have some supporters. 
His o w  n relatives formed a self-interested group of backers. His 
son Hashim was the chief leader of the administration for the first 
six months after the amir's return to Mecca. Hashim's highhanded 
diversion of water from Ayn Zubaydah at the expense of the pil­
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grims alienated m a n  y of the devout. Still, his death in January 1881 
deprived A b d al-Muttalib of an able assistant. Newly appointed Ot­
toman officials were initially pro-amir. Increases in civil rank, m e d ­
als, and robes of honor were obtained from Istanbul for the amir's 
friends, followers, and Bedouin allies. The consuls in Jidda under­
estimated his popularity because they k n e  w only his enemies; the 
friends the amir m a d  e a m o n  g the Bedouins by his generosity and 
a m o n g townsmen by his piety and anti-European attitudes did not 
live in Jidda. 
The decisive factor in A b d al-Muttalib's second reign was his 
failure to maintain security on the pilgrimage and commercial 
routes. H e and Izzet, the n e w vali, had been ordered by Istanbul to 
m a k  e peace, order, and caring for the pilgrims their top priorities. 
The grand vezir was worried about the 1880 attacks on the Jidda-
Mecca road. Quarrels a m o n g the tribes and with the amir kept 
breaking out. As security lessened, food supplies in Mecca de­
creased. The Hijaz cholera epidemics of the early 1880s also ad­
versely affected the economy. W h e n O s m a n was n a m e d vali in July 
1882, his orders were not specifically aimed at the amir: Istanbul 
was more worried about the Sanusis, the political prisoners kept at 
Taif, cholera, and the penetration of British influence a m o n  g the 
nomads. But O s m a n soon ordered A b d al-Muttalib to restrict his 
authority to Mecca. The vali wanted the amir to give up contact 
with the nomads, and all judicial and appointive powers, leaving 
him only with the responsibility for the organization of the pilgrim­
age. Sultan Abdulhamid approved this radical change, revoking as 
well all monopolies in food and goods possessed by the amir. The 
vali reinforced the garrisons and sought religious support by or­
dering the destruction of all liquor in Jidda. Bottles were broken 
and poured into the sea to cheers—while the French consul ve­
hemently objected.31 
The crowning touch was rumors that the amir was ambitious 
for the caliphate, was acting in cooperation with the British, and 
favored the release of the Taif political prisoners. Even though 
there was no authentic evidence that these were true, there had 
been s o m  e suggestions m a d  e outside the Hijaz along these lines, 
and the imperial palace accepted the rumors as distinctly possible. 
A b d al-Muttalib was quietly arrested by the vali in September 1882 
and m o v e d to Taif and then to M u n a , where he died in 1886. The 
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amir's popularity with the Meccans was of no value to him in his 
m o m e n t of need. Unlike 1855-56, w h e n he raised the tribes in re­
bellion, this time he was obliged to accept the imperial order of 
dismissal as permanent. 
Under A b d al-Muttalib and his two predecessors, the amirate 
provided relatively able leadership to the Hijaz. The storms that so 
severely affected the central Ottoman lands had little impact in the 
distant Hijaz. Ottoman aid to the Hijaz was large in comparison 
with locally raised funds, and the Hijaz was clearly dependent on 
the central government. Most of the m o n e  y spent in the province 
was used for supporting military forces that could provide backing 
for the valis. Another large category of aid went to the religious 
hierarchy in the holy cities. Pilgrims to Mecca and Medina provided 
the greatest source of income for the Hijazis, but the gifts and sub­
ventions from the empire and Egypt were next in importance. 
Other than customs fees, there were practically no taxes; the area 
was too poor to pay its o w n way. 
Amir A b d Allah in particular helped establish tranquillity in 
Mecca and Jidda as well as the desert. With his help the Ottomans 
even extended their power beyond its normal sway in Arabia. The 
religious prestige of the amirate and the personal ability of the 
amirs were the primary causes of the successes achieved in this 
period. However, the deposition of A b d al-Muttalib opened the 
way to a secular challenge by the central government to the amir-
ate. 
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CHAPTER 9 
COMPROMISE CHALLENGED, ESTABLISHED 
AND THREATENED ANEW, 1883-1908 
T H E O T T O M A N C E N T R A L G O V E R N M E N T , in the 1880s and 1890s, 
sought desperately to save itself from the threats posed by the mil­
itary superiority and expansionism of the European powers and 
the ideology of secular nationalism that was rapidly spreading 
a m o n g the empire's ethnic groups. T w o tools used by Sultan Ab­
dulhamid II to meet these clangers were autocracy and Pan-Islam. 
Abdulhamid believed that the centralization of all power over 
provincial governments in his o w  n hands, plus the legitimacy de­
rived from an emotional bonding of the empire's and the world's 
Muslims, might save his dynasty and the state. The construction of 
the pilgrim Hijaz Railroad between 1900 and 1908 illustrates these 
goals and methods: the technological modernization, which had 
an ostensible religious goal, actually was designed to link together 
Syria and the Hijaz and thereby bring under central control all of 
western Arabia and southern Syria. 
For the religiously based authority of the amirate of Mecca, the 
sultan's policies represented a n e w threat. W h e n Ottoman power 
was directly imposed in the Hijaz, as in the governorship of O s m a n 
Pasha in the 1880s, the amirate was inevitably weakened. Ironi­
cally, the Pan-Islamic movement and its concrete expression, the 
Hijaz Railroad, also were a challenge to the political power of reli­
gion in the Hijaz. Pan-Islam and centralization were incompatible 
with the power-sharing compromise between amir and vali that for 
so long had been the basis of the Hijazi-Ottoman political order. 
Between the two challenges by the centralizing government of 
Istanbul in the 1880s and the 1900s, the old compromise was re­
established in governing Mecca, but such issues as popular oppo­
sition to health measures and rising dissatisfaction a m o n  g the 
nomads caused major problems in Jidda and on the desert routes. 
The political importance of A w  n al-Rafiq (b. ca. 1836), the 
third son of the Amir M u h a m m a  d to become amir, was initially 
severely limited by the ambitious, energetic, and able Vali O s m a n  , 
w h  o had supported A w  n al-Rafiq's brother for the amirate. 
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Thefirst challenge to face both amir and vali in 1883 came 
from the Bedouins. Payments to the tribes were in arrears, and the 
Harb were attacking caravans, telegraph poles, and villages close 
to Jidda. The Jiddawis feared a possible revolt by their o w n poor, 
and leading people in each quarter of Jidda organized to watch for 
suspicious actions a m o n g the populace. There was fighting in the 
streets of Mecca and, briefly, in Jidda by Bedouins w h  o allegedly 
feared government and foreign action against slaveholding and in 
favor of quarantine measures. Although these were in some degree 
the real causes of the uprisings, intertribal feuding and the failure 
to pay tribal subsidies probably played a larger role. The amir led 
a detachment of Ottoman regulars and the Utaybah against the 
Harb at Asfan, where he forced the tribes to stop these actions. In 
return, payments were resumed to the tribes, some of the backlog 
owed them was paid, and Harb prisoners were released. The head 
of the Wadi Fatimah communities reconciled the amir with the 
Harb. 
Although O s m a  n had been remarkably inactive in ending the 
fighting, he persuaded Istanbul to dismiss other officials in the Ot­
toman administration and leave him in c o m m a n d . The kaim­
m a k a m of Jidda was ousted at the suggestion of the W a r Ministry, 
which viewed him as inefficient and an alarmist. U m a r Nasif was 
dismissed and then arrested by O s m a n on the unlikely accusation 
of complicity with the Harb. Nasif s real guilt lay in being a strong 
supporter of the amir, w h o  m the vali was determined to limit to an 
ineffectual role.1 However, Sayyid Safi remained in Medina as an 
independent agent of the sultan, reporting directly to Istanbul on 
government in the northern Hijaz. 
Vali O s m a n n o w assumed more and more power in his o w n 
hands. H  e became sheikh of the Meccan Haram in 1884, so as to 
centralize authority over the ulema. S o m e Meccan notables were 
exiled; even though U m a r Nasif was ultimately pardoned by the 
vali at the order of Istanbul, the notables were cowed by their harsh 
treatment. The vali retained control of the police and the military, 
increased his influence with the tribes, and even the foreign con­
suls were unable to force him to act against his wishes. W h e  n the 
French explorer Charles Huber was murdered in the desert near 
Rabigh by his two guides in 1884, the French consul insisted to no 
avail that the vali immediately arrest the murderers. O s m a n prom­
ised to catch them, but he rejected what he considered to be the 
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consul's meddling in the internal affairs of the Hijaz. Although the 
famous Tayma stele that was in Huber's baggage was ultimately 
recovered, his murderers were never punished. 
Another murder of a prominent individual in the Hijaz took 
place in response to Istanbul's orders. Midhat Pasha (1822-84), a 
prominent Ottoman reformer, had been arrested by order of the 
sultan and imprisoned in Taif in 1881. Midhat was accompanied by 
a suite of liberals w h  o opposed the resumption of autocratic power 
by the sultan. The prisoners were closely guarded. They were not 
permitted to m a k  e the pilgrimage, and any hint of sympathy for 
them was reported to Istanbul, with harsh consequences for the 
official foolish enough to have displayed it. A military aide of the 
sultan, O m e r Bey, was m a d e commandant of Taif, and the sultan 
personally followed any news of the prisoners. His extreme fear 
and dislike of the Tanzimat reformers and of Great Britain m a d  e 
him receptive to rumors of British plots to free Midhat, though 
such plots did not actually exist. 
In 1884 Midhat was strangled, probably at the order of the sul­
tan. Vali O s m a  n participated in a charade designed to conceal the 
method of his death by conducting a superficial investigation of 
the incident that was designed to show Midhat had died naturally. 
Secretly Midhat's body was removed from Taif to Istanbul.2 In this 
fashion there died in the Hijaz the leading figure of Ottoman polit­
ical and administrative reform in the nineteenth century; Midhat 
was exiled to, and died in, the province that had been affected least 
by his o w n reforms. Vali Osman's indirect part in the death of Mid-
hat was rewarded by the sultan's continuing support despite nu­
merous complaints received from Osman's enemies. 
Vali O s m a  n Pasha brought about changes in the methods of 
paying troops in the early 1880s. In late 1880 about two hundred 
fifty m e  n had downed their arms and demonstrated at the Proph­
et's tomb in Medina because their terms of duty had expired and 
they had no pay. The m o n e y for back pay and n e w troops from 
Syria were soon sent, and by 1884 the army was receiving its cur­
rent pay on time and in full, thanks to O s m a n . 
Osman's accomplishments for the empire earned him the op­
position of notables w h  o had vested interests in the maintenance 
of local autonomy. The vali managed to limit the impact of the 
British occupation of Egypt and the mahdist uprising in the Sudan. 
Recurring trouble with the Harb nomads was balanced by Osman's 
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alliance with the Utaybah. Substantial public works were under­
taken: provincial yearbooks were printed, repairs of the Haram in 
Mecca were made , the Jidda-Mecca and Jidda-Suakin telegraphs 
were opened in 1882, and the walls of Yanbu were rebuilt. In the 
first years of his administration, O s m a  n repaired and expanded the 
Daudiyyah school, widened the Ibrahim Gate, and improved the 
Ali Gate in Mecca. The path from the Ibrahim Gate to the Kaba was 
widened and renewed. O s m a n moved the library that had been 
established by Sultan Abdulmecid in 1845/46. Government build­
ings were constructed everywhere in the province: four n e w bar­
racks, eighteen small army guardhouses, a government school in 
Jidda, an office building in Mecca, and several military hospitals. 
The water system of Mecca was rebuilt, repaired, and expanded, 
though largely with private funds. O s m a n began to gain power 
over outlying regions of the province, and he protested Egyptian 
control of the northern Hijaz. Mecca and Jidda obtained grain re­
serves sufficient to last two years; however, Medina remained sub­
ject to possible food blackmail by the tribes controlling the routes 
leading inland from the coast. Grain for the soldiers and Bedouins 
there was in short supply by 1886.3 
So great was the authority of O s m a n by 1885 that he could 
dispose of all his enemies. The ka immakam of Jidda for the pre­
vious two years, Said Fehmi Bey, w h  o had been reporting criticism 
of O s m a n to Istanbul directly in cipher, was arrested and dis­
missed. The Arab guards of the amir, including those w h  o had 
been used to guard the Jidda-Mecca route, were disarmed and dis­
banded; Ottoman soldiers replaced them. Robbers were summar­
ily shot, blockhouses were built, and the head of one bandit, a 
sharif, was displayed at Mecca. Robberies decreased dramatically. 
The amir's legal jurisdiction was narrowed by the vali. 
O s m a  n then proposed the establishment of a local municipal 
organization in Mecca with two sheikhs and an i m a m for each 
quarter. This served as a rallying point for his opponents, w h  o be­
gan public protests. Placards appeared calling for the dismissal or 
murder of the vali on the grounds that he intended the n e w offi­
cials to conduct a census preparatory to the introduction of taxa­
tion and conscription in the holy city. The amir, scenting the 
possibility of getting rid of his rival,finally openly opposed the vali. 
A w  n al-Rafiq accompanied the returning pilgrims to Medina in 
1886 and announced there that he would not return to Mecca until 
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either he or O s m a n was dismissed. The amir was accompanied by 
member  s of his family, m a n  y notables and merchants, the Shafii 
mufti of Mecca, and a number of the ulema. Even though O s m a n 
enjoyed the protection of the head of the Istanbul palace eunuchs, 
he could not overcome this public split. The amir used to telling 
effect the recurrence of trouble with the Harb, w h o  , according to 
the amir, were not being paid by the vali; a petition by notables 
alleging that the vali engaged in torture and did not pay their salar­
ies; and the influence of Sheikh A h m a  d Asad, the amir's father-in­
law, w h o was a religious adviser to the sultan.4 O s m a n was reas­
signed to the governorship of the Aleppo Vilayet, a transfer that was 
in fact a promotion. The amir returned triumphant to Mecca, and 
centralizing reform seemed to be at an end in the Hijaz. 
Mecca and Jidda were in turmoil, but Medina remained rela­
tively calm in the 1880s. From 1878 to 1889, there were only two 
sheikhs of the Medina Haram and only four governors of the city. 
In the same period, Jidda had eight kaimmakams. Their rapid 
ouster was due in part to their perpetual opposition to the valis. 
Several also fell because their patrons in Istanbul were dismissed, 
and the appalling climate of Jidda claimed two victims through 
death from illness. The prior experience of the kaimmakams usu­
ally was in the European or Anatolian provinces and not in the Arab 
lands. Although consultative councils were created for the vilayet 
and for the major towns in the 1870s, they had small influence in 
government. W h e  n pressed by demands from external sources, 
such as the Jidda consulates, the valis in the Hijaz as in Syria used 
the n e w councils as a means of delaying distasteful decisions or 
spreading responsibility a m o n g a wide group of people. N o real 
changes that outlasted O s m a  n Pasha took place in the administra­
tion of the smaller towns, villages, or tribes. 
Amir A w n al-Rafiq adopted a n e w style of dress and behavior. 
H  e substituted relatively plain attire for the gaudy dress of his pre­
decessors, and he tended to transact business in private meetings 
rather than in the public receptions that had been used for that 
purpose earlier. A w  n al-Rafiq was able to convey an image of pious 
perspicacity while instituting his o w n control over more and more 
of the political process in the Hijaz. Beneath the superficial 
changes he introduced, there was the deeper reality of a return to 
the old compromise of the amir and vali governing the Hijaz to­
gether. 
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THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER, 1886-95 
Amir A w  n al-Rafiq eliminated or weakened his enemies and 
evolved by the 1890s a comfortable working relationship with the 
sultan and his representative, the vali, in the Hijaz. A w  n al-Rafiq 
used the pilgrimage and his religious status to gain enough m o n e y 
to bribe officials, nomads, and notables. Though his position was 
by no means completely secure, he could manage to defuse any 
incident. H  e kept control through his power of appointment and 
recommendation to the chief religious, social, and economic po­
sitions in Mecca. At the same time, he had b e c o m e so unpopular 
by his death in 1905 because of his extortions that the suspicious 
sultan did not have to worry about him as a rival for the caliphate. 
The amir's performance in those areas crucial to the Hijazis and to 
the Ottomans was at least minimally satisfactory: security was 
maintained; the tribes were frequently on the verge of insurrection 
but were not usually actual dangers; the pilgrimages took place 
with little trouble, except for increasing cholera epidemics in the 
early 1890s; and Islam remained dominant in all aspects of life in 
the towns. The amir's authority rested on a religious base, but the 
pious were apparently not severely shocked by the large-scale brib­
ery,fraud, and extortion of the pilgrims practiced by him. 
In December 1886 the amir was delighted by the dismissal of 
Vali O s m a n Nuri. From then until Ahmet Ratib Pasha became gov­
ernor for the second time in July 1895, there were seven interven­
ing governorships, or about one vali per year. Obviously, in the 
short time available to them, the valis were not able successfully to 
challenge the amir A w  n al-Rafiq, w h  o had held his post since 1882. 
Thefirst of these valis, Huseyin Cemil, former governor of 
Aleppo, resigned because of ill health after onlyfive months in the 
Hijaz. The next, Safvet, w h  o had been vali once before, lasted an 
even shorter time. Nafiz Pasha arrived in 1889 with explicit instruc­
tions from the sultan to prepare plans for increasing the military 
and naval readiness of the Hijaz against foreign attack. Nafiz was 
informed that the problems of the Sudan across the Red Sea were 
dangerous for the Hijaz, but even more pressing was the failure in 
the past to pay the troops and to discharge them at the end of their 
terms of service. The only local internal political difficulty might 
come , it was expected, from the sharifs. Nafiz was ordered to ob­
serve their activities secretly and report to Istanbul. In addition, he 
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was required to care for the pilgrims and particularly to provide 
camels for them at afixed price. The religious significance of the 
Hijaz to the sultan was greatly stressed.5 U p o n his arrival in Mecca, 
the vali began to carry out these instructions by stopping the ex­
actions by the amir upon the pilgrims. In response, the amir incited 
the Bedouins to cut the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Medina routes. 
Then the vali offended the ulema and nomads by emphasizing his 
commitment to the sultan's orders against the slave trade. And the 
unfortunate governor also inherited the problems caused by two 
years of drought. H  e forbade the export of animals, but, over­
whe lmed by the burden of his duties, hefinally sought refuge in 
Taif, leaving the qadi of Mecca to administer the vilayet as his dep­
uty. 
With the next vali, Ismail Hakki, came the rains. This auspi­
cious beginning for the former Ottoman minister of commerce 
was continued by a policy of caution and of dependence upon 
Istanbul for detailed orders before undertaking any action. As a re­
sult, Hakki lasted longer than his immediate predecessors, but the 
Hijaz rapidly fell into near anarchy as the tribes undertook raids 
against the caravan routes. In despair at this, Hakki asked for his 
o w  n replacement by the former vali O s m a  n Nuri. 
While the valis came and went, the amir was consolidating his 
o w n influence. By remorseless mulcting of the pilgrims, he gained 
large sums to be used for securing and extending his authority. 
O n e of thefirst examples of his maneuvering was the Quran scan­
dal of 1882. O s m a n Bey, thefirst secretary of the sultan, w h o was 
also related to the amir by marriage, owned a printing press in 
Istanbul. O s m a n sold A w n al-Rafiq 10,000 Qurans for T. L 2,500, 
and the amir forced each Javanese pilgrim to buy onefrom him 
until the Netherlands consul stopped him. The bookstores of 
Mecca were compelled to buy quantities of the Qurans at inflated 
prices. In 1888 U m a r Nasif, the amir's Jidda agent, desired to repeat 
this arrangement but in a more elaborate fashion. H e purchased 
10,000 more Qurans from O s m a n Bey and distributed them to the 
pilgrim guides, w h  o in turn required their pilgrims, even those 
w h  o were illiterate, to buy a copy at three times the current price 
for printed Qurans. The profits were then divided a m o n g the amir, 
the vali, the guides, and Nasif.6 
Another device to raise m o n e y came with the selection of a 
route for the major pilgrim caravans between Mecca and Medina 
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that would most profit the amir. Every year there was a discussion 
among the Syrian pilgrimage leaders coming from the north and 
among the pilgrims w h o were in Mecca w h o wanted to go to M e ­
dina about the land routes and the desirability of traveling by sea 
instead of by land. Sometimes Istanbul, the vali of Damascus, and 
the Hijaz leadership were consulted: in 1894 and 1895, the Hanafi 
and Shafii muftis of Medina, the governor of the city, several offi­
cials of the Haram, and the Syrian caravan leaders determined the 
route.7 O  n several occasions the amir tried to force the pilgrims to 
go by land rather than by sea because he had a financial stake in 
the rental of camels by the nomads to the pilgrims. Since the purely 
land route was longer, more dangerous, and more costly, the pil­
grims and their consuls usually tried to arrange for the Mecca-
Jidda-Yanbu-Medina sea passage rather than that by land. W h e  n the 
amir and the valis embezzled m u c h of the subsidy that was due the 
nomads for protecting the land route, the Bedouins attacked the 
caravans as they traveled on land between the major towns. 
The amir's power was contested in the deserts by tribes w h  o 
were unsatisfied with the arrangement for revenue-sharing worked 
out by the amir and the valis. Bedouin payments were m a d e in 
notes that had to be sold at a substantial discount, sometimes as 
m u c h as one-half, in order to gain cash to buy supplies. A note 
entitling the bearer to one ardeb of wheat was worth only one-half 
of the actual market cost of an ardeb. The drought and locusts of 
1887-89 increased the needs of the tribes; at the same time, Otto­
m a n troops were weak and poorly equipped to overawe the no­
mads. High troop mortality rates were m a d e even higher by the 
corruption rampant a m o n  g Hijazi officials responsible for supplies. 
The amir could supply some m e n from his o w n retinue and, on 
occasion, could secure allies from a m o n  g the tribes, but the Otto­
man-amirate forces were insufficient to hold most parts of the re­
gion against large-scale or determined opposition. 
Sultan Abdulhamid recognized that the amir's influence had 
to be expanded to the north of Mecca, but he ordered the grand 
vezir to go slowly; the safety of the pilgrims then in the Hijaz and 
the concern of the foreign states for their welfare meant that little 
could be done in the short run except to promise the nomads that 
their payments would be m a d e more equitably in the future." The 
amir concluded an arrangement with the nomads whereby they 
received a cash payment for their runaway slaves, blood m o n e  y for 
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their losses in recent fighting and raids, and a promise that in the 
future refugee slaves would not be harbored in Jidda. Booty seized 
in caravan raids did not have to be returned. This extraordinary 
concession was opposed by the vali, but he was dismissed and re­
placed by the formidable O s m a n Nuri in the s u m m e r of 1892. 
The return of O s m a n for a second tour as vali led all the tribes 
to submit out of fear of his vengeance. The reinforcements of 5,000 
troops w h  o came with him also ensured the restoration of order, 
but O s m a n stayed only six months before departing again. H e sub­
sequently became vali of Damascus. 
In addition to the nomads, A w  n al-Rafiq was opposed by the 
notables of Jidda and Mecca, including m a n y sharifs w h o peti­
tioned the sultan asking for the amir's dismissal in 1891-92. In­
stead, two commissions were sent to investigate their charges of 
embezzlement of waqfs, oppression, and persecution. 
The commissions were led by Ahmet Ratib Pasha, an imperial 
aide-de-camp and naval officer, w h o was also ordered to look into 
the condition of the military. Ratib had been present in the Hijaz 
during the end of Ismail Hakki's governorship and again in the 
short second term of O s m a n ; in December 1892 Ratib himself be­
came vali and commander of the military forces, a post he held 
until June 1894. Although he k n e w no foreign languages, Ratib had 
traveled twice to India, and while there he became strongly anti-
British. H  e enjoyed the confidence of the sultan. During his inves­
tigations before assuming the governorship of the Hijaz, A w  n al-
Rafiq gave him a bribe of at least T. L 14,000 to ignore the notables' 
complaints and to himself complain against the alleged meddling 
of the vali in the amir's affairs. It was at Ratib's urging that Vali Os-
m a  n was dismissed and Ratib was appointed governor.9 
The ideological base of Ottoman rule was m a d e clear in a 
speech written for Ratib by the imperial palace to give to soldiers 
in the Hijaz. In his talk he was to urge the soldiers of Islam to re­
m e m b e r that the sultan, w h o was also the successor to the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d  , wished for the best for his always victorious troops. 
They were to fight under a banner bearing the declaration of faith 
in the oneness of G o d and the prophethood of M u h a m m a d . The 
sultan in turn acknowledged his obligation to the whole Islamic 
world to protect the two Harams. Ratib was ordered to remind 
troops that service in the Hijaz carried with it the privilege of a 
reduction of one-third in the required years of army service, but it 
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also carried with it an obligation of strict loyalty to the sultan-cal­
iph's orders.l0 
Declining health conditions m a d  e these pronouncements 
seem somewhat beside the point. In 1894 Field Marshal Asaf Pasha 
arrived in Jidda with T. L 40,000 and a staff of 150 to build hospitals 
and investigate the health of the Hijaz. Both A w  n al-Rafiq and Ratib 
were suspicious of him and brought about his rapid return to Istan­
bul. Before going, he was able to bring about the dismissal of Ratib 
on the grounds that he had not done enough to stop the cholera 
epidemics. Ratib objected that there had not been enough m o n e y 
to carry out the military, religious, and health requirements obli­
gated by Istanbul. 
The n e w vali, Hasan Hilmi Pasha, had formerly governed 
Konya Vilayet. H e was weakened by not being given the c o m m a n d 
of the troops in the Hijaz. After making the pilgrimage, Hasan left 
sweltering Mecca for the relative coolness of Taif. The provincial 
treasurer and the amir were left in charge of the government as 
Hasan pled ill health. H e did, however, force the amir to end some 
of his more flagrant extortions of the pilgrims. 
The Jidda kaimmakamate provided no alternative source of 
administrative energy or policy. Most of its occupants between 
1888 and 1899 were former members of the valis' staffs, and they 
held office for only short periods of time. 
Power gravitated to the amir. His distance from Jidda and his 
lack of concern about health matters created a situation, however, 
where there was no effective leader available to help stop the 
spread of cholera or to quell the growing tensions in Jidda relating 
to health issues. W h e n the sultan ordered Asaf Pasha, the one m a n 
with enough rank and authority to act, back to Istanbul, a crisis 
occurred. 
THE CRISIS OF 1895 
Numerous epidemics of cholera after 1832 led to the creation 
by the European powers of the Sanitary Administration of Egypt at 
Alexandria and the Health Council of Constantinople, two quar­
antine stations for pilgrims at Tor and Kamaran in the Red Sea, and 
the annual sending of an Ottoman medical mission to the Hijaz.'' 
The Ottoman government rejected m u c h of the attempted Euro­
pean intervention in the Hijaz on the grounds that diseases were 
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being carried to Mecca from abroad, where they had begun. If this 
view of the origins of cholera had been correct, then quarantine 
measures outside the Hijaz would have been more valuable than 
improving the cleanliness and water systems of Jidda, Mecca, and 
Arafat. The Ottoman delegate to the Paris Convention of 1894 re­
fused to sign itsfinal health agreement on the pilgrimage because 
it would have given an internationally controlled body supervision 
over the pilgrimage. 
The health situation in the Hijaz from 1890 to 1895 indicated 
that urgent measures to improve the safety of the pilgrims needed 
to be undertaken by someone, whether Europeans or Ottomans. 
Cholera broke out four times in six years: 1890, 1891, 1893, and 
1895. In 1890 an estimated two thousand people died in Jidda from 
cholera, yet the Ottoman authorities seemed unconcerned. The 
French consul saw pilgrims struck by disease outside the town 
dragging themselves near the walls to die. The sick died without 
care. In 1891 the medical vice-consul of Britain at Jidda, Dr. Abdur 
Razzack, brought about some improvement in the cleanliness of 
Jidda, but the vali rejected protests about the dirtiness andfilth in 
Mecca's streets only two weeks before a major cholera outbreak 
took place there. In the extreme heat of the pilgrimage in July and 
August of that year, w h e  n the temperature at Arafat reached 48° C  , 
casualties from cholera alone were 3,100. The lazaret in Jidda func­
tioned so poorly during the epidemic of 1893 that the pilgrims 
were completely without medical assistance, and more than one 
thousand died that year at Mecca. In 1894 doctors from the Otto­
m a n army and navy w h o inspected the health of Mecca proposed 
a ban on the drinking of water from Z a m z a m , which they consid­
ered a source of disease, and the establishment of two disinfecting 
machines to cleanse the property and clothes of the pilgrims. Eu­
ropean consuls supported these proposals strongly. Amir A w  n al-
Rafiq, w h  o controlled access to the Z a m z a  m well, vetoed the first 
proposal, but the disinfectant machines were set up in Mecca and 
Jidda in M a y 1894, and were used in the relatively mild cholera 
attack of April 1895. 
Popular reaction a m o n  g Jiddawis to these health measures 
was extremely negative. It was observed that those w h  o used the 
hospital and the disinfecting mechanismsfrequently died; people 
in Jidda argued that it was a case of cause and effect. This post hoc 
ergo propter hoc logic was not completely invalid, given the 
COMPROMISE GOVERNMENT, 1883-1908 197 
wretched conditions of the hospital and, in general, most quaran­
tine facilities. Unhappiness with the Europeans grew as most of the 
Ottoman garrison of Jidda and the ka immakam went to Mecca on 
28 May for the pilgrimage. Only aboutfifty soldiers were left in 
Jidda. 
O n the evening of 30 M a y 1895, William Richards and Dr. Ab­
dur Razzack, the British consul and vice-consul, George Brandt, the 
acting Russian consul, and C . Dorville, the chancellor of the French 
consulate, were sitting on a bench just outside Jidda near the M e ­
dina gate. They were attacked and shot. Abdur Razzack was killed, 
Brandt was seriously wounded, and Richards and Dorville were 
lightly wounded. O n the same day in Mecca, a disinfecting m a ­
chine was completely destroyed and the building in which it was 
housed was torn apart by Utaybah Bedouins and Meccans. T w  o 
days later the Mecca hospital was attacked, and the hospital's doc­
tors fled, some in disguise. The vali forbade the use of troops 
against the rioters because he objected to bloodshed in the area of 
the Haram. Then the disinfection machine in Jidda was destroyed 
by Bukharan pilgrims; the medical inspectors there also fled, in 
this case to vessels in the harbor. T w  o doctors at Taif also disap­
peared because they feared for their lives.12 
Catching those w h  o had attacked the consuls was a frustrating 
problem. The real attackers had fled by camel and seemed beyond 
the reach of the vali, w h  o felt that the attack had been a case of 
mistaken identity—the Bedouins had thought those they were as­
saulting were quarantine doctors, not consuls. The commander of 
the Ottoman Red Seafleet joined the European and local Muslim 
mourners for the funeral of Abdur Razzack. In Paris the Ottoman 
ambassador to France expressed official regret at the attack. More 
troops were ordered to Jidda to ensure order. 
None of these measures satisfied the British or French, w h  o 
sent warships to Jidda. Since the ka immakam of Jidda had returned 
from Mecca with 700 more soldiers, the threat of further violence 
in Jidda was ended, but the punishment of the attackers remained. 
The amir said that they were members of the Sahhaf section of the 
Harb tribe. Instead of proceeding against the Harb, Vali Hasan 
Hilmi went to Taif, citing his health as the reason for delay. The vali 
did order the construction of the Jidda hospital stopped, the streets 
patrolled, and the walls guarded, but most of the European com­
munity of Jiddafled to vessels in the harbor anyway. Istanbul dis­
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missed the vali and appointed, for the second time, A h m e  d Ratib 
Pasha as vali on 20 June.13 
As soon as the grand vezir in Istanbul heard about the attack, 
he ordered the amir and vali to go to Jidda and reestablish order 
with troops from Y e m e n . The sultan warned the two leaders of the 
Hijaz that foreign military intervention was likely; it could be 
stopped only by the reestablishment of security in Jidda. Sultan Ab­
dulhamid especially cited the loss of Ottoman prestige that might 
ensue from foreign intervention during the pilgrimage season.14 
The amir arrived in Jidda on 10 June and promised to attack 
the Sahhaf after the pilgrimage. But as the weeks slipped by, it be­
came clear that A w n al-Rafiq intended to do as little as was possi­
ble. Acting consul Alban suggested to his ambassador that the 
dismissal of the amir by the sultan was the only way to secure jus­
tice. Alban suspected that the amir was paying off old scores by 
falsely accusing the Sahhaf. It was even suggested that the amir and 
the vali, w h  o had both quarreled repeatedly with Abdur Razzack, 
had instigated the attack upon the vice-consul. 
In September foreign pressure for action increased. The Brit­
ish ambassador argued that responsibility for the attack should rest 
with the vali. The amir had no standing in international diplomacy, 
and, more importantly, he could not be pressured as easily as the 
vali. The dismissal of the k a i m m a k a m of Jidda and his replacement 
by the active and energetic Sami Bey, the Ottoman naval com­
mander of the Red Sea squadron, seemed to indicate that foreign 
pressure was beginning to work. O  n 20 September the sultan in­
formed Ambassador Currie that the vali had received T. L 4,000 to 
give to the tribal sheikhs so as to secure the guilty persons. Currie 
responded by suggesting that the amir had had a hand in the mur­
ders; this was rejected by the sultan, w h  o argued that it was the 
amir w h  o was the chief maintainer of law and order and therefore 
he could not have done such a thing! France also threatened the 
Ottomans. She unofficially suggested that the great powers might 
jointly act to internationalize Jidda if the killers were not soon pun­
ished.IS 
The consequences of all these threats were minimal. The amir 
did offer to give the Harb three sharifs as hostages to guarantee a 
fair trial for the accused. This offer was rejected by the Sahhaf, w h  o 
pointed out that sharifs could not be injured because of their reli­
gious status; in the event that the amir broke his word, the hostages 
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could not be punished. Instead, the Sahhaf asked for the amir's 
secretary as a hostage. This time the amir refused the deal. 
More Ottoman troops were sent to the Hijaz: there were 4,000 
m o r e there by January 1896. T h e amir obtained m e n from the Utay­
bah and other tribes to march against the Sahhaf, w h  o were raiding 
the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Medina paths from their base at Asfan. 
Utaybah cooperation w a  s not purely voluntary; several of their 
sheikhs had been arrested in Mecca by the amir so as to apply pres­
sure upon the tribe to participate in action against the Sahhaf. T h e 
same tactic w a s used in Jidda, where sheikhs of the Harb clans 
other than the Sahhaf were arrested in October and N o v e m b e r 
1895. Supplies and subventions to the Bedouins were stopped 
until they joined the amir's planned expedition, and as a result, 
security for caravans w a s greatly lessened.16 T h e campaign against 
the Sahhaf that finally took place w a s desultory and accomplished 
little. 
T h e consequences of the 1895 attack were extremely unsatis­
factory from the foreign point of view. British and French pressure 
upon the vali w a s weakened in March 1896 by the withdrawal of 
the warships at Jidda that had been present since June 1895. T h e 
few Bedouin prisoners w h o had been held by the amir as a m e a n s 
of exerting pressure on the Harb were released in April 1896 so as 
to m a k e possible camel leasing for the upcoming pilgrimage. 
Both the French and British consuls unsuccessfully called for 
the removal of the amir and vali. Alban attacked Vali Ratib Pasha: 
I have had some experience of good, bad and indifferent Turkish and 
Arab functionaries, but I have never I think met one w h  o displayed in­
capacity, dishonesty, official discourtesy and unblushing mendacity in a 
more striking degree than A h m e d Ratib Pasha, and in saying this I a m 
not in anyway exceeding the popular estimate of his character.1" 
The French consul asked that as compensation for the attacks 
the amir should be fired, the Bedouins disarmed, the consuls 
ought to nominate the pilgrim guides, a railroad concession for the 
Jidda-Mecca route should be given, and Muslim vice-consuls for 
Mecca should be appointed.18 None of these extraordinary sugges­
tions was in fact adopted by the French government. More to the 
point, the vali and the amir, w h o had done so little to catch the 
attackers, stayed in office for many years. A w n al-Rafiq remained as 
amir until his death in 1905, and Ratib was vali until the 1908 Rev­
olution. After 1895 the two leaders established a close cooperation. 
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Politically, little changed as a result of the 1895 attack. Halil 
Rifat Pasha became Ottoman grand vezir precisely because he ad­
vocated not giving in to foreign pressures. The n e w kaimmakam of 
Jidda, O m e  r Ali Bey, served only from October 1895 to July 1896, 
w h e n he was recalled because of poor health, the enmity of Ad­
miral Sami Pasha, and the dislike of the vali founded on Omer's 
good relations with the consuls. 
Security along the Medina-Mecca and Jidda-Mecca routes re­
mained poor in 1896. O n e could go from Mecca to Taif in late 1896 
only by paying for a Harb escort. The leading robbers on the Jidda-
Mecca path were the Sahhaf, w h  o had been accused by the amir of 
murdering Abdur Razzack. Ottoman punishment of them ex­
tended only to withholding their usual subventions. 
In subsequent years attacks on sanitary facilities continued. 
Bedouin camel-drivers attacked the Yanbu military hospital, which 
contained a disinfecting machine, claiming that the disinfectants 
were designed to kill people. Nine died in the ensuing riot in 1896. 
Three years later, a quarantine at Jidda and disinfection measures 
against the plague caused a riot by 1,500 Jiddawis. Bedouins, 
camel-drivers, soldiers, and w o m e  n attacked the quarantine yard 
and seized the goods stored there because a quarantine would 
have severely damaged the success of the impending pilgrimage 
and thereby the economic well-being of Jidda. The consuls, w h o 
doubted the efficacy of the quarantine measures, successfully 
sought the intervention of their ambassadors in Istanbul to reopen 
passage from Jidda to Mecca, thereby ending the rioting and tur­
moil. 
Despite these problems, public health in Jidda and Mecca did 
improve in the late 1890s. The cause was the active and public sup­
port for cleaning the streets and disinfecting houses by Ab  d Allah 
Nasif, w h o allowed his house to be disinfected; and by the n e w 
ka immakam of Jidda, w h o spent honestly a good deal of m o n e y for 
that process. The ka immakam appointed a committee composed 
of six local notables, headed by the judge of the Jidda commercial 
court, to supervise the cleaning of water cisterns, streets, and build­
ings. In this way the notables of Jidda secured what foreign and 
Ottoman doctors could not: public tolerance for health measures. 
FOREIGN AND REGIONAL INTERESTS 
Sultan Abdulhamid II was greatly worried about the growing 
intervention of Europe in his empire during the nineteenth cen­
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tury. H  e blamed nationalist revolts on outside agitators. In Arabia 
he saw Great Britain as the chief problem, for it ruled, or had great 
influence over, nearby Egypt and most of the eastern and southern 
coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. His emissary in Egypt, Gazi A h m e  d 
Muhtar, reinforced his suspicious attitude by describing alleged 
British plots to destroy Ottoman dominion on the western shore 
of Arabia.19 In light of the eventual emergence of the British-sup­
ported Arab revolt in 1916 led by the Amir Husayn against the Ot­
toman Empire, it might have been plausibly argued that the sultan 
was correct in the 1890s and 1900s. But in fact Britain was then 
opposed to any expansion of influence in the Hijaz because of Brit­
ish fears of the religious reaction this might cause a m o n  g Muslims 
in its o w  n possessions. 
Undoubtedly 1879 had been the high-water mark of British 
political influence in the Hijaz. In that year both the amir and the 
vali secretly asked for British aid and assistance. Amir Husayn re­
layed to the British a letter from Shir Ali, of Kabul, in which the 
latter asked for the blessings of the amir for a rising of Muslims in 
India against the British. The amir refused on the grounds that his 
master, the sultan, had friendly relations with Great Britain. In ad­
dition to divulging this correspondence, the amir promised to aid 
the British secretly, though he would do so only as long as nothing 
was done contrary to the interests of the sultan. In 1879 Vali Nashid 
Pasha asked the British consul to write his ambassador in Istanbul 
to urge the Ottoman government to send troops to the Hijaz and 
to undertake reforms there. 
Abdulhamid was so suspicious of the British and the amir that 
he ordered O s m a n Pasha, the n e w vali, to be on the alert against 
the Hijazi tribes w h o were allegedly being subverted by bribes 
from the British. The sultan's suspicions were heightened by Jamal 
al-Din "al-Afghani," w h  o suggested in 1883 that Great Britain 
wanted to establish an Arabian caliphate based at Mecca. In 1891 
the sultan asked the vali of the Hijaz if it was true that the amir was 
conspiring with the British to revolt against Ottoman authority. In 
1900 a book published in Egypt presented the most amazing of all 
these suggestions of conspiracy. According to the author, A b  d al-
R a h m a n al-Kawakibi, a convention whose purpose was the reno­
vation of Islam had been held in Mecca recently. The delegates to 
the convention were strongly anti-Ottoman, and favored an Arab 
caliphate. The account was recognized at the time as being fiction, 
but it caused speculation about Arab separatism in the Hijaz to ap­
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pear for years thereafter. There seems to have been no foundation 
in fact for suspicions of the loyalty of the amirs of Mecca. Despite 
his suspicions the sultan retained A w  n al-Rafiq as amir; his long 
rule sufficiently indicated Istanbul's continuing support. 
If the British were disinclined to interfere in the Hijaz, despite 
the Ottoman perception to the contrary, other European states had 
even less interest in doing so. France's chief concern was to gather 
intelligence from pilgrims about opposition to its rule in other 
Muslim areas, and the French maintained agents in Jidda and 
Mecca for this purpose. Germany, Russia, and Austria m a d e no ef­
fort to exert any political influence in the Hijaz. 
A crisis might well have occurred involving Egypt w h e  n that 
country's government under the control of A h m a d Urabi was 
crushed by the British invasion of 1882. In Damascus the ouster of 
Urabi was vigorously protested by the local ulema, and the Otto­
m a n army was mobilized to suppress popular discontent.20 Urabi 
had sent a letter to the amir of the Hijaz; unfortunately, its contents 
are unknown. There was s o m e popular enthusiasm for Urabi, es­
pecially a m o n  g the Khalwatiyah Sufis; but despite the fears of the 
consuls in Jidda, there were no riots or anti-foreign incidents fol­
lowing upon his arrest and exile. Because of the changed situation 
in the Red Sea, the Ottomans did send additional naval and army 
units to the Hijaz. 
More serious for the Hijaz was the uprising in the Sudan 
against Egyptian control. The Sudan was directly across the Red Sea 
from the Hijaz, there were m a n y Hijazi merchants w h o traded with 
the Sudan regularly, and part of the Sudan had recently been under 
the administration of the Hijaz. In 1881 M u h a m m a d A h m a d ibn 
Abd Allah declared in the Sudan that he was the expected mahdi. 
The Ottoman government ordered the vali of the Hijaz to take spe­
cial precautions against mahdist agitation. In December 1882 three 
mahdists were arrested in Medina. The police, w h o were searching 
houses for more suspects, were met by the resentful householders 
with the question, "Are you Muslims?" The three emissaries of the 
mahdi had to be released because of popular insistence. S o m e Hi­
jazis even volunteered and fought for the mahdi in the Sudan. The 
theological students in Mecca were strongly in favor of the mahdi 
in 1884, and Hijazi merchants objected to the British blockade of 
the Sudan that began in 1885. 
The success of the Sudanese mahdists against the Egyptians 
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ensured the continuing presence of the movement in the Hijaz. In 
1888 about two hundred Sudanese mahdists landed north of Jidda, 
but Ottoman troops captured one hundredfifty of them and sent 
them back to the Sudan before they could rouse the nomadic tribes 
of the Hijaz to rebellion. Subsequently, Istanbul announced that it 
intended to double the size of the garrisons in the Hijaz and to 
rebuild the walls of Jidda. 
The main branch of the Mirghaniyah Sufi brotherhood in the 
Hijaz favored the British cause in the Sudan. In 1884 the leaders of 
the Mirghaniyah went to Suakin in order to persuade their follow­
ers in the area to actively oppose the mahdi. 
Although the mahdi and Urabi aroused s o m e popular enthu­
siasm and thus worry for the amir and vali, their primary concern 
with British-dominated Egypt lay in a completely different area. 
Egyptian troops continued to occupy small villages in the northern 
Hijaz lying along the route of the land pilgrimage from Cairo to 
Medina and Mecca, even after the general Egyptian withdrawal 
from the Hijaz in 1841. This occupation was clearly in defiance of 
the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant of 15 July 1840, 
which called for the complete withdrawal of Egyptian forces from 
Arabia. The passage of time had seemingly authenticated the Egyp­
tian presence until Vali O s m a  n Pasha discovered that n e  w barracks 
were being built by the Egyptians at Wajh. O s m a n wrote the grand 
vezir to suggest that the Hijaz extended up to Aqaba, and that Egypt 
had no right to station troops anywhere in the Hijaz. Nothing was 
done about this until 1887, w h e n 200 Ottoman troops arrived at 
Wajh and Egyptian troops left after a short confrontation. In 1892 
the Ottomans regained Muwaylih and Diba, and the khedive or­
dered the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from the Hijaz. 
The expansion of Ottoman interest in Y e m e n in the 1890s and 
1900s affected the neighboring Hijaz. The region of Y e m e n closest 
to the Hijaz, Asir, was the scene of continual unrest, including a 
general uprising against the Ottomans in 1902. Asir's capital, Abha, 
had to be evacuated by the Ottomans in 1903; it was recovered in 
1904, and lost again in 1905. Even though the amirs of Mecca were 
related by marriage to the Aid family, the amirs' pleas for peace and 
reconciliation were futile. The rise to power of M u h a m m a  d al-Id­
risi in Asir in 1906 posed a potential threat to the amirate, for his 
claim to power was based on a charismatic religious-political lead­
ership in rivalry with the amirs.21 
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In 1904 most of Y e m e  n rose against the Ottomans. Sana fell in 
April 1905. In that year more than 55,000 Ottoman troops landed 
in Y e m e n to suppress the revolt. T w o missions were sent by the 
amir of Mecca to try to reconcile the i m a m to the sultan's rule. Al­
though thefirst mission in 1906 was courteously received by the 
imam, it failed in its purpose. The second mission consisted of 
ulema from Mecca and Medina, w h  o visited only Ottoman-held ter­
ritory and addressed their exhortations principally to the towns­
people of Sana. They achieved little.22 
The rise of A b d al-Aziz, the leader of the Saudi dynasty in Ri­
yadh, did not pose as immediate a threat to Ottoman interests as 
did thefighting in Y e m e n  . Still, the result of Saudi assertiveness in 
Najd was to draw in Ottoman regular troops in support of the Rash­
idis. Medina was used in 1904-5 as a military base for 2,500 Otto­
m a n infantry in Najd and Qasim, although most of the troops 
employed there came from Iraq. In 1906 Qasim and Najd were 
yielded to the Saudis because of their military victories.23 Ottoman 
dominion in central Arabia came to an end. Ottoman setbacks in 
Najd and Y e m e  n emphasized the importance of increasing the 
speed of military transportation—the completion of the Hijaz Rail­
road became even more important to Istanbul. Another conse­
quence of thefighting was the presence of political refugees in the 
Hijaz. 
The former amir of Bahrayn and his family took refuge in 
Mecca in the 1880s, and they received a small subsidy from the 
sultan. The descendants of the Caucasian leader Shamil were given 
pensions. A number of palace eunuchs and imperial concubines 
were sent to Medina and Mecca. Kurdish chieftains and Istanbul 
liberals were all held in Mecca and Medina so as to isolate them. 
Their dissents were of no consequence in the conservative and re­
ligious Hijaz, and they did not impress in any fashion pilgrims from 
abroad. 
PUBLIC SECURITY, 1896-1908 
The maintenance of a m i n i m u m of public order was a prereq­
uisite to remaining in power. War, robberies, army mutinies, and 
clashes with the Bedouins became the major problems confront­
ing the vali and amir. These problems did not raise the issue of 
social change associated with fear of the Christian foreigner that 
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had been responsible for the 1895 attacks. Unlike earlier periods, 
the same individuals were retained for long periods as amir, vali, 
and sheikh of the Haram in Medina. 
During the thirteen years following 1895, the Ottoman E m  ­
pire engaged in only one war: the brief conflict with Greece in 
1897 was quickly concluded by an Ottoman victory. The war posed 
no dangers to the Hijaz, since it was far distant from the scenes of 
fighting in the Balkans. The number of pilgrims declined not be­
cause of the war but because of fears about disease in Mecca. Pray­
ers were said in the towns for the victory of the sultan's armies. 
Greek citizens left Jidda, and freight rates increased because 
Greek flag vessels were no longer available; but otherwise no eco­
nomic consequences of the war were seen. The ka immakam of 
Jidda increased security and particularly kept a careful watch on the 
boatmen's guild so as to avoid any outbreaks of violence in the 
town. None took place. 
M u c h more dangerous to the peace of the Hijaz was the rela­
tionship of the amir and the vali with the Bedouins. In order to 
maintain themselves in office, enhance their o w  n influence, and 
enrich themselves, the chief officials responsible for relations with 
the Bedouins embezzled a substantial portion of the aid and sub­
sidies supposed to go to them. In turn the Bedouins from time to 
time rose against the government to secure funds, food, fodder, 
and guns. Perceived necessity on both sides led to constant 
clashes. The vali, the amir, and his agent at Jidda benefited even 
w h e n the Bedouins were paid, since they were usually given drafts 
rather than cash or food. These drafts were discounted by the sup­
ply officials and intermediaries, and the officers of the state were 
thus enriched. 
The easiest way for the nomads to recoup their losses was to 
raid pilgrim caravans. Between 1896 and 1898, the Jidda-Mecca 
route was raided constantly and caravans had to pay protection 
m o n e  y in order to pass. Robberies with seizure of all property and, 
more rarely, loss of life occurred. W h e  n foreign merchants were 
robbed, they asked their consuls in Jidda for compensation from 
the Ottoman governor. The vali in turn requested the amir to in­
vestigate these claims and, if possible, to recover the goods from 
the nomads. Although most claims were reduced, they ultimately 
were paid by the amir, even if after years of delay. 
The Ottoman military was not able successfully to oppose the 
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nomads. In the late 1890s, the permanent garrisons usually in­
cluded only 4,000 m e n . M a n y were withdrawn for emergencies 
elsewhere in the empire, and for those w h o remained there was a 
high rate of illness. M e n whose tour of duty had expired were still 
kept in the area; they sometimes secured their releasefrom the 
army by peaceful demonstrations. In the 1890s the Amir A w n al-
Rafiq and Vali A h m e  d Ratib witnessed a series of riots and strikes 
by soldiers protesting their poor conditions. In 1891 an infantry 
company that had already served one year beyond its term was in 
Jidda, where they seized a mosque that they held until promised 
their seven months' back pay, transport to Istanbul where they 
would be discharged, and the right to keep their weapons until 
they left the Hijaz. In the correspondence from Istanbul during a 
similar event in 1894, it was clearly shown that the palace under­
stood the problem and viewed it as being important. The reduc­
tion of one year in the standard tour of duty as a bonus for 
conscripts w h  o served in the Hijaz and their prompt payment were 
held to be especially important because misbehavior would be so 
visible to foreign Muslim pilgrims. Still, only temporary solutions 
were found, so there were recurrences of troop mutinies. 
In 1896 soldiers in Jidda seized the Akkash mosque in the ba­
zaar and demanded payment of their back salaries, their dismissal 
from the service, and return to their homes. These demands were 
granted after n e  w troops arrived in Jidda and after protests by the 
British embassy in Istanbul about the insecurity reigning in Jidda. 
The troops were poorly fed, housed, clothed, and paid. Medical 
facilities were lamentable. A n d there was little improvement over 
the years. In the 1900s soldiers even had to sell their rifles to the 
Bedouins to get enough m o n e y to eat! In 1901 more than one-half 
of the total 3,000 soldiers in the Hijaz had filled their time of ser­
vice and yet were still detained there. A mutiny that same year even 
led to the seizure of the Meccan Haram for two months to protest 
military conditions. Only w h e  n they received most of their back 
pay and were promised transport to Anatolia did the troops desist.24 
M o n e y and food for the soldiers were in very short supply in 
the 1890s and 1900s. The Ottomans provided more than 4,000,000 
okas of wheat and 2,000,000 okas of barley from Syria and Iraq in 
1892/93, most of which went to the military. The cost to the prov­
ince for its purchase, shipment, and transportation inland was itself 
a major item of expense. By 1898 the central government o w e d the 
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Hijaz more than T. L 67,000, and the vali was aware that military 
supplies were low. In 1899, according to Vali Ratib Pasha, the price 
of flour was up, the Bedouins had no grain, there was only a ten 
days' supply of fodder on hand for the armed forces' animals, the 
Jidda and Hudayda customs receipts had been used for local ad­
ministrative expenses, contractors refused to deliver supplies, and 
the customs workers had not been paid. As a result of the financial 
crisis, the Jidda garrison went for six weeks without receiving sup­
plies, and the price of bread in Mecca began to increase rapidly. 
The approaching pilgrimage season m a d e the arrival of food and 
m o n e y essential. Although the crisis then was ended, by 1903 the 
same problems had reemerged. N  o flour was available either for 
the small northern garrisons or the major ones in Jidda and Mecca. 
By 1904 Jidda merchants were owed more than T. L 10,000 for 
foodstuffs delivered to the armed forces but not paid for at the 
time. Money was being spent on the Hijaz Railroad, not on meeting 
the basic needs of the army in the region. 
W h e  n troops were present in large numbers, there was still no 
guarantee for merchants or pilgrims of immunity from attack. A 
600-camel caravan with eighty-five mounted soldiers was attacked 
in daylight only ten miles from Jidda in 1899. The Egyptian mahmal 
was attacked by the Utaybah, even though there were three 
hundred soldiers with it as guards. Since pilgrims preferred to 
travel during the cooler night hours, robberies were easier for the 
nomads, w h o could hide behind hills or in gullies under protec­
tion of the darkness before attacking the caravans. 
Fortunately for travelers, the amir and the vali were sometimes 
able to stop the raids. W h e  n absolutely necessary, the amir would 
buy peace by giving gifts to tribal leaders. Sometimes large n u m ­
bers of troops would temporarily overawe the nomads and thereby 
break blockades of towns. Bargaining, compromise, the exchange 
of hostages for good conduct, and the prospect of profits from 
camel rentals could be used by the amir to ensure temporary 
peace. Since the Bedouins wanted to buy goods in the towns, they 
had to be on reasonably good terms with the town authorities. 
Also, since the nomads did not coordinate their attacks, the amir 
was able to play off one tribe against another. 
The townspeople usually posed no serious threat to the se­
curity of the Ottomans, but fighting a m o n  g and between tribesmen 
sometimes broke out in the towns. In Mecca in 1897, the Hudhayl 
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and the Harb quarreled over camel thefts that had taken place; 
w h e  n the amir's agent refused to intervene, fighting led to the 
death of three Bedouins. This episode in turn m a d  e the leaders of 
the Syrian pilgrimage caravan anxious about the safety of the route 
going through Harb territory. The muftis of Medina, the guides of 
the caravan, and the officials of the Medina Haram urged the amir 
to allow them to take the eastern path, which was outside the Harb 
territory. 
In the decade of the 1900s, security on land deteriorated. In 
1901 the vali himself was attacked while traveling to Taif, and the 
governor of Medina was forced to journey via Rabigh rather than 
Yanbu to avoid trouble. Causes for the unusually numerous inci­
dents included the failure to pay full subsidies to the tribes, corrup­
tion a m o n g officials, feuding a m o n g the tribes, declining numbers 
of pilgrims in the late 1890s, less rain than was normal, and possi­
bly repercussions from troubles in Y e m e n  . T  o end the constant 
robberies, A w n al-Rafiq fired his deputy in Mecca and dismissed 
the governor of Taif. The amir then mobilized 1,000 Hudhayl 
tribesmen to attack robbers along the Jidda-Mecca route. In 1904 
an expedition by the Utaybah against the Harb, supported by the 
amir, failed. Other steps taken to reduce the violence included al­
lowing caravans to travel only by day, keeping Ottoman troops as 
unobtrusive as possible so as to minimize tension, and allocating 
freight-hauling to a different set of nomads in the Jidda area. These 
measures were only partially successful, since they did not deal 
with the basic causes of the robberies. The raids continued and 
even increased. 
O n  e example of the threats posed by the robbers took place 
in 1904 w h e n 400 Ottoman troops joined the Egyptian pilgrimage 
caravan that already had 180 Egyptian infantry, two cannons, and 
40 cavalry as protection. However, they were soon faced with 6,000 
nomads, w h  o demanded their back subsidies. Sultan Abdulhamid 
himself followed the ensuing negotiations closely, as did the Brit­
ish in Egypt. Ultimately, the caravan went to Medina by a different 
part of the desert so as to avoid the tribesmen. 
After the installation of the n e  w amir, Ali (r. 1905-8), robber­
ies decreased sharply. For instance, during the pilgrimage of 1906 
not one robbery of a British-Indian subject was reported. Tribal 
feuding at Mecca was stopped by the amir; Bedouins w h  o com­
mitted murder as part of blood revenge for a prior murder were 
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executed in Mecca by the n e w ruler. H e promised to pay in full, 
and promptly did so, the tribal subsidies as well as extracting thor­
ough and swift justice against lawbreakers. Successful pacification 
was also aided by increased rainfall in 1905. As a result,, the pil­
grimage routes became safer, the tribes were peaceful, and the 
number of pilgrims started to increase. 
POLITICS STABILIZED AND THEN THREATENED ANEW, 1896-1908 
Political stability created the preconditions for order in the 
governing of Medina and Jidda, the reorganization of local govern­
ment, the suppression of political enemies, and the relatively easy 
transfer of power in 1905 w h e n A w n al-Rafiq died. 
Political longevity in Mecca was m a d e possible by close con­
tacts and alliances with leading figures in Istanbul. M a n y of the sul­
tan's advisers were Arabs w h  o consciously promoted ties with the 
notables of the Arab provinces. Such relationships were mutually 
beneficial. The patrons in the capital provided information and ad­
vice to the provincials; w h e n the provincial leader fell from power, 
his patron would welcome him to Istanbul and do everything pos­
sible to restore him to imperial favor and influence. In return, the 
notables gave m o n e y and gifts to the patron and provided him with 
information on local conditions. 
Abdulhamid II was personally encouraging to Arabs w h  o 
sought high posts, for he considered Arabs to be natural leaders in 
the Pan-Islamic movement he was so assiduously fostering. The 
sultan's second secretary from 1880 to 1892 was Abd al-Qadir 
Qadri al-Qudsi, of Aleppo. A successor, A h m a  d Izzat Pasha al-Abid 
(1855-1924), of Syria, became a confidant of the sultan in the 
1890s. It was he w h  o persuaded the sultan to build the Hijaz Rail­
road. A h m a d Asad (d. 1906), w h o became an adviser to Abdul­
hamid, was born in Medina. H e held the honorary position of a 
sweeper at the Prophet's tomb and was also a leader in a Sufi order 
in Medina. Ahmad's daughter married a son of Amir A w  n al-Rafiq 
in 1896. Asad was alleged to have brought about the dismissal of 
one supervisor of the Medina Haram and competed for influence 
with M u h a m m a  d ibn Hasan A b  u al-Huda al-Sayyadi (1850-1909), 
the former naqib al-ashraf of Aleppo, w h  o tended to favor Ab  d al-
Muttalib's clan of the amirs. A b  u al-Huda with the approval of the 
sultan helped expand the Rifai Sufi order—three n e  w Rifai build­
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ings were established in Arabia by Abu al-Huda. M u h a m m a  d Zafir 
al-Madani, son of a distinguished Medina theologian, was a leader 
of the Shadhili Sufis in the Hijaz and in North Africa and an adviser 
to the sultan.25 These Arabs, plus the Hashimites living in Istanbul, 
provided the Hijazis with access to the corridors of power. 
In Medina the influence of Amir A w  n al-Rafiq was limited by 
the considerable authority of O s m a n Pasha, w h o was for most of 
the period 1891-1908 both sheikh of the Haram and governor 
(muhafiz) of the city. H  e was dismissed from office in 1898 be­
cause of bitter quarrels with Vali Ratib Pasha, but was reinstated 
after visiting Istanbul. O s m a n was a useful balance for the Otto­
mans against the vali and the amir, and was entitled to write di­
rectly to Istanbul rather than through the vali. Even though O s m a  n 
was incapable of resolving the crisis brought on by the imposition 
of a sanitary tax in Medina in 1903, he was reappointed as sheikh 
then. In 1904 soldiers blocked the entrances to the Haram as a 
means of enforcing their demands for ten months' back pay, and 
the Haram workers complained against O s m a n . At the demand of 
crowds of Medinans, Mufti O s m a n Daghistani asked the Medina 
consultative council to request the sultan to dismiss O s m a n  . Only 
the arrival of the Syrian pilgrimage guards rescued O s m a  n from 
virtual house arrest. But instead of dismissing O s m a n , Sultan Ab­
dulhamid sent 1,300 troops from Aqaba and Y e m e n . Once military 
strength was great enough and the coincidental mutinies in Jidda 
and Mecca were suppressed, the leaders of the Medina crowds and 
their highly placed official sympathizers were arrested. The qadi 
was exiled to Damascus, and 37 military officers were tried. The 
Medina garrison showed itself to be unreliable in times of crisis; it 
had intermarried with the local population and identified with it.26 
Despite the insurrection, O s m a n was kept as sheikh of the Haram 
until 1908. 
Jidda was governed by a series of kaimmakams from 1895 to 
1899; including acting governors, there were at least seven officials 
holding that post infive years. W h e n a ka immakam under the influ­
ence of the amir held office, the vali attempted to force his ouster, 
and vice versa. O  n one occasion the grand vezir and the minister 
of the interior could not agree on a candidate, causing delay and 
confusion. A w  n al-Rafiq placed his o w  n choice in the position of 
head of the municipality, but the struggle for control of the kaim­
makamate was w o n by the vali in August 1899, w h e n he secured 
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the appointment of Ali Yumni , w h  o remained in that post until 
1907. 
Ali, w h  o was b o  m in 1861 in Jidda, was the son of a liberated 
Ethiopian slave w h  o had been owned by an Ottoman official living 
in the Hijaz. Ali's mother was the daughter of an Egyptian silver­
smith. H  e grew up and was educated in the Hijaz, where he at­
tended the Meccan Ottoman school. H  e became an apprentice 
clerk in the provincial advisory council office and then a clerk in 
the Jidda customs, both jobs being the result of patronage appoint­
ments. Ali shared his father's alliance with the Nasif family of Jidda 
and his enmity toward Vali O s m a  n Nuri. Ali resigned from office 
twice w h e n O s m a n was governor of the Hijaz. In 1892 Ali became 
chief clerk for the advisory councils and chief Ottoman corre­
spondence clerk for the amir.27 His detailed knowledge of the Hijaz 
and of Ottoman administration, his amiability, and his willingness 
to go along with the duumvirate of the amir and the vali m a d e him 
a perfect compromise choice for the governorship of Jidda, and he 
was successful in most areas. H e repaired public buildings, rebuilt 
part of the town wall, and kept the streets of Jidda relatively clean 
of refuse. Insofar as Jidda's extremely limited revenues permitted, 
the town was maintained well. Neither the perpetual troop disor­
ders nor the insecurity of the Jidda-Mecca path were his responsi­
bility. His fall from power took place as the result of a quarrel with 
the vali over the division of the profits from camel rentals and from 
the shipping pool. Ali had received about T. L 1,000 per year, but 
in 1907 the vali proposed tofreeze him out of these lucrative op­
portunities for personal profit. After sending his family to Istanbul, 
Ali boarded a steamer at Jidda and then wired the vali his resigna­
tion. 
W h e  n even the vigorous measures of Ali Y u m n  i brought about 
only limited improvement in the services given by government to 
the people, it is easy to see w h  y the subunits of provincial govern­
ment were weak and w h y they had little impact. The organization 
of the administrative divisions of the Hijaz and the establishment 
of advisory councils meant little more than reshuffling of existing 
forms and officials. 
In the 1880s the provincial subdivisions, both the kazas and 
nahiyes, gained advisory councils. Taif and Yanbu in 1887-88 had 
councils both for the towns themselves as well as for the areas 
around them. Lit, Khaybar, Rabigh, Wajh, and Suwarqiyyah were 
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officially given regional governments in the 1880s and 1890s. Al-
Ula gained a regional government in the 1900s. At the provincial 
level, and even more so at the lower levels, the councils were 
merely devices by which the vali and the amir secured support for 
their o w  n wishes. 
The capital of the province had been officially changed from 
Jidda to Mecca, and it was indeed there that the vali usually resided. 
During the summers he lived in Taif; occasionally Ratib would visit 
Jidda, leaving the qadi of Mecca to act as vali in his absence. Both 
Ratib and A w  n al-Rafiq had deputies in Jidda to watch their per­
sonal interests. W h e  n the agents quarreled, so did their masters, 
usually over jurisdictional disputes. 
By 1907 the political structure in Mecca had become articu­
lated along functional lines, though the concentration of all real 
power in the hands of Ratib and the amir m a d e m u c h of the struc­
ture meaningless. Ratib was governor and commander of the 
ground forces. The qadi of Mecca and his deputies were chiefly 
responsible for justice, with the assistance of the Hanafi mufti and 
the police. More specialized functions werefilled by the following: 
the defterdar; the head of the clerks; the supervisor of imperial 
charities; the admiral commanding the Red Seafleet; the health 
commission; the commande  r of the gendarmerie; the provincial 
advisory council; the telegraph and post director; the guest house 
director; the government schoolteachers; and the hospital m a n  ­
ager. Mecca directly supervised the local government of Taif. The 
amirate was responsible for order in the Haram, the amir's o w n 
justice system, and various clerks and secretaries. Medina's Haram 
was under the control of O s m a n Pasha. Medina had its o w n qadi 
as well as separate treasuries for both the town and the Haram. The 
local government duplicated Mecca's, with officials for justice, the 
post office, hospitals, telegraph, and so forth. A census clerk was 
listed, though apparently no census was ever taken. Khaybar's gov­
ernor was directly controlled from Medina, and there were also 
local regional administrations for Yanbu, U m  m Lajj, Wajh, Aqaba, 
Suwarqiyyah, al-Ula, and Diba. Jidda was governed by the kaim­
m a k a m , w h o had basically the same staff with the same functions 
as the governor of Medina. In addition, Jidda had a more special­
ized court system, quarantine officials, a waqf supervisor, a govern­
ment storehouse supervisor, an inspector of markets, a passport 
officer, a representative of the tobacco monopoly and public debt 
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authority, tax collectors, and, most numerous of all, those e m ­
ployed by the government in the Jidda customs house facing the 
shore. The Jidda municipal council employed an engineer, street 
cleaners, police, doctors, and the port authorities. The Red Sea na­
val headquarters was in Jidda. Rabigh was controlled by Jidda; Lit 
had its o w  n local government.28 
Elaborate plans were drawn up at various times for the total 
reorganization of the administration of the Hijaz. In 1896, for in­
stance, the imperial council of ministers contributed detailed sug­
gestions for n e  w rules to direct the Hijazi civil service, advisory 
councils, and police. However, the plan was not put into effect. 
Gazi A h m e  d Muhtar Pasha, the sultan's representative in Egypt, 
noted in an official report that m a n  y of the amir's responsibilities 
could and should be transferred to the vali.29 Nothing came of this 
proposal because it was felt the pilgrims valued the amirate highly 
for its religious significance; to downgrade the amir might be likely 
to cause a reduction in the pilgrimage. Another probable reason 
for the absence of significant structural reform was the political 
strength in Istanbul of m e n tied by bonds of m o n e y and sympathy 
to the amir. Sultan Abdulhamid himself sent holograph letters pe­
riodically to the amir that indicated his esteem and regard. W h e  n 
investigative missions from Istanbul did arrive in the Hijaz, the 
members were bribed to report back that all was satisfactory and 
no changes needed to be m a d e . 
The long tenure of the amir and vali that m a d e the adminis­
tration relatively stable was also a result of the amir's local popu­
larity. H  e issued very popular sumptuary legislation in 1899 
designed to limit dowries and restrict lavish wedding ceremonies. 
A w  n al-Rafiq gained favor a m o n  g s o m  e of the pious by tearing 
d o w n saints tombs near Jidda, curbing s o m e Sufi ceremonies, 
eliminating the use of the term "sayyid" for those w h  o were not 
truly descendants of the Prophet, and clearing away buildings over­
looking the Haram. By a careful policy of favors, threats, and in­
trigue, he gained influence a m o n g the leaders of the nomads. 
Poems written in praise of him were published in Egypt. H e was 
also famous for his love of flowers and his gardens at Taif and 
Mecca, for which he imported trees from Syria and India. 
A w  n al-Rafiq built up a group of proteges w h  o felt their inter­
ests to be dependent upon his continued stay in power. These in­
cluded the m e m b e r  s of the Jidda shipping pool, the camel rental 
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monopoly, and the pilgrim guides. U m a r Nasif, in Jidda, w h o was 
the amir's busines agent, and M u h a m m a  d Ali, the amir's private 
secretary in Mecca, were intelligent, able, rich, and efficient. The 
inefficiency and possibly the foreigness of the Ottoman bureauc­
racy also accounted for m u c h of the power of the amir, w h o ruled 
in part by the default of the Ottomans. Both A w  n al-Rafiq and Ratib 
also punished their enemies in the Hijaz by arrest, long confine­
ments without trial, and exile. The carrot and the stick were used, 
generally with success, except a m o n g the nomads, w h o tended to 
regard the amir with distrust, hatred, and suspicion. 
The diabetic illness of A w  n al-Rafiq from 1903 to 1905 began 
a power struggle even before his death on 17 July 1905 at Taif 
opened the formal process of selection that lasted until October. 
The two chief rivals were A b d al-Ilah ibn M u h a m m a d and his 
nephew Ali ibn A b d Allah ibn M u h a m m a d (b. 1859/60). A b d al-
Ilah's case was weakened by his long absence from the Hijaz in 
Istanbul, his poor health, and his extreme age. Ali had held the 
rank of pasha since the death of his father, Amir Abd Allah, in 1877. 
More importantly, he had assisted his uncle A w  n al-Rafiq in the 
governing of Mecca. Vali Ratib actively supported the choice of Ali 
and m a d e him acting amir. Even though A b d al-Ilah was serving on 
the Ottoman council of state, the sultan disliked him personally. 
Finally, Ali was n a m e d amir with the rank of vezir.30 
In the three years of Ali's rule up to November 1908, he ac­
complished a great deal. Most of the personnel and policies of his 
uncle were retained, but by a more honest and efficient policy to­
ward the Bedouins, he reestablished order along the caravan 
routes and stopped most of the tribal raiding. 
Substantial changes were needed to ensure law and order. 
Thefirst step taken to increase Ottoman rule in the Hijaz was the 
construction of guardhouses between Jidda and Mecca. Military 
communications were quickened by building a telegraph line. A 
Damascus-Medina line via Muzeirib, Maan, and Madain Salih had 
been opened in late 1900 after rapid construction by the Ottoman 
military. Linkage of Medina to Jidda and of Mecca to Taif proved 
more difficult because of open opposition by the Bedouins and 
covert opposition by the amir. The Utaybah destroyed telegraph 
lines and poles near Mecca despite bribes to their sheikhs. A w  n al-
Rafiq's uncle, the amir of Taif, failed to reconcile the tribes there to 
the extension of the telegraph line. The centralization of authority 
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represented by the n e  w telegraph line posed a threat to the free-
d o  m of action of the amir. His outward support of the project con­
cealed an inner opposition to it. 
Even more of a clanger to the amirate came from the expan­
sion of the Ottoman railroad system south from Syria toward 
Mecca. In 1900 the sultan announced the intended construction of 
a railroad designed to link Damascus, Medina, Mecca, and Jidda. Its 
stated purpose was to promote the pilgrimage, but it was also in­
tended to decrease the independence of the amir of Mecca, in­
crease military capacity, and allow direct rule of the turbulent 
desert areas of south Syria and the Hijaz. Construction was slow 
because of inefficiencies in technology and manpower, but as so­
lutions to these problems were found and as m o n e y was m a d e 
abundantly available, the railroad tracks steadily reached south of 
Damascus toward the Hijaz. The Medina station was opened in 
1908. Publicly the amir favored the Hijaz Railroad as a religious 
project that would increase the number of pilgrims as well as their 
safety in travel. Privately, he m a d e sure that construction in the 
Jidda-Mecca area did not take place; for not only would the railroad 
overawe the nomads, it would likely enable the Ottoman central 
government to rule Mecca directly with no need for him in partic­
ular and for the amirate in general.31 
As the Hijaz Railroad reached closer and closer to Medina, the 
tribes in the area w h o had been hiring their camels to the pilgrims 
feared the loss of their livelihood. As a result, in 1908 there was an 
uprising of the tribes and large-scalefighting north of Medina. In 
response the Ottomans sent troops to crush the tribes; at the same 
time they increased payments to them. 
The opposition of the tribes to the Hijaz Railroad was deep-
rooted. F e w tribesmen were employed in its construction, main­
tenance, or operations. Instead, the enemies of the Bedouins, the 
Ottoman troops and Circassian guardsmen from A m m a n  , were 
used. As the railroad came south, the tribes feared it would lead to 
conscription, taxation, Ottoman justice, and direct government. T o 
overcome these well-founded fears, the Ottomans undertook a 
number of measures besides payments. They backed some tribes 
against others. The amirs of Mecca were reconciled, at least super­
ficially, by promises of autonomy and a delay in the extension of 
the line south of Medina. But once the railroad reached Medina in 
1908, a n e w age began locally. Troops could n o w be transported 
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rapidly and cheaply from Syria to the Hijaz, and the Bedouins lost 
their military superiority, at least in the territory close to the rail­
road tracks. 
Even more important for the Hijaz than the Hijaz Railroad was 
the constitutional revolt of 1908 that eventually ousted not only the 
incumbent sultan but led to an increase in the secularization of the 
empire and the final disappearance of it and the sultanate-caliphate 
following defeat in World W a r I. The year 1908 in the Hijaz also 
witnessed the beginning of the events leading to the Arab Revolt 
of 1916 and to the political independence of those Arab lands then 
part of the Ottoman Empire. 
F e w if any of these momentous developments were foreseen 
by the Hijazis w h e  n they finally learned of the military revolt that 
had forced Abdulhamid II to reinstitute the Constitution of 1876. 
The amir and vali had suppressed the news as long as possible. O n 
19 August 1908, military officers at Taif openly proclaimed the con­
stitution. They forced Amir Ali to swear on the Quran his loyalty to 
the n e w order, his acknowledgment of equality of sharifs with non­
sharifs, his pledge to stop illegal extortions from pilgrims, and his 
promise to attempt in the future to maintain the safety of the pil­
grimage routes. Ali blamed all problems on the vali and was al­
lowed to remain in office until November. There ensued public 
celebrations, oaths of loyalty to the constitution by the c o m m o  n 
soldiers and government employees, thefreeing of prisoners from 
Ottoman and amirate jails, andfreely voiced criticism of the vali 
and amir in Taif, Jidda, and Mecca. The vali, the c o m m a n d e r of 
troops, and the governor of Medina were arrested, and sympathiz­
ers of the constitutionalist movement took their places temporar­
ily, pending orders from Istanbul. Ratib was sent to Istanbul and 
ultimately was exiled. Another detained person, A b d al-Rahman 
Banaja, a prominent Jidda merchant, was released at the request of 
the Hadramawti community ofJidda.32 
Amir Ali secured petitions requesting his retention as amir, 
but he was dismissed anyway by orders from Istanbul. The initial 
nominee to be Ali's successor was A b d al-Ilah ibn M u h a m m a d , 
w h  o had resided in the capital since the accession to power of his 
brother A w n al-Rafiq in 1882. A b d al-Ilah served on the council of 
state, held the rank of vezir, and was the father-in-law of Abdulham­
id's chief secretary. These qualifications proved of no conse­
quence, for he died in Istanbul shortly after being n a m e d amir. The 
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choice for the n e w amir then became one between Husayn ibn Ali 
(1853/54-1931), of the D h a w u A w n , and Ali Haydar, of the D h a w u 
Zayd. Sultan Abdulhamid m a d e the choice, with no apparent role 
in the process given to the military leaders w h  o had precipitated 
the 1908 revolution. The sultan suspected that the military and the 
Committee of Union and Progress favored Ali Haydar, and for that 
reason Abdulhamid was inclined to n a m e Husayn. The latter's re­
ligiosity, his residence in Istanbul for some fifteen years, and his 
service on the council of state since 1896 also recommended him. 
H e was the nephew of the amirs A b d Allah, Husayn, A w n al-Rafiq, 
and Abd al-Ilah, and hisfirst wife had been Amir Abd Allah's daugh­
ter; Ali Haydar's clan had not held the post of amir since his grand­
father Abd al-Muttalib's brief tenure ended in 1882. The grand vezir 
also favored Husayn, w h  o was appointed officially on 1 November 
1908. Foreigners played no significant part in the choice of H u ­
33 sayn.
In addition to a n e w amir, a n e w vali was selected. Kazim 
Pasha (1839-1936) had been in charge of the construction of the 
Hijaz Railroad; his choice indicated a determination on the part of 
the regime to continue its construction in the Hijaz beyond Medina 
toward Mecca. N e w m e n were n a m e d to the governorships of M e ­
dina, Yanbu, and Jidda, and to be the sheikh of the Haram in M e  ­
dina. Local power in the Hijaz became uncertain: it was unclear 
whether ultimate authority lay with the amir, the Ottoman civil 
administration, or the local military branch of the Committee of 
Union and Progress. The committee was composed primarily of 
lieutenants and military physicians. Several higher officers and ci­
vilian notables joined it after the arrest of Ratib.34 Anti-committee 
riots in Mecca in November were suppressed, but the committee 
was shown to be unpopular. Elections for the Ottoman parliament 
were held, and the victors were a rich Jidda merchant, the Hanafi 
mufti of Mecca, a Medina sayyid, and one m e m b e r w h o resigned 
upon his election. Political and military centralization was applied 
by the central government in Syria to the north and Y e m e  n to the 
south. By 1908 the end was in sight for the style of government of 
A w  n al-Rafiq; his ally, Vali Ahmet Ratib Pasha; and his successor, Ali 
ibn Abd Allah (r. 1905-8). But the causes of the changes following 
1908 lay outside the Hijaz. The religious-political synthesis there 
had been stable, but it was threatened because the Hijaz was be­
coming part of the n e w international order created by the Euro­
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pean states and by the secular nationalism arising in Istanbul after 
1908. 
The arrival of Amir Husayn on 6 December 1908 marked the 
end of thefirst stage of the Ottoman revolution's effects, for he 
rapidly restored the power of the amirate, curbed the local com­
mittee, and began vigorously to oppose the extension of constitu­
tionalism and central control into the Hijaz. Instead of the Ottoman 
constitution, Husayn argued that the basic law of the Hijaz was and 
should be the Quran, the holy law of Islam, and the customs of the 
Prophet M u h a m m a d  . However, Husayn's local restoration of the 
old order was deceptive; the force of circumstances by World War 
I would compel Husayn to revolutionize the relationship between 
the Hijaz and the Ottoman Empire. The political-religious synthe­
sis that had prevailed between 1840 and 1908 had ended. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
R E L I G I O N D E T E R M I N E D the social, economic, and, to a lesser de­
gree, the political history of western Arabia in the nineteenth cen­
tury. Religion and religious values, the environment, and, of less 
importance, economic needs, the actions of rulers, and the increas­
ing interference of European states were the most important fac­
tors influencing the political and social history of the majority of 
Middle Eastern people in the nineteenth century. The primacy of 
religious institutions, leaders, and values in Hijazi social history is 
easily ascertained, but the role of religion in determining the limits 
of local political action is mor  e difficult to see. W h e  n situations of 
stress emerged, however, the determinative force of religion was 
clearly revealed. Even though a general spirit of conservatism, mi-
son detat, the idea of monarchy, and personal ambition were cru­
cial to politics in the Hijaz, the parameters of political behavior 
were set by the religious beliefs of the Hijazi townspeople. 
Elsewhere, in m u c h of the Ottoman Empire and more gener­
ally in the Middle East as a whole, secularizing nationalists gained 
ascendancy in the nineteenth century because of the perceived 
need to emulate the growing military power of industrial Europe. 
The Hijaz was unusually removed from the reach of domestic or 
foreign secularizers precisely because of the sanctity attached to its 
two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, its poverty, and the prestige 
conferred upon the Ottoman dynasty as protectors of the pilgrim­
age. 
Although the Hijaz was exceptional, its example shows that 
economic or nationalistic determinism are not sufficient to explain 
the configurations of Arab-Ottoman society in all cases. Even the 
more satisfying and flexible school of historical analysis centered 
on Fernand Braudel, w h  o has found ultimate causality in the phys­
ical environment and in cyclical economic change, has not dealt 
convincingly with areas such as the Hijaz because it underesti­
mates the importance of religion. 
Imperial structures based upon religion and dynasty have 
been misunderstood. In light of the numerous catastrophes in­
flicted upon the twentieth-century Middle East by nationalistic 
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states, the relative success of the Ottoman Empire's general poli­
cies and administration before 1908 n o w has become clear. The 
successes of the Ottomans from the perspective of the Muslim m a  ­
jority were seen in their sponsorship of Islam, the defense of the 
Muslim state against foreign and non-Muslim encroachment, the 
economic and social integration of the empire that was under way 
by the end of the nineteenth century, and the glory and stability 
provided by a six-hundred-year-old dynasty. In addition, Hijazis in 
particular welcomed Ottoman rule because of its financial bene­
fits, protection of the pilgrimage, and the small scale of local gov­
ernment. 
Ottoman problems consisted of the failure to implement rap­
idly economic and technological changes and, partially as a result, 
financial difficulties leading to bankruptcy in the 1870s and budge­
tary austerity thereafter. O  n the whole, however, Ottoman admin­
istration in the Hijaz between 1840 and 1908 was a success. The 
later separation of the Hijaz from the empire in 1916 was caused 
not by widespread and long-standing opposition a m o n  g the 
townspeople but rather by Amir Husayn's fear that he would lose 
local power, the opportunity presented by World W a r I, tribal op­
portunism, and the growing feeling that the empire could no 
longer protect the Middle East from European expansionism. 
Religion was so important in the Hijaz in part because of the 
lack of other bases for organizing society. The poverty of agricul­
ture and the inability of the nomads to organize a state contributed 
indirectly to a close linkage between religion and politics. Hijazis 
needed exterior help to be able to live in the towns, and this help 
was predicated upon the holiness of Mecca and Medina in Islam. 
The prestige of being called the servant of the two Harams was 
ample compensation to the Ottoman sultan for the expenses at­
tendant upon ruling western Arabia. 
Ottoman valis wanted to create the circumstances needed for 
the protection of the pilgrims, the maintenance of order and reli­
gious values in Mecca and Medina, and acknowledgment of Otto­
m a n overlordship. Amirs of Mecca, whose post was dependent 
upon their family's claimed links to the Prophet M u h a m m a d  , 
wanted autonomy, money, and protection from exterior threats. 
Since the amirs were in office longer and enjoyed some local sup­
port, they were usually successful in reaching their goals despite 
occasional attempts by strong valis to assert Ottoman power. 
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Townspeople and nomads both wanted no taxes, freedom from 
conscription, and subsidies from abroad. All these they received, 
though sometimes benefits were delayed or embezzled. The holy 
law and the pilgrimage were maintained, and thus the prerequi­
sites for a moral life and prosperity were preserved by the Otto­
man s and the amirs. 
In the late eighteenth century, several challenges to the sys­
tem of politics in the Ottoman Hijaz were overcome. Struggles 
a m o n g the sharifs for the succession to the amirate were abruptly 
replaced as the focus of political life by the taking of Mecca and 
Medina by the Wahhabis, and the invasion and occupation of the 
Hijaz by M e h m e t Ali. Each of these external threats was defeated, 
though this was done by groups exterior to the Hijaz. Temporarily 
imposed changes, whether in the form of religious reforming zeal 
or secularizing Europeanizing administration, left few traces in the 
Hijaz after 1840. 
The failure of the Wahhabis and the M e h m e t Ali regime to 
create any lasting n e w institutions was partially caused by their 
concentration on other parts of their states, the correct perception 
by the Hijazis that constant military adventures discouraged poten­
tial pilgrims, and the great expense of ruling thoroughly all the 
Hijaz. In addition, there were s o m e underlying factors, central to 
the later failure of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms in the Hi­
jaz, such as the social diversity of the towns, a general opposition 
to innovation and the favoring of tradition, the religious conserva­
tism of the Sunni ulema, and the popular respect for the amirs. 
Financial subsidies from Istanbul benefited all sectors of the econ­
o m  y and the society, and Ottoman rule was less burdensome for 
most Hijazis than either Wahhabi or Egyptian control. The Otto­
m a n restoration in the 1840s saw a return to power for the amirs 
and a general return to the pattern of life that had existed before 
the 1790s. 
In the 1850s O t t o m a n reformism c o m b i n e d with what 
seemed to the Jiddawis and Meccans to be a threat to their reli­
gious and economic interests to create the unsuccessful rebellion 
of the Amir A b d al-Muttalib in 1855 and the Jidda massacre of 1858. 
A b d al-Muttalib's supporters in both years worked upon underly­
ing fear and dislike of Christian Europeans and their Muslim mer­
chant proteges. Especially after British rule was firmly established 
in India, Arab Muslims resented the Christian-ruled nations of Eu­
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rope that gave their subjects resident in the Hijaz advantages in 
tariffs and access to consuls w h  o protected them from the local 
government in Jidda. International security and peace permitted 
large-scale credit arrangements beneficial to Indian Muslims. 
Christian Europeans often tended arrogantly to regard themselves 
as superior to the supposedly backward and fanatical natives. Eu­
ropeans exalted nationalism as a basis for political organization 
rather than religious identity. In 1858 the European powers crush­
ingly demonstrated their military superiority, forcing the Ottomans 
to execute the instigators of the Jidda massacre. M a n y Hijazis saw 
1858 as a definite victory for Christian Europe over Islam. 
There ensued a relative period of tranquillity between I860 
and 1880. Amir A b d Allah ibn M u h a m m a d even kept the nomads 
relatively quiet. H  e and the Ottomans expanded their control in 
Asir, Najd, and the northern Hijaz. From 1857 to 1881, there were 
fifteen valis, with an average of only 1.7 years per governor. The 
amirs of the time were more powerful than the valis. 
The general military, diplomatic, financial, and political crisis 
of the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s did not destroy the fabric of 
Ottoman power in the Hijaz. Vali O s m a n Nuri was able to arrest 
Amir A b  d al-Muttalib in the 1880s even though the end product of 
his tenure as vali was the emergence of the most powerful amir of 
the time. A w  n al-Rafiq operated in the 1880s, 1890s, and the first 
decade of the 1900s within the Ottoman system and with the sup­
port of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The murder of Ahmet Midhat Pasha 
in Taif in 1884 and the dismissal of O s m a n Nuri in 1886 d e m o n ­
strated that the empire would not extend secularization, technical 
change, and political centralization to the Hijaz. 
The nomads remained on the edge of the Ottoman system. 
Political linkages to Istanbul patrons preserved the amirsfrom dep­
osition, but what was needed to subdue the tribes was Ottoman 
military power and cash. Ottoman military detachments were sta­
tioned in the towns but were largely ineffective against nomads in 
the desert. Delays in paying soldiers and in releasing conscripts 
plus the small size of the Ottoman garrisons allowed the nomads 
to be semiautonomous. T o maintain a tenuous peace with the 
tribes, large subsidies were spent by the Ottomans on the military, 
grain, gifts to the nomads, as well as salaries to prominent religious 
and political leaders. 
Security on the caravan routes was chancy at best in the 1890s 
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and 1900s up until the short administration of Amir Ali ibn A b d 
Allah. However, alleged British expansionism in western Arabia, 
the Mahdist rule in the Sudan, and the rebellions in Y e m e  n posed 
no real threats to Ottoman rule of the Hijaz or to the perceived 
legitimacy of the religious/political synthesis that dominated the 
Hijaz. 
The physical environment of the area dictated certain contin­
uing facts that affected politics as well as society and the economy 
in the Ottoman era. A harsh, hot, and forbidding climate and 
mountainous topography created persistent problems for transpor­
tation and communications. In other areas of the Middle East, the 
agricultural cycle dominated concepts of time, but in the Hijaz the 
Muslim lunar year was the key to the organization of time. Thanks 
to the diverse situations of the towns, a rich variety of styles, cus­
toms, and economic life existed. The desert's extremely hostile en­
vironment separated the n o m a d s from town norms and patterns. 
Only the amirate, as an institution accepted by both Ottomans and 
nomads , could mediate between the needs of the towns and those 
of the nomads . 
Religion was everywhere, in the desert and in the towns alike. 
Physically, emotionally, and intellectually, life rotated around the 
pilgrimage, the Harams, the ritual of prayer, and the inward beliefs 
associated with external signs of faith. The structures of religious 
institutions sometimes masked, but could not conceal, the occa­
sional exploitation of religion for purposes of practical gain and 
the manipulation of religious values for political advantage. Reli­
gious institutions were associated with the holy law and the ulema 
as well as with the mystical rituals and yearnings of the Sufis. The 
officers of the holy law, the Sufis, the occasional repression of re­
ligious innovation, and the officeholders in the harams and m o s ­
ques acted in such a wa  y as to routinize, preserve, and inculcate 
religious values and beliefs. Since the Ottoman central govern­
ment and the amirs appointed most of the key officials and pro­
vided m u c h of the m o n e y needed for operations, most religious 
institutions were subservient to state purposes. The Sufis remained 
outside the political arena in the Hijaz, although they played an 
active part in the politics of other parts of the Middle East at the 
time. 
It was the pilgrimage that most directly linked political, reli­
gious, and economic elites. Secular factors outside Ottoman con­
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trol such as health and improvements in technology were crucial 
to the level of attendance at the pilgrimage ceremonies. But Otto­
m a n and amirate measures designed to improve security on the 
caravan paths and to decrease disease in the towns sometimes had 
a favorable impact upon attendance. The worst example of Otto­
m a n adminstration in the Hijaz was the exceptionally incompetent 
and inadequate measures taken to reduce the great cholera epi­
demics of the early 1890s. However, those few steps taken by the 
Ottomans that were intended to improve health, such as quaran­
tines and disinfecting machines, were precisely the most hated as­
pects of Ottoman rule, as incidents such as the 1895 riots in Jidda 
and Mecca showed. 
The widely disparate groups of people in the Hijaz naturally 
had varying expectations and needs in regard to education and 
law. Although religious knowledge and religious texts remained 
the prime sources for both learning and law, the Ottomans at­
tempted some secularizing changes, which most Hijazis and resi­
dent foreigners opposed. Unlike the eighteenth century w h e  n 
Mecca and Medina were a m o n g the leading centers of thought, es­
pecially for Sufis, in the nineteenth century after 1840 there were 
fewer original authors and thinkers. Standard theology and poetry 
continued to appear, as did local handmade products, sometimes 
including objects of considerable beauty; but innovations such as 
n e w genres of literature were not produced. 
Life in the cities was relatively safe from crime, which was con­
sidered a great blessing; but this was not the case in the country­
side, where robbery of merchants and pilgrims by the nomads was 
frequent. 
Local merchants had more to worry about than just safety from 
robbery. The introduction of steamships, the opening of the Suez 
Canal, and the growing role of British-controlled India and Egypt 
in local commerce gravely affected the economic interests of Hijazi 
merchants. Although foreign Christian merchants were restricted 
to the coast, foreign Muslims could and did transact business in 
Mecca and Medina. The exclusion of Christians from the interior 
was not sufficient to save the local commercial elite from active 
competition and, in m a n y cases, losses to outsiders. The separation 
of merchants from the political elite was lessened by the interre­
lationships established by some merchants w h  o acted as bankers 
to the amirs and valis and by the shipping ring, which limited com­
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petition to the benefit both of political leaders and shipping 
agents. 
Group life a m o n g the Sunni Muslims was organized along 
neighborhood and guild identities, the largest of which was com­
posed of pilgrim guides. Religion played a part in determining sta­
tus: pious persons and descendants of the Prophet were respected, 
but since nearly everyone was a Sunni Muslim, other factors were 
frequently more important. Wealth, gender, ethnicity, servile con­
dition, linguistic skills, and knowledge of Arabic were used more 
often to determine status than was religion. 
Although the slave trade was greatly decreased by the end of 
the nineteenth century as a result of British and Ottoman actions, 
slavery itself was still regarded by most Hijazis as religiously sanc­
tioned and morally proper. Resistance to changes aimed at de­
creasing or outlawing the slave trade and slavery was widespread. 
The riots and risings of 1855 in Mecca were, to a degree, caused by 
popular resentment of the foreign-induced Ottoman prohibition 
of the slave trade. 
W h e  n the Ottomans themselves changed the basis of the state 
so as to appease nationalists and increase technicalization and cen­
tralization, the consequences were significant for the Hijaz. The 
local political elite and the general population opposed the Hijaz 
Railroad, feared and despised the secularizers and nationalists of 
the Committee of Union and Progress w h  o usually dominated Ot­
toman government between 1909 and 1918, and despaired of Ot­
toman efficacy after the disasters of the war with Italy in 1911-12 
and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13- In 1916 the Hijaz, under the lead­
ership of Amir Husayn, ironically became the leader in what 
seemed to be a nationalistic upsurge against the Ottoman-Turkish 
domination of the Arab peoples. However, Husayn himself was 
scarcely a nationalist. Within a decade after the revolt began, the 
amir was replaced by the Saudi state, which was headed by a dy­
nasty based upon religious legitimacy and opposed to pan-Arab 
nationalism. Saudi control of the Hijaz, particularly in the era of oil 
wealth after World W a r II, has in m a n y ways replicated the political 
pattern of the late Ottoman Hijaz. Religion has continued to deter­
mine political identity and social structures; the only major change 
is the n e w independent role of the economy. 
M u h a m m a d ibn Abd al-Muin
Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib
M u h a m m a d ibn Abd al-Muin
Abd Allah ibn M u h a m m a d
Husayn ibn M u h a m m a d
Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib
A w n al-Rafiq ibn M u h a m m a d
Ali ibn Abd Allah
Husayn ibn Ali
APPENDIX

AMIRS OF MECCA, 1840-1908

 1827-51

 1851-55

 1855-58

 1858-77

 1877-80

 1880-82

 1882-1905

 1905-08

 1908-16

Amir 
Caliph 
Defterdar 
Ferman 
Imam 
Jihad 
Kaimmakam 
Madrasa 
Mufti 
Muhtasib 
Qadi 
Rushdiye 
Sharif 
Sheikh 
Sheyhulislam 
Sufi 
Sultan 
Tanzimat 
Ulema 
Vali 
Waqf 
Zawiyah 
GLOSSARY 
Prince; leader; commander 
Successor to the Prophet M u h a m m a d 
Treasurer 
Imperial order 
Prayer leader 
Struggle for Islam, especially in a holy war 
Ottoman provincial deputy governor and governor of Jidda 
Higher religious school 
Jurisconsult 
Market inspector 
Judge 
Secular Ottoman government school 
Descendant of the Prophet M u h a m m a  d 
Bedouin leader; head of a town neighborhood; general title 
of respect 
Chief mufti of Istanbul and leader of the Ottoman religious 
establishment 
Islamic mystic 
Ottoman ruler 
Reforms in central Ottoman government, especially in the pe 
riod 1839-76 
M e  n of religion 
Ottoman provincial governor 
Charitable foundation 
Sufi chapel house 
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